11555 514MSAT1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 -------------------------------------x 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 3 3 v. S1 02 Cr. 395 (JGK) 4 4 AHMED ABDEL SATTAR, a/k/a "Abu Omar," 5 a/k/a "Dr. Ahmed," LYNNE STEWART, 5 and MOHAMMED YOUSRY, 6 6 Defendants. 7 -------------------------------------x 7 8 January 4, 2005 8 9:40 a.m. 9 9 10 10 Before: 11 HON. JOHN G. KOELTL 11 12 District Judge 12 13 13 APPEARANCES 14 14 DAVID N. KELLEY 15 United States Attorney for the 15 Southern District of New York 16 ROBIN BAKER 16 CHRISTOPHER MORVILLO 17 ANTHONY BARKOW 17 ANDREW DEMBER 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 18 19 KENNETH A. PAUL 19 BARRY M. FALLICK 20 Attorneys for Defendant Sattar 20 21 MICHAEL TIGAR 21 JILL R. SHELLOW-LAVINE 22 Attorneys for Defendant Stewart 22 23 DAVID STERN 23 DAVID A. RUHNKE 24 Attorneys for Defendant Yousry 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11556 514MSAT1 1 2 (Trial resumed) 3 (At the side bar) 4 THE COURT: I could have done this from the bench. 5 Mr. Fletcher tells me it is going to be another 15 minutes or 6 20 minutes while the jurors finish filling out their menus. I 7 just wanted to come out and let you know that so you weren't in 8 anticipation of imminently beginning. 9 MR. TIGAR: Thank you very much, your Honor. 10 (Recess) 11 (At the side bar) 12 THE COURT: Mr. Fletcher advises me that there is 13 rumbling and frustration about the food. And there are some 14 jurors who prefer one restaurant, other jurors who prefer 15 another. Going to two restaurants on any day presents 16 logistical problems. Jurors may get their foods at different 17 times. I've asked Mr. Fletcher -- the jurors are filling out 18 the menus from one restaurant today. I've asked Mr. Fletcher 19 if in order to keep the jurors satisfied, if we could order 20 from two restaurants so that the jurors would get -- each of 21 the jurors would get the food that they most prefer. 22 Mr. Fletcher will have to tell the jurors that we will keep the 23 food until all the food has arrived and that may result in some 24 jurors not getting as hot meals, but I don't want to see food 25 coming in at separate times. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11557 514MSAT1 1 This will occur during jury deliberations also if they 2 order from two restaurants. They all should be getting the 3 food at the same time. It is not as much of a problem during 4 summations. The food can be kept until both restaurants have 5 delivered, but Mr. Fletcher should advise the jurors that if 6 they are ordering from two restaurants, some jurors are not 7 going to be getting the food -- we will hold the food until it 8 all comes. I bring that to your attention. 9 MR. TIGAR: Thank you, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: We are also going to try, as I've 11 indicated to you before, to have a buffet of some sort catered 12 for them, but that takes some time to arrange. 13 MR. TIGAR: We appreciate what Mr. Fletcher is doing. 14 It is a very difficult situation. The parties I'm sure do not 15 want to know how the jurors stand divided on the question of 16 which restaurant they prefer. 17 THE COURT: I just wanted to always keep you advised 18 of all juror issues. I hope that they will have finished the 19 menus soon. I know that you're anxious to begin, you're 20 anxious to continue. 21 MR. STERN: I will be here whenever they are ready. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 (Recess) 24 MR. STERN: Judge, if you could give us one second. 25 We are just waiting Elda to come back. She runs the stuff. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11558 514MSAT1 1 Judge, thank you. She is back. 2 THE COURT: All right. Call in the jury. 3 (Jury present) 4 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is 5 good to see you all. 6 Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to continue with 7 the summations. I've already given you instructions with 8 respect to summations and you continue to apply them to all of 9 the summations. 10 Mr. Stern, you may proceed. 11 MR. STERN: Thank you. 12 We began yesterday with the opinion of Sheikh Rahman 13 about whether or not Mohammed Yousry was part of the inner 14 circle. Put on your headphones again and hear what he has to 15 say about that. It is very, very brief. 16 (Recording played) 17 MR. STERN: That's it. Now, if that's all there was 18 in the case you would say, yeah, that's cute, it is one small 19 moment, but we know how deeply emersed he really is in the 20 business of conspiracy. But everything in this case shows you 21 that that's just not true. We have gone through letters. We 22 have gone through messages being brought into the prison. 23 Everything you hear and more that you will hear today backs up 24 the Sheikh's opinion of whether or not Mohammed Yousry is part 25 of a conspiracy if there even is one, if they are part of the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11559 514MSAT1 1 inner circle, is entitled to hear what the Sheikh at least 2 wants to happen. 3 Now, a lot has been made in this case of press 4 releases. The government has said, well, we know that 5 Ms. Stewart issued a press release and we know that Mohammed 6 Yousry was in the prison with her when the Sheikh dictated that 7 press release. And he should have known, something should have 8 gone off in his head, wait a minute, this is a bad thing. This 9 is the time when he should say no. That's the government's 10 position. But you have to look back at the history of the case 11 and what you know about it to see if that's borne out, to see 12 if you were in Mohammed Yousry's shoes, you would have said at 13 that moment, this is so out of the ordinary, this is so unusual 14 that even though I'm just the interpreter, I better stand up to 15 these lawyers, stand up to Lynne Stewart, who you know is not 16 easy to stand up to, and say, no, I will not participate in 17 this. 18 Let's talk about the history of these lawyers in 19 bringing out statements from the Sheikh or about the Sheikh in 20 prison. You know that in 1997, Ramsey Clark issued a statement 21 in favor of a ceasefire. That's MY-516-T. And in that article 22 Ramsey says: These are the words of the Sheikh. When you read 23 the article, you will see that the person who writes it, a 24 person named Kashoggi says verbatim, this is what the Sheikh 25 said. And the government says to you, well, it is true that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11560 514MSAT1 1 that was done, but it is not really a problem because we 2 altered the SAMs later on. We changed it to make it clear that 3 you couldn't do that. 4 Those SAMs, of course, were never given to Mohammed 5 Yousry. And you know that this kind of thing with Ramsey, 6 Mr. Clark, went on over and over and over again. If you look 7 at what is 518 and 507 in evidence, an article in which Ramsey 8 Clark goes to Egypt and the photo along with it is Ramsey Clark 9 sitting at a table with Muntasir al-Zayyat, who was the 10 Sheikh's lawyer in Egypt, with the Sheikh's son, Abdullah, and 11 giving a press conference about the Sheikh. And you know that 12 this was a common practice because if you look at MY-10001-CT, 13 184 through 186, that's Mohammed Yousry's notebook. 14 You will see that Ramsey Clark went with him to prison 15 and gave to the Sheikh questions an Italian newspaper wanted 16 answered. The paper was called Corriere de la Sierra. He 17 talks about the size of the paper and they are asking all 18 political questions. Take a good look at it. They are asking 19 questions about the Sheikh's opinion on this and the Sheikh's 20 opinion on that. And Mohammed Yousry is there translating. 21 And the message he is getting is, this kind of thing must be 22 okay. No one ever said, Ramsey you're in trouble, don't do 23 that anymore. 24 And so Yousry was never told you're in trouble, don't 25 do that anymore. Abdeen Jabara, he is not here. He didn't SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11561 514MSAT1 1 testify. But the government tells you, he is the one who 2 follows the rules. When Yousry is with him he is constantly 3 talking about going to the press. July 25 of 2000, well after 4 the SAMs talk about not doing these kinds of things, he says: 5 I am going to speak with the Arab press and Newsday. And this 6 can be found at MY-1206-X3. It is from July 25 of 2000. And 7 if I can find it, I will tell you what he says. This is what 8 he says. Mr. Jabara: We are going to make a big stink about 9 this, Sheikh. I'm -- I'm going to tell him right now, but we 10 are going to do something about this. It is outrageous. He is 11 talking about the Sheikh's prison conditions, that other people 12 on high-profile cases have more rights than the Sheikh does. 13 Mohammed Yousry is saying Mr. Abdeen is telling you that he 14 will try to submit this. And Mr. Jabara is saying it is 15 outrageous. We need to get a journalist, however, who can 16 expose this whole thing, right. Then there is glitches so you 17 can't hear what Mr. Yousry says. Jabara says who is it. 18 Mohammed Bazzi. Static again. Jabara says: I'll call him, 19 I'll call him. Yousry asks: You have his card? Jabara: Oh, 20 yeah, I have it. Yousry: Mr. Abdeen is asking -- saying that 21 he wants to bring a journalist this week. I told him Mohammed 22 Bazzi of New York Newsday. Jabara says: All right. The only 23 way that the government is going to change this is that we 24 get -- do it in the Arabic press. The government says: When 25 you do it in the Arabic press, you really mean business because SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11562 514MSAT1 1 you're going to where your people are. And I suppose that's 2 true because here no one cares that much about the Sheikh. But 3 that's just what Abdeen Jabara is doing. I am going to do it 4 in the Arabic press. That's the way to give something to the 5 press. And Yousry says: Mr. Abdeen will hold a press 6 conference. And the Sheikh speaks up for the first time and 7 says wow. Yousry says: Here we go. And he laughs. And 8 Rahman says: Praise be to God. 9 Of course, that's not the only time that Abdeen Jabara 10 does something like that. If you look at MY-1231-X1 from June 11 11 of '01, it happens again. Jabara says: Yes. Tell the 12 Sheikh that I did an interview with this Hasan Abdullah, 13 Abdullah Hasan, rather. From Cairo Times, paper about the 14 Sheikh. Mr. Yousry: Mr. Abdeen is telling you, sir, that he 15 did an interview with Hasam Abdullah. I mean Jabara Abdullah. 16 OAR says: Hum. Yousry says: Abdullah Hasan, who is a 17 reporter for the Cairo Times. And Jabara says: And he 18 apparently reporter or something, perfect English. He worked. 19 Because he worked for, I don't know how long, a couple of 20 years. Journalist for Cairo Times. Cairo Times could be found 21 online if you want to look at it. Yousry says: Mr. Abdeen is 22 telling you, sir, static, for a couple of years, 23 unintelligible. And before he left Egypt he agreed to become a 24 freelancer for the Cairo Times as a journalist who writes for 25 them by piece. And the Cairo Times could be accessed on the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11563 514MSAT1 1 internet. Where is it published? Cairo Times. Yousry: On 2 the internet. OAB: On the computer. Jabara, well, no. It is 3 clear Jabara understands because he answered. No. It is 4 printed. But they also put it -- Yousry says: Mr. Abdeen is 5 telling you, sir, that the paper is printed and is posted on 6 the internet as well. Where is it published? Yousry says: Is 7 it published in Egypt? Jabara says: Yeah, in English. And 8 Yousry says: Yes, it is published in English in Egypt. 9 Of course, you know that Lynne Stewart speaks with the 10 papers. She speaks with them about the ceasefire and she has 11 told you about that. But even then, as far as Mohammed Yousry 12 knows, she is not making a decision just on her own. She has 13 spoken with the other lawyers. And Mr. Dember ridiculed that. 14 He said: Well, there is no evidence other than her word that 15 she spoke with the other lawyers. And Ramsey Clark, the 16 elderly gentleman, didn't even seem to remember it. So how 17 could it be true? But remember I remind you over and over 18 again that Mr. Dember told you, when people talk on the phone, 19 they tell the truth. That's when they are candid and open and 20 saying the truth. 21 Let's take a look at 1712X, MY-1712-X. And see what's 22 said in that conversation. It is Mohammed Yousry talking to 23 Mr. Sattar. And I'm not telling you whether -- 24 THE COURT: Hold on. There is an interruption in 25 getting something up on the screen. Is it there. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11564 514MSAT1 1 MR. RUHNKE: Seems to be okay now, your Honor. 2 MR. STERN: I'm not telling you whether Mr. Sattar is 3 honest or dishonest. That's up to their lawyers. What I am 4 telling you is the government tells you again and again and 5 again, we are showing you all these things for people's 6 knowledge, intent, and state of mind. So here is what Mohammed 7 Yousry is told on June 11, couple of days before Lynne Stewart 8 goes to the press. This is the conversation. Yousry says: So 9 people can just come out of nowhere and claim that they 10 received a letter and all that. Lynne continued to -- she 11 said -- she spoke with Ramsey and Abdeen and told them that the 12 Sheikh said this and that. And she was wondering whether or 13 not to release it to the press. Sattar says: Hum. She 14 thought about it for a long time. Finally, Ramsey and Abdeen 15 told her, if you feel like saying it, say it. 16 So Mohammed Yousry, when this statement was issued, 17 was under the impression that not just Lynne Stewart, who 18 herself is a formidable lawyer said it was okay, but the group 19 of lawyers, the lawyers who work with the Sheikh said it was 20 okay. 21 Now, the government is going to say, well, these other 22 lawyers, Abdeen Jabara, Ramsey Clark, when they issued 23 statements after affirmations and the SAMs were changed, their 24 statements were about jail conditions and that wasn't 25 forbidden, or about the Sheikh's condition, and that wasn't SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11565 514MSAT1 1 forbidden. But they weren't statements that the Sheikh said, 2 and there is a distinction. There is no question about it. 3 But is it a distinction that Mohammed Yousry, a nonlawyer, an 4 interpreter, is obliged to make? Is he the one who is supposed 5 to say, wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute, you're 6 asking the Sheikh how he feels, but are you going to tell the 7 press the Sheikh says this is how he feels, or are you going to 8 say, he is not well? You're asking the Sheikh if he is allowed 9 to go to prayers. 10 But are you going to say to the press, the Sheikh says 11 he is not allowed to go to prayers, or are you just going to 12 say, he is not allowed to go to prayers? If it is the first 13 thing, I told you, no, I can't do it. If it is the second, let 14 me review the law as applies to SAMs and affirmations. I'll 15 get back to you tomorrow to see if I can answer your question 16 or not. I'll get back to you tomorrow to see if I will 17 translate or not. It can't possibly happen that way. He is 18 not a decision maker. He is not a line drawer. He is an 19 interpreter. People say words to him and he relates them and 20 then the lawyers make decisions, what's appropriate or 21 inappropriate, not him. 22 Ask the government when they get back up or when 23 you're in the jury room to show you a single time, one time 24 over all these years when Mohammed Yousry, without the lawyers' 25 permission, communicated a message to the press or to anyone SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11566 514MSAT1 1 who wasn't part of the defense team, one time he did that. One 2 time Mohammed Yousry called a reporter and said: Hey, let me 3 tell you something. One time Mohammed Yousry called someone in 4 Egypt and said: Let me tell you how the Sheikh is doing. One 5 time Mohammed Yousry has in any way made the decision that 6 something should be released or not released, said or not said. 7 Never. They can't because he always did his job in good faith. 8 You've heard a lot from the government about terrible 9 incidents and terrible people. And there is no dispute between 10 us and the government about the people or the incidents. Taha 11 seems like a murderous lunatic. Atia is a member of the 12 Islamic Group who apparently wants to kill people if he can. 13 The bombing of the Cole was an abomination. The people in Abu 14 Sayyaf who kidnap people, terrible, disgraceful, disgusting. 15 But do they really add to what you need to know to 16 decide whether Mohammed Yousry is guilty or not? Does the tape 17 of Osama Bin Laden, a boogie man for this millennium, help you 18 decide if Mohammed Yousry is guilty or not guilty? None of 19 them are on trial, none of those incidents are crimes with 20 which Mr. Yousry is charged. They are dangerous people who 21 commit evil acts, but you don't have to make decisions about 22 that. 23 So let's see what they add, if anything, to your 24 decision about Mohammed Yousry, and let's start with the U.S.S. 25 Cole. You all know what it is, a bombing of a ship in Aden SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11567 514MSAT1 1 harbor. The government heads this portion of the indictment: 2 The conspiracy to threaten acts similar to the bombing of the 3 U.S.S. Cole unless Abdel Rahman is freed. Let me read that 4 again. It is the conspiracy to threaten acts similar to the 5 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole unless Abdel Rahman is freed. They 6 don't limit that, of course. Maybe they mean that Mr. Sattar 7 is in such a conspiracy. But you know that Mohammed Yousry is 8 not in any conspiracy to do anything about the Cole. 9 But what really happens is that Mr. Sattar gets this 10 call in which someone tells him, I guess Taha, hey, the Cole 11 was bombed. Maybe somehow we can use this to help out the 12 doctor. And Mohammed Yousry tells you that Sattar shows up at 13 a party all shaken up and all nervous and tells him, someone 14 told me that the Cole was in part done for the Sheikh. Now, 15 does anyone dash off a letter to the Sheikh telling him that? 16 Does anyone run to the government and say, you better free him, 17 or more ships will be bombed? No. 18 What really happens is that nine months later, in the 19 very end of a conversation, as an afterthought they talk about 20 it with the Sheikh. Of course, this is Lynne Stewart's client. 21 And this is something directly related to her client. And so 22 do they say to him, how can we best use this? No. They say to 23 him, this is ridiculous. Sattar shouldn't be involved in this 24 at all. I think Lynne says it is adventuristic of him. They 25 are saying: Maybe he is being set up, let's forget about it, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11568 514MSAT1 1 nothing should be done. When you hear this threatening title, 2 the conspiracy to threaten acts similar to the bombing of the 3 U.S.S. Cole unless Abdel Rahman is freed, ask yourselves why it 4 is given that title when what really happens is nothing. 5 The next thing is Abu Sayyaf. And Abu Sayyaf is even 6 more interesting because when they discuss Abu Sayyaf, Yousry 7 is in there doing his job, he is translating. And he brings it 8 up to the Sheikh. But he doesn't have to tell the Sheikh 9 anything about it. You know why? Because the Sheikh has 10 already been told about it. And you will see if you look at 11 Exhibit 1706X, MY-1706-X, lines 10 through 14. This is how the 12 conversation goes. It is very brief. Yousry, talking to the 13 Sheikh: Do you know also know, sir, that Abu Sayyaf of the 14 Philippines is requesting your release? Abdel Rahman: Abu 15 Sayyaf. Yousry is a little surprised: How did you know? 16 Abdel Rahman: Abdeen read it to me. 17 So what does that tell you or in what way does that 18 help you decide whether or not Mohammed Yousry is guilty? 19 Threatening, yes. It was a terrible thing. But Mohammed 20 Yousry doesn't say it is good. He doesn't say it is bad. He 21 doesn't comment on it. He just reads the news. 22 There was a letter which Sattar writes to the Sheikh 23 in which he says: I'm in semiconstant contact with IG leaders. 24 And you know what happens with that. Mohammed Yousry tells 25 Lynne Stewart the contents of that letter. He says there are SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11569 514MSAT1 1 things in here from IG leaders. Lynne says: Okay. Read it. 2 And he does. That's his job, after all. Is this another place 3 where the government says you must say no? You know, lawyers 4 do all kinds of things and lawyers at the highest level do even 5 more of all kinds of things. They negotiate to get people 6 transferred from one country to another. Ramsey Clark told 7 you: They get a treaty done sometimes in a week. 8 Mohammed Yousry is not supposed to say: What do you 9 intend to do with this? What is the legal function of this? 10 Tell me now before I translate. If he does that, every visit 11 will have to take a year. He says this is what it says, should 12 I read it? Yes. I read it. Here is what the Sheikh says. 13 And what's most interesting about that is that at a 14 time when he is not under indictment and he is not charged with 15 a crime, you know he meets with the FBI. And he tells them 16 that that visit -- I think it is May 19 -- was the first time I 17 ever knew that Sattar was in contact with leaders of the 18 Islamic Group. He didn't have to talk to the FBI at all. He 19 is an American citizen. He can say, get away from here. I'm 20 not going to talk to you. He does, of course, talk to them for 21 quite a while, for a period of months and months. He doesn't 22 hide this from them. If he thinks it is a bad thing, if he 23 hadn't said it, the government would say, well, it is 24 consciousness of his guilt. But he tells them, yeah, I had 25 this -- read this letter. That's when I knew it. That's the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11570 514MSAT1 1 first time. 2 So what does that really add to your decision? One of 3 the most interesting things, the allegations they make, what 4 they call the attempted delivery of a message to Abdel Rahman. 5 And it is interesting because the government still seems to say 6 that that is somehow a measure of Mohammed Yousry's guilt. And 7 I suppose the reason we have trials and in the end juries to 8 decide things is because we see things differently. 9 What happens on that visit? It is a visit that you 10 heard. It is a February 19, 2000 visit. It is Government 11 Exhibit 1701. And during the visit Abdeen, who is at best 12 lackadaisical, you remember the government complaining about 13 Ms. Stewart, what legal things does she really do. Abdeen 14 sleeps, among other things. Hardly the work of a lawyer. They 15 are there in part just to keep the Sheikh sane, I guess. But 16 they are just killing time while Abdeen is there. 17 At one point Abdeen gets up and he leaves the room and 18 you will recall when we played for you a long conversation in 19 Arabic that was timed. It was eight minutes. And those eight 20 minutes begin with the Sheikh saying to Mohammed Yousry, I 21 can't dictate a letter to IG in front of Abdeen, or I won't 22 dictate a letter to IG in front of Abdeen. And Yousry says 23 okay. And then he begins to read the news, the same boring 24 news he reads day after day after day. He has eight minutes. 25 Keep that in mind. He writes very well, smart person. He SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11571 514MSAT1 1 doesn't say: Sheikh, the dude is out of the room, come on, 2 tell me now. We will write it now. I'll bring it to somebody, 3 we will get it to IG, don't worry, pal. We are in this 4 together. He says: Okay. And he reads him the paper. What 5 should he have done then? What's the government's suggestion? 6 Guard, come in here immediately. He wants to write IG. No. 7 He does what he should do. Because later, Abdeen comes back in 8 the room and the Sheikh leaves to go to the bathroom. 9 Now, does he hide it from Abdeen, that the Sheikh 10 wants to write the Islamic Group? Does he try and figure out a 11 way to wait until another lawyer is there so that Abdeen can't 12 interfere with it? No. Here is what he does. And this is in 13 GX-1701. He says, whispering, Mr. Abdeen, when you went to ask 14 them about the coffee. And Jabara says what. He says: When 15 you went upstairs, when you -- you stood up to ask for coffee 16 and he told me he wants to dictate a letter to al-Gama'a 17 al-Islamiya. Jabara says no. Yousry says: I tell you what he 18 said and what he said, but he is not going to do it now because 19 of you. He said: I am not going to do it because of Abdeen. 20 I am going to do it when Lynne comes or when Ramsey comes. 21 Jabara says okay. Jabara doesn't say: By the way, don't ever 22 do that. Don't let anyone else do that. It will violate the 23 SAMs, which is the burden, of course, that the government puts 24 on Mohammed Yousry to do. Jabara says okay, you want to do it 25 with another lawyer, fine with me. Yousry says: Then they can SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11572 514MSAT1 1 take it out. I just thought to let you know, because Ahmed is 2 expecting this letter. Jabara says okay. Yousry says: 3 Because in Ahmed's letter to the Sheikh. Yousry says: And he 4 is telling him, you know, this is the summary. Usually the 5 Sheikh answers him back. That's why I told him. Tell me. 6 Ahmed is going to get upset. Jabara said hum or says something 7 unintelligible. Yousry says: So he told me. I will take it 8 to Ramsey and I give it to Ramsey and then maybe Ramsey will 9 give it to Ahmed. Jabara says no. Yousry says: The Sheikh 10 wants to wait. Jabara says: That -- that's fine. He doesn't 11 say don't wait, don't ever fight it. Yousry says: No. I'm 12 just letting you know what happened. 13 Sounds to me like he is just doing his job. He could, 14 of course, have gotten it out in many ways. He didn't. He 15 told Abdeen. Abdeen can now go to say to the other lawyers, 16 don't take this message out. It is a bad idea. Don't do it. 17 Would Yousry take that risk if he was really part of some 18 conspiracy? 19 There is one final allegation that I'd like to talk 20 briefly about and that's in the section of the introduction to 21 the indictment which describes the defendant. And they give 22 you only two facts about Mohammed Yousry. They says he is an 23 Arabic interpreter for the Sheikh's attorneys, and they say -- 24 this is a quote -- he testified as a defense witness at Abdel 25 Rahman's 1995 criminal trial. Now, you know that everything in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11573 514MSAT1 1 an indictment is there for a reason. And when you read that it 2 has a pretty bad sound to it. Sounds like he must be pretty 3 close to the Sheikh if he is prepared to testify for him at 4 trial. 5 But as the trial goes on and it becomes clearer and 6 clearer that that's not really what happened, finally on 7 November 15, 2004, the government enters into a stipulation. 8 It is MY stip 1. And this is what it says: At the trial of 9 Sheikh Abdel Rahman, Mohammed Yousry was called by Lynne 10 Stewart, and several of the other defense attorneys, to testify 11 regarding issues of translation and interpretation of the 12 Arabic language. 13 Mr. Yousry's testimony at Abdel Rahman's trial was 14 entirely in his role as a translator. 15 It is funny that that's not in the indictment because 16 it could -- after all, he said he testified in his role as a 17 translator at the Sheikh's trial. But it doesn't. The truth 18 in this case is that Mohammed Yousry is purposely excluded from 19 a conspiracy, if one exists, and has no idea that anyone is 20 planning to kill or kidnap or anything else. How do you know 21 that? You know that much more from what was never done than 22 what I'm able to show you. You know that he never, ever calls 23 or speaks with anyone in Egypt. 24 Let him show you one call. Keep in mind, Mohammed 25 Yousry is highly intelligent, very knowledgeable, speaks Arabic SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11574 514MSAT1 1 and English fluently. Who better to actually communicate with 2 these members of the Islamic Group than Mohammed Yousry? But 3 never, not one time does he talk to any of these characters, 4 Yunis, Taha, Hamza, Muntasir, not even a member of the Sheikh's 5 family. He doesn't even call to talk to Abdullah, Mohammed, 6 the Sheikh's wives, nobody. If he is a member of some 7 conspiracy, why wouldn't they use him that way? The only 8 mention of him ever, ever in a phone conversation is as a 9 professor working on his dissertation. 10 And let's look at GX1006X. It is from January 26, 11 1999. It is a conversation between Hamza and Sattar. And 12 Hamza says, as they often do, I suppose: Peace be upon you. 13 Sattar says hello. Hamza: Peace be upon you, please go ahead. 14 Sattar: Peace and mercy of God be upon you. I have it in here 15 in front of me. Hamza: Fine. Hold on it to the end. I want 16 to ask you. Sattar: Yes. Concerning our brother, who is 17 preparing for the Ph.D., if you get from him specific 18 information about the subjects and the material which he is 19 looking for, put it in writing in a nice way. That will be 20 fine. Sattar says: God willing. Hamza says: I talked to Abu 21 Yasir. Maybe he can prepare something for the periods 1986 and 22 1992. He may try and tell this man. He doesn't even know 23 Yousry's name. Do you trust him? Is he a good brother? 24 Sattar says. Oh, yes, yes. Yousry, you can bet, if he is the 25 ambitious academic that the government claims he is, would be SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11575 514MSAT1 1 all over these guys if he had the chance to talk to them 2 personally on the phone and get quotes from them personally. 3 He would be a star. Maybe he would be the Harvard worthy 4 academic that the government says he wants to be. But he 5 doesn't because he doesn't even know that this is going on 6 until May 19. And they don't really even know who he is. They 7 just know he is the brother working on his Ph.D. 8 Is there ever a phone call where Sattar tells Yousry 9 that he is talking with members of the Islamic Group? 10 Remember, Mohammed Yousry is supposed to be in cahoots with 11 Ahmed Abdel Sattar. They are supposed to be working together 12 in some kind of conspiracy. They were listening to Sattar's 13 phone for years and years and years. They were listening to 14 Yousry's phone for three or so years, Ms. Stewart's phone for 15 three or so years, two years maybe. Let the government show 16 you one call where Sattar says: Hey, I got in contact with our 17 friend Taha. I got in contact with our friend Hamza. Guess 18 what, Atia is on the run. One call, one time when Mohammed 19 Yousry is clued into what's going on. It never happens and 20 they can't show you where it does. Maybe they will say, but 21 that letter he read on May 19 and that said Taha, and these 22 other letters, he must have known. He read and translated 23 letters as part of his job. 24 But when is he clued into what's really going on? You 25 remember some talk about diabetes and claiming the Sheikh SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11576 514MSAT1 1 wasn't getting his treatment. When is Yousry told about that? 2 If he is a coconspirator in some conspiracy or another, why 3 isn't he clued in or asked his opinion? How can we do this 4 best? 5 How about the fatwah? The government itself says a 6 primary part of this case is the fatwah to kill Jews. How 7 about telling Yousry about it if he is one of your compadres. 8 How about letting him in the on the game now? Not once. They 9 can't show you a time when that happened. Even when Sattar is 10 negotiating on behalf of IG to make peace with the Egyptian 11 government, Yousry is not told about that. 12 What is he really let in on here? Not one important 13 thing. What kind of coconspirator is that? The government has 14 talked a lot about how knowledgeable Mohammed Yousry is about 15 the Islamic Group. And that, of course, is true. He is. And 16 they have said, well, that's why you should find him guilty, 17 because he must have known. But it is another case where they 18 sort of want to have their cake and eat it. What's been going 19 on with the Islamic Group? 20 First, ask yourselves, do they really listen carefully 21 to what the Sheikh says? In 1997, Ramsey Clark takes a message 22 from the Sheikh in which he says, there should be a ceasefire, 23 a unilateral ceasefire. Three months later 58 tourists are 24 killed at Luxor, a direct repudiation of what the Sheikh had 25 just said. And from 1997 on, not one person is killed, not one SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11577 514MSAT1 1 person is hurt attributable to the Islamic Group, and Yousry 2 knows that, too. He knows the Sheikh is an aging sort of crazy 3 person. He heard the Sheikh talk about odors and all kinds of 4 things. He knows people love the Sheikh but don't necessarily 5 listen to him. And he knows that IG has been decimated, hunted 6 down by the Egyptian government, killed whenever they find them 7 and has no real power. When the government says, he should 8 know that this is going to cause deaths and kidnapping, what he 9 knows is they are not very powerful anymore. 10 There is one other thing that makes you question 11 whether or not Mohammed Yousry could really be part of any 12 conspiracy. Because conspirators by their nature have to 13 remain part of what they are doing. That is, they want to be 14 there to help the cause. But Mohammed Yousry did not. The 15 government says, oh, he was faking because he told the Sheikh 16 he should have two visits a week instead of one. But that 17 didn't mean he wanted to be the one at those two visits. And 18 we have at least two examples of him saying explicitly that he 19 no longer wants to be involved. One is from Ramsey Clark. It 20 is page 8844 of the transcript. Goes on to 8845. Ramsey Clark 21 is asked: You were asked a number of questions about 22 Mr. Yousry acting as interpreter during the trial, right, and 23 Mr. Yousry as an interpreter during the appeal, and acting as 24 an interpreter after the appeal was complete. Do you remember 25 those questions. And Mr. Clark says yes. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11578 514MSAT1 1 "Q Now, during the time he was acting as an interpreter, did 2 he always want to continue acting as an interpreter for the 3 Sheikh? 4 "A Well, I think it was a tremendous burden for him. I mean, 5 there were three lawyers who could talk -- four, actually, and 6 only one interpreter. And it was taking an enormous amount of 7 his time and -- but I think I'd have to say he was very 8 faithful about it. I think he hoped we could find other 9 interpreters. And we tried very, very hard, but we couldn't 10 get any approved by the government. 11 "Q And did he tell you of his hopes that you could find other 12 interpreters?" 13 Then there is an objection. 14 "Q Did he tell you of his hopes that you could find other 15 interpreters to help on the case? 16 "A Well, I knew he hoped very much that we could, because 17 that would give him some relief. 18 "Q And why didn't that happen? 19 "A That didn't happen because the government wouldn't approve 20 anyone, still hadn't." 21 We also know from Michael Gasper, who you remember was 22 his colleague when he was a graduate student and is now a 23 professor, they had conversations about the case and this is 24 what he had to say about Mohammed Yousry's eagerness to remain 25 on the case: SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11579 514MSAT1 1 "Q Now, do you know if while he was working on his 2 dissertation Mr. Yousry did any other work to support himself? 3 "A Sure. He was -- you know, he is well known. He was 4 working as a translator. 5 "Q Do you know what cases he worked on? 6 "A Not all of them. I know he worked on the, you know, 7 Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, of course. 8 "Q Did you and he ever have conversations about his work on 9 that case? 10 "A Yeah, sure, on a number of occasions. 11 "Q Did you ever have a conversation about your ability to act 12 as an -- your ability to act as an interpreter on that case? 13 "A Yeah. I mean, we discussed this a number of times. 14 Mohammed, as the years went by -- it was years really -- wanted 15 to get finished with graduate school and became increasingly 16 concerned that the work that he was doing for the -- you know, 17 for the court case was taking up too much of his time. And in 18 fact he mentioned to me on more than one occasion that -- you 19 know he said: Well, you, you know, why don't you think about 20 doing this? You know, taking my place. And I thought you 21 know, I wasn't -- not interested in doing it. But he did 22 mention it to me on a couple of occasions. He just had enough, 23 I think." 24 Hardly the way you would expect a coconspirator to 25 behave. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11580 514MSAT1 1 Something really kind of frightening happens in this 2 case. The government says to you, I'll tell you how we will 3 prove he is guilty. We are going to go through the books of 4 his home to show his true knowledge, intent, and state of mind. 5 We are going to show you all of the things he has about the 6 Islamic Group and Luxor to prove that he is guilty of these 7 crimes. We are not going to talk to Zach Lockman who we know 8 about from his phone calls. We are not going to listen to his 9 radio interview in which he says to the Sheikh, I don't agree 10 with you. We are not going to read the part of his 11 dissertation that says he is exchanging one form of 12 totalitarianism for another. We are going to go to his house 13 and we are going to look at his books and we are going to bring 14 him to you, and we are going to say, this is why you should 15 find him guilty. 16 You know what his house looks like. It is the house 17 of an academic. His office in that house is filled with books. 18 You can look at 2301L, 2301M, 2301N. They are pictures of his 19 house. And you will recall Agent Monaco. You remember who she 20 was. She was the agent who searched his home, told you, 21 although the government didn't, that there were books on Latin 22 America and books on multiculturalism and books on Jesus, all 23 kinds of books in that house. But the books they brought to 24 court to show you were all books on terrorism and the Islamic 25 Group. It is a frightening day when what we think is judged by SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11581 514MSAT1 1 the books we have. 2 If any of you have books by Mark Twain, be careful 3 because Mark Twain was accused of being a racist, the author of 4 Huckleberry Finn and Tom Sawyer. T.S. Eliot, the guy who wrote 5 the story of which the play Cats was based, was accused of 6 being a fascist. If you have his books, it doesn't make you a 7 fascist. Hemingway, the author For Whom the Bell Tolls, was 8 accused of being a communist, but having his books doesn't make 9 you a communist. 10 Even newer books, Dan Brown's the Da Vinci Code, he 11 was accused of being an anticatholic. If you read that book 12 and keep it in your home, it doesn't make you an anticatholic. 13 Even worse, maybe some of you studied in school Karl Marx's 14 Communist Manifesto, and you still have it in your home. Adolf 15 Hitler's Mein Kompf. Maybe you have a copy of the video 16 statements of Osama Bin Laden. Maybe you want to study them 17 critically. Maybe you want to understand what we have to be 18 fearful of and how we can avoid it. 19 Study should never be equated with acceptance, with 20 belief or support. If we are to find by the books or the 21 articles we read, study or possess, we may all be in trouble. 22 But this isn't just my philosophical musings about 23 books and the freedom to read what you want. You have a good, 24 concrete illustration of how dangerous it is in this case. 25 Take a look at GX, Government Exhibit 2415-3, shown to you as SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11582 514MSAT1 1 being found in Mohammed Yousry's home as an interview with an 2 IG leader. Proof of his beliefs. And that is all you're 3 shown. You're not told where it comes from, you're not told 4 what context it is in. You're just told, he has it, that must 5 mean something about him. 6 But then Professor Lockman comes in and we put into 7 evidence MY-506. It is a book, a book called Political Essays 8 from the Middle East report. And it is a mainstream book used 9 in schools everywhere where they study the Middle East. The 10 chapter Yousry has was given to him in a course. So there is 11 nothing scary, there is nothing bad, there is nothing you can 12 infer from his possession of that chapter. But the government 13 asked you to infer something bad from it. 14 We deserve to be judged by what we say and think and 15 do, not by the books we have. So what does Mohammed Yousry 16 think? Do we have to really infer what he thinks from books? 17 No. We know from many sources what he thinks from people who 18 he discussed his thoughts and feelings with long before he had 19 a motive to say these things, long before he was arrested, long 20 before he knew he was being investigated, long before he was 21 indicted or sat here in court. 22 One of the people you heard from was Professor 23 Lockman, and I think you remember who he was, really kind of a 24 brilliant cerebral guy, professor at Harvard, then a professor 25 at NYU, head of a program, given many, many grants, a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11583 514MSAT1 1 thoughtful academic. And he knew Yousry for many years because 2 Yousry has been working on his dissertation for many years. 3 And he told you in the course of his work on his dissertation 4 he and Yousry had conversations about the Sheikh and the 5 political movement in which the Sheikh was involved. And he 6 was asked, well, what were you told? And this is what Mohammed 7 Yousry told him. Mohammed was someone who was an Egyptian, 8 believed that his country should initiate democracy, democratic 9 government, greater human rights, and did not share the kind of 10 approach to the society Egypt should be or vision of the world 11 of Abdel Rahman and his movement. 12 (Continued on next page) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11584 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 MR. STERN: Publicly. Openly, that's how he feels. 2 We also know from a conversation he had with Michael 3 Gaspar. Michael Gaspar, I will remind you again was his 4 friend, his colleague, another academic, and this is how he 5 described Mohammed Yousry's beliefs. It is at transcript page 6 8931. I'm sorry, the last one was page 8860. 7 Michael Gaspar says, he had quite strong disdain 8 actually for, you know, sort of Islamists and Islamic politics. 9 Why would he conspire to help the Sheikh's cause? 10 You heard from Pastor Sawyer, Pastor Sawyer you 11 remember is a preacher, the preacher in Yousry's wife's church, 12 and he told you that Yousry has never interfered. 13 You heard from his daughter and you heard from Yousry 14 himself. You heard his words from before he was ever indicted 15 or charged. 16 You heard him at the very beginning when I told you he 17 said he is exchanging one form of totalitarianimity for another 18 when he said I don't think that state in Islam is religious, 19 when he said I don't agree with the Sheikh or what he stands 20 for. 21 Judge, is this a good time for a break? 22 THE COURT: We will take 10 minutes. 23 Ladies and gentlemen, please remember to follow all of 24 my instructions. Please remember, do not talk about this case 25 at all. Please remember to keep an open mind until I have SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11585 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 finally instructed you on the law and you have gone to the jury 2 room to begin your deliberations. 3 Have a good break. I will see you shortly. 4 All rise, please. 5 (Jury not present) 6 THE COURT: See you shortly. 7 (Recess) 8 MR. TIGAR: Your Honor, one of the facilities is not 9 functioning. 10 THE COURT: All right. Everyone is here now. All 11 right, let's bring in the jury. 12 (Jury present) 13 THE COURT: Mr. Stern, you may proceed. 14 MR. STERN: I want to start by correcting two things I 15 told you that were wrong. One was the conversation in which 16 Mr. Sattar and Mr. Yousry talk about Lynne having discussed 17 with Ramsey and Abdeen the advisability of releasing the 18 statement was June 15th. I think I said June 11th and that was 19 incorrect. 20 Also, I talked about Ms. Stewart's phone being tapped 21 and her phone was never tapped. That was wrong. Any calls 22 that Ms. Stewart is on were either calls made to Mr. Yousry or 23 maybe -- although I don't recall this being the case -- legal 24 weekly calls, or calls made to Mr. Sattar. I think there were 25 some where you remember her talking to Lisa Sattar. So, it was SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11586 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 never on her phone. 2 Those two things were incorrect and I apologize for 3 that. 4 One of the things that you really heard very little 5 about in the government's summation was Mohammed Yousry's 6 testimony. They were glad to call him a liar and say he was 7 dishonest with you, but they didn't give you much evidence of 8 that and they didn't because there isn't evidence of that. 9 They told you he did all he could to follow the SAMs as he 10 understood them. He told you he didn't think there was 11 conspiracy to kidnap or kill much less joined it. 12 Even without his testimony, even if he had never taken 13 the stand you should find him not guilty. The government 14 doesn't have a case against him but his testimony is icing on 15 the cake. 16 Why should you believe him? People can say about 17 every defendant, he's the one with something to gain and 18 something to lose, of course would lie, therefore I won't 19 believe him. And if you say that then no one ever can testify 20 and make a difference. You have to look at him like every 21 other witness. It's true, of course, that he has something to 22 gain and something to lose but you have to evaluate what he 23 says and how he says it and what you know about him. 24 And what you know is that virtually every word he says 25 is supported by his notebooks, notebooks he made virtually SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11587 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 contemporaneously, notebooks which he couldn't possibly have 2 known would some day be shown in a court of law. 3 If you have the patience, go through his notebooks and 4 go through each visit. Go through his notebooks and go through 5 the calls and you will see that they match up. 6 So, it is not just him saying, well, this is what 7 happened, take my word for it. It is him saying this is what 8 happened and when it happened, one, two, three years ago I made 9 notes of it. That's how I remember it and that's how you know 10 it really happened that way. 11 There is something else here and that's character 12 witnesses. Now, you can say any of us could get our friends to 13 come in and say we're a good guy. And I hope that's true for 14 all of you, that you have friend that would come in and say 15 you're a good guy. But we heard from an awful lot of people, 16 from a lot of different worlds. 17 We heard from his colleague Michael Gaspar; we heard 18 from his employer at York College, Professor Coleman; we heard 19 from family and friends, Pastor Sawyer and his daughter Lesley; 20 we heard from Larry Schilling; we heard from Ramsey Clark, all 21 from different parts of his life. 22 And in the end what is character evidence? What does 23 it really mean when all these people come in and say, as far as 24 I know he's an honest person, he is a truthful person. 25 You know, as we go through life we leave footprints SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11588 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 like walking in snow and we don't look back and see where they 2 are or what they look like but they lead to us. And if we're a 3 liar in life it comes back to us one day through those same 4 footprints. And if we are truthful and honest like Mohammed 5 Yousry, that leads back to us too. 6 And you can be sure that if there were someone to come 7 in and say, well, they said he's honest and truthful, I know 8 him as a liar; the government would have brought him in here. 9 They would have put him up on the stand to say, yeah, his 10 friends say he is truthful but I know he is a liar. 11 Did you hear that? No. Because the truth about him 12 is irrefutable. He is an honest person. 13 Well, the government says we didn't do that but we did 14 prove what a liar he really is by his own words. And they say 15 they did that four ways or three ways really. They say they 16 did it with the FBI, they say they did it with his dissertation 17 notes, and they say they did it with his resumes. So, let's 18 talk about these one at a time. 19 The World Trade Centers are bombed -- one of the 20 greatest tragedies ever anywhere and certainly in the United 21 States. And a day later the FBI shows up at your door -- his 22 door. He is an Arab American man. He is working on the 23 Sheikh's case. And unannounced the FBI -- can we talk to you, 24 Mr. Yousry? He doesn't say get me a lawyer; he says, Yeah. 25 And he talks to them. And he tells them what happened at SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11589 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 meetings but the government's big knock on him was, well, you 2 didn't tell them about the Cole, did you? You didn't tell them 3 about the discussion of the Cole. 4 But what really does happen? What really happens and 5 you will see it at transcript page 9904, is that the next day 6 he calls them back. They come September 13th; September 7 14th -- and remember now that they're listening to these calls, 8 they know what's in them. 9 September 14th he calls them, not vice versa, and he 10 says, ho, I forgot something. And this is what he tells you 11 happens: 12 "Q And what did you tell the agents on September 14th 13 about what you now remember about the U.S.S. Cole as related to 14 Sheikh Rahman's case? Did you tell the agents something about 15 the Cole on September 14th? 16 "A Yes, I did. 17 "Q What did you tell the agents? 18 "A I told them what I remember, that I believe it was 19 a book signing party that was organized by Mr. Jabara and I 20 just recounted what happened to them during that particular, 21 you know, book signing party. 22 "Q And what did you relate? Tell us what you 23 related. 24 "A I told them that Mr. Jabara was holding this 25 particular book signing party for a friend of his and I was SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11590 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 there and Mr. Jabara was there, Ms. Lynne Stewart. Mr. Clark 2 was invited. I left before he came in. Mr. Sattar showed up, 3 he was shaken, he was so worried. And he was asking about 4 Mr. Jabara and he wanted to speak with him. And I'm not sure 5 if he spoke with Mr. Jabara or not but, you know, I wanted to 6 find out what was wrong with him. And he was so nervous and he 7 said that he got a call from some people claiming that they did 8 this for the Sheikh." 9 So now what's the government's beef that he didn't 10 say? And we then had a 15-second conversation nine months 11 later in which we said it was a stupid idea, let's forget about 12 it. He told them what he knew. 13 They asked him about Taha on 11/6/01, and does he hide 14 information about Taha as the government suggests? Does he 15 really say I don't know anything about him? 16 Let's look on page 9897, beginning at line 20 and see 17 what he tells them. He's asked: 18 "Q Do you remember what you told the FBI about 19 Mr. Taha and your understanding of his role? 20 "A Yes." 21 He's asked: 22 "Q What did you tell them? 23 "A Well, I told them everything I know about him at 24 the time; that he was a leader in the movement, that he led a 25 splinter after 1999, I believe, and that he was somewhere in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11591 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 Afghanistan and that the Egyptian government, I believe, 2 received him later on from the Syrian government. 3 "Q Do you remember on April 9, 2002, following your 4 arrest, again, whether or not you sat down with the FBI or 5 spoke with the FBI and answered questions following your 6 arrest? 7 "A Yes, I do. 8 "Q And do you remember what you told the FBI on April 9 9, 2002, about your knowledge of Mr. Taha? 10 "A I don't really recall" -- 11 I'm sorry: 12 "A I really don't recall if I -- 13 "Q I will refer you to Defense Exhibit MY-1311 and 14 direct your attention particularly to page 77 of that exhibit. 15 Would you find that please, for me? 16 "A Yes, I found the page. 17 "Q Looking at the final paragraph on page 77 and 18 going into the top of page 78, do you remember what it is that 19 you told the FBI about Mr. Taha? 20 "A Yes. Yes. 21 "Q What did you tell him? 22 "A Well, I actually told him that I know most of the 23 information about Taha Musa -- that's how they referred to 24 him -- was based on my research in my doctorate dissertation 25 and I knew that he was a leader in the Islamic movement and I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11592 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 knew that he was a leader of a splinter movement and also that 2 he was handed over to the Egyptian government. 3 "Q Did you have any discussion with the FBI whether 4 or not you were aware that Mr. Sattar was or was not in touch 5 with Mr." -- 6 Oh. I'm sorry. I should haven't read that question. 7 "Q Did you have any conversation as to your knowledge 8 of anyone else who may have actually been speaking with 9 Mr. Taha? 10 "A Yes, I did. 11 "Q What did you tell the FBI about that on April 9, 12 2002? 13 "A I told them that I was aware that Mr. Sattar was 14 indirectly in contact with Mr. Taha and I became aware of that 15 on May 19 of 2000." 16 Now, you all might think that if the FBI showed up at 17 your door unannounced a day or two after the World Trade Center 18 you would have a perfect memory of everything that had happened 19 a week ago, two weeks ago, a month ago. You can fault him for 20 not, but you can be sure that if his testimony was not true the 21 government would have called the agents who took those 22 statements and said he never told us that about Taha, he never 23 called us about the Cole. But they don't. And of course they 24 don't because they can't because his testimony was true. 25 You remember a time in his cross-examination when SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11593 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 Ms. Baker asked him endless questions about footnotes. She 2 went through footnote after footnote after footnote. And then 3 she asked him about rough notes. They weren't even a draft of 4 a dissertation, they were notes. Many of the things in them 5 were wrong, some of them were right. But what you know is that 6 those footnotes were made primarily from tapes seized in 7 Denmark, used at the Sheikh's trial in which IG members were 8 bragging after their acquittal for the Sadat murders. 9 And so she says when things are wrong in there, well, 10 that's the proof that he's a liar and he says, no, I'm an 11 academic. These are rough notes. I make these notes and later 12 I check them out to see if they're right or not. I'm not 13 saying these things are true, I'm saying that's what I read or 14 that's what I saw. 15 She says, ah, but there is this introduction where you 16 say I have spoken with IG members from all over the world. 17 It's an introduction he hopes will one day be part of his 18 dissertation but it hasn't yet come true. Does that make him a 19 liar? 20 If any of you have written a long paper or a 21 dissertation, think back and ask yourselves how you would do if 22 you were quizzed on every note you ever made; if you were asked 23 years later -- and remember, these were made I think around 24 '97 -- what about this note? What about that note? Did you 25 know it was true when you wrote it? Do you know if it's false SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11594 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 now? Which of you wouldn't falter and would it make you liars? 2 Finally and the only other thing on which he was 3 impeached are these resumes. 4 Now, I'm not making admissions myself but if padding 5 resumes is a reason to go to jail, we need a lot more jails. 6 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Stern's 7 summation should not be interrupted. Thank you. 8 Mr. Stern, you may proceed. 9 MR. STERN: In a case about terrorism and cheating the 10 government, padded resumes have no place. They don't show 11 anybody he ever gave them to, they just show that they're on 12 his computer. That's the thumb they try to put on their side 13 of the scale. 14 Above everything else you have to ask, Why in the 15 world would Mohammed Yousry do this? 16 He's here earning $200,000 a year as an interpreter. 17 He has a wife he loves, he has a wonderful daughter, he's going 18 to throw it away for what? To make life less bearable for his 19 family in Egypt? Does that make any sense? 20 Is he going to do it, as the government suggests, 21 because he wants to be a professor at Harvard? Does he even 22 behave like a person who is so ambitious he wants to go to 23 Harvard? After all, he's been working on his dissertation for 24 years and doesn't even have a draft yet. He's not exactly 25 banging down the doors of Harvard, he's happy at York College, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11595 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 until the government interferes and he gets fired. 2 He is not an ambitious academic, he is a person trying 3 to make a life for himself here. And you never hear anything 4 about him being an ambitious academic until the case begins to 5 come in and it's clear that there is no other conceivable 6 reason for him to do this. 7 You don't hear it in the opening. The government 8 didn't say when they opened, Mohammed Yousry is dying to be a 9 Harvard professor, that's why he did this. They concocted it 10 when there was nothing left and it's an insult to you for them 11 to think that you would accept that. 12 Well, that leaves us only with charges that he 13 conspired to violate the Special Administrative Measures and 14 the government says you know he knew what the Special 15 Administrative Measures said and what they required. And they 16 say that, of course because if he didn't he is not guilty. 17 They said in passing sort of, well, he doesn't really have to 18 know, he just has to know he is violating them. Okay. 19 But what you know about Mohammed Yousry is that he 20 relied on two propositions in acting on those Special 21 Administrative Measures; one, I can't speak for the Sheikh, 22 that's the attorney's job and the attorney's decision; and two, 23 everything I do with the Sheikh is subject to review by the 24 lawyers. It is they who are responsible in deciding what can 25 and cannot be done under the SAMs. That's his understanding of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11596 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 the SAMs. 2 The government says, however, they were found in his 3 home. That's proof that he read and understood them. I want 4 you all, when you are in the jury room, to take a look at any 5 one of them. This happens to be Government Exhibit 4, it is a 6 long, single-spaced, legalistic document. Take turns seeing 7 who can read through it without falling asleep and if you don't 8 fall asleep, try and explain it to one another. None of you 9 are lawyers as far as I know, try. Go ahead. Go back in the 10 jury room and say, we've read this carefully, we understand it. 11 But beyond that, what evidence is there that Mohammed 12 Yousry ever read it? You know, out of his home they took 26 13 boxes of stuff and they left at least that much there. Did he 14 read everything? Did he read it carefully and understand it? 15 There is no evidence of that. 16 There is something else. You know, we all act in life 17 in certain ways and we don't always read anything carefully. 18 Any of you who have rented a car, you go in and you check the 19 boxes you want insurance or you don't and you decide if you 20 want to bring the car back full or not. Ask each other which 21 of you has read, beginning to end, those rental agreements. 22 Which of you, when you drop your clothes off at the 23 dry cleaner read the back of the ticket to find out what's 24 going to happen if you lose your shirt? 25 Which of you, when you take your kids or grandkids to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11597 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 Six Flags, read the ticket to see what happens if your child 2 goes flying out of the roller coaster? 3 We don't. We should. We don't. 4 Now, imagine that you are standing in line at Hertz to 5 rent a car and who is there with you? Mr. Hertz. And as you 6 walk through the line and get your agreement and he says, sign 7 it, it's okay. Which of you won't and which of you would say, 8 No, I'm sorry, Mr. Hertz, I know this is your car company but 9 I'm going to read it first. 10 Ramsey Clark said the things Yousry was doing were 11 okay and he's the Mr. Hertz of the government. He's the 12 Attorney General. He was, at one time, the head of the Bureau 13 of Prisons. So, how should Yousry know that the things he was 14 doing weren't okay? 15 Well, the government says again, ah-ha, we really do 16 have him though because we found in his notebooks -- these 17 notebooks that I'm urging you to read -- proof that he read the 18 SAMs and understood them. 19 So, you should look at page 284 of the notebooks. It 20 is a page that Mr. Dember showed you only he didn't share with 21 you everything that was in it because that page, he said, is 22 proof that Yousry read the SAMs. And I say it's proof that he 23 didn't. 24 What it shows is that a lawyer was explaining to the 25 Sheikh one day what they meant and this is how it was explained SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11598 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 or mis-explained. Take a look at first thing he says. He 2 says: The Sheikh is prohibited from speaking to or 3 communicating with any other prisoners. At any rate, he could 4 be given permission to give and receive information. 5 Is that anywhere in the SAMs? Does that show he 6 really understands these SAMs? Or does it show that he really 7 doesn't and is just acting on what he has been shown? 8 The second one, the Sheikh is forbidden to send or 9 receive any information, taped or written, unless it is from 10 the lawyers. 11 Well, isn't it true that every single letter he ever 12 read in prison, everything he ever said was from the lawyers, 13 approved by the lawyers, given to him by the lawyers? 14 So, when the government tells you look at page 284, 15 that's the proof that he knowingly violated the SAMs, it proves 16 exactly the opposite. 17 You know, even the government's position that the SAMs 18 were so important to them is a purely retrospective position. 19 They look back and say, yeah, they were really, really, really 20 important; really, really, really serious documents. That's 21 why we took them so seriously that in the years from 1997 to 22 2001, when these are renewed every four months and are 23 changing, Ramsey Clark signed two SAMs. The guy is visiting, 24 he's taking two calls a week, Ramsey Clark and Larry Schilling 25 signed two SAMs. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11599 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 Now, the government wants you to say these are so, so 2 important. They didn't think so back then or they would have 3 treated them like they were. 4 Now, one of the things the SAMs do say is that the 5 attorneys are required to tell their staff about what's 6 required. If you will look at GX 906, it's a 1997 affirmation, 7 and MY-602, which is a 2001 affirmation, you will see that 8 that's what it says: I have also instructed the staff in my 9 office that the such staff are not to patch calls... 10 The other one says: I have also instructed the staff 11 in my office that such staff are not to patch calls... 12 It is up to the lawyers to tell the staff what to do 13 but you know that they don't because not one lawyer -- not 14 Ramsey Clark, not Abdeen Jabara, not Larry Schilling, not Lynne 15 Stewart -- no one says, well, I sat down with Yousry and I 16 explained to him what these required. I sat down with Yousry 17 and I read these to him. I sat down with Yousry and asked him, 18 do you have any questions because I don't want there to be any 19 problems, never. 20 Did the government say, well, we thought these were 21 very important so after we were listening in on the calls we 22 wanted to see if he was intentionally violating them so we 23 tried to inform him. We had a prison person say, by the way, 24 you can do this or you can't do that. 25 Don't let them say, Well, that would have blown the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11600 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 fact that we were listening in because they could have said it 2 was a new rule. There were new rules all the time with the 3 SAMs. But they don't do that. 4 They never asked him to sign an affirmation. Simple, 5 right? Give them to him with an affirmation like you do the 6 lawyers. Sign this, then we'll all know if you read them or 7 not. There is no rule against it, no one told you that. They 8 just didn't do it. 9 They never went to the lawyers and said, you know, we 10 have an idea that something is going on here that maybe 11 shouldn't. We want to make sure you have told all of your 12 staff what these require. No, you never heard that. 13 They never wrote Yousry a letter. Mr. Yousry, have 14 the lawyers informed you of the SAMs? Yes or no? Check box A 15 or box B? No, no. 16 Even Pat Fitzgerald, who sort of invented these SAMs 17 and was in charge of them, told you that Yousry was never 18 informed in any way, verbally or in writing, what he was 19 supposed to do, what he was expected to do. So how was he 20 supposed to know? Well, the only way he could know was by the 21 behavior and the direction of the attorneys. 22 Now, I have a question which is this: Is it okay to 23 rely on the people who were supposed to advise you how to 24 behave? Well, the government is not in a position to say no 25 because their employees do exactly that. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11601 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 You will remember who Gerard Francisco was, he 2 testified about how he sent out these SAMs. I would get them 3 and time would go by and I would send one out and either I 4 would get it back or I wouldn't. 5 And he was asked questions about doing things with 6 people and he was asked about the tasks he did: When you say 7 various other tasks, do you mean if the attorney would ask you 8 to do something within reason you would do it, right? 9 His answer, of course is, Yes. 10 He works for the attorneys. 11 Does that mean if they said to him take a gun and go 12 shoot somebody he would do it? No. It means he was never 13 asked anything like that. 14 We know also from Ms. Banout, who was one of the 15 interpreters who testified; she was the person, I think you 16 will remember, translated Sattar's calls for years and years. 17 And this is at page 3631, lines 9 through 18, she is asked: 18 "Q My question is: Do you, yourself, do legal 19 research into whether or not they had grounds to get that court 20 order? Do you yourself do that research or -- 21 "A No 22 "Q -- do you take their word for it? 23 "A No, I don't. 24 "Q You take their word for it, don't you? 25 "A Yes. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11602 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 "Q And there is nothing wrong" -- I think it is 2 supposed to say "with"-- "that?" 3 And the answer is "No." 4 That's because there is nothing wrong. We all accept 5 if you're not the chief, take direction from people and assume 6 that what they're telling us or leading us to do is okay. 7 We know something else which is that the government is 8 forgiving of people who act in good faith but don't do things 9 perfectly. And we know that from the testimony of Agent 10 Monaco. 11 You remember Agent Monaco. She was the one who did 12 the search of Mohammed Yousry's home. And she told you that I 13 went and I got bad information from another agent, Agent 14 Whittle, so I had to go back and get another search warrant 15 because it was for the wrong address. But I finally got the 16 warrant and then I went in and I began to take things from the 17 house. And I really only wanted to take things that were 18 allowed to be taken by the warrant. That's my job, I'm an 19 agent. I have a warrant. 20 Remember, she said it has a rider; these are the 21 things that I can take. She went in and took things that have 22 nothing to do with the warrant. She tried to justify some of 23 them but it became increasingly clear that she did. She took 24 books on Latin America, condolence letters to Yousry on his 25 father's death, books on cultural diversity, letters from the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11603 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 international fellowship of Christians and Jews. 2 Now, do I say she did something evil? No. She had a 3 huge job to go through. To go through all of Yousry's junk is 4 a huge job. She relied on Ms. Banout who wasn't an agent at 5 all to tell her and she did her best. She acted in good faith 6 at someone else's direction. That's okay with the government. 7 How was Yousry guided by the attorneys? That is, is 8 there evidence that when the attorneys said to do something it 9 was done and when they said not to that was done? Well there 10 is, of course. Let's start with them asking questions about 11 his dissertation 12 You recall he would ask the lawyers, May I ask this or 13 that about my dissertation? And they would say yes and 14 sometimes they would say no. So, on November 2nd of 2001 15 Mohammed Yousry was with Abdeen Jabara talking to the Sheikh, 16 MY-1244X-1 and he wants to ask a dissertation question. 17 He says: Okay, sir. The situation is very difficult. 18 Well, I have a question for you, sir, if Mr. Abdeen approves 19 it. What happened -- this hijacking of planes, killing 20 civilians -- is this Islamically permitted or not permitted? 21 Rahman: Planes, what planes? 22 Jabara: I don't think you should ask him that because 23 they...I really don't think you should ask him. 24 Yousry: Mr. Abdeen is telling you sir, no, no, do not 25 answer. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11604 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 And Rahman says: Okay. 2 Find the time when that question is asked again when 3 he goes to a different lawyer and says, hey, can I ask this 4 question? You won't, because he didn't. 5 When the lawyers tell him to take things out of 6 notebooks that is precisely what he does. Let's look at page 7 314 of his notebook. He is taking notes as he is talking to 8 the Sheikh, he apparently translates them later for Lynne 9 Stewart and it says: Do not read, as per Lynne Stewart. And 10 it's crossed out. And do you ever see that, delivered, read, 11 anything? No. 12 It happens again with Mr. Jabara. You will see at 13 page 436 of his notebook there is a note: Not to be sent as 14 per Abdeen. And see if you ever see that letter anywhere. 15 You also know that there are approvals on every single 16 article. Yousry writes what lawyers approves it. 17 So, when he is with Ramsey Clark you will see exhibits 18 541 -- I'm sorry, notebook pages 541 and 1200 that there are 19 articles. Those articles are approved by Ramsey Clark. 20 If you look at pages 833, 834 and 1187 of the notebook 21 you will see articles that are approved by Abdeen Jabara. 22 Interestingly the third article is in English of the New York 23 Times and it is one in which Abdeen Jabara makes a statement 24 about what the Sheikh has said in the Fatwah. He says: It's 25 not true any legal advisor transmitted such a message. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11605 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 Sort of what the Sheikh I guess asked people to do. 2 But I don't think Abdeen got in much trouble for that. 3 And when he is with Lynne you see the same thing. On 4 each and every article you see approvals by Lynne Stewart. So, 5 find the time when you don't have that. Find the time when he 6 avoids doing what the lawyers ask him to do. 7 And you know the government is always trying to ask 8 you to infer from this and infer from that what Yousry's state 9 of mind is, what his intent is but we know from explicit 10 conversations what he thinks about the SAMs and what his 11 understanding of the SAMs is. We see it expressed in a 12 conversation he had with Nasser Ahmed. 13 You remember the testimony about him, he had a 14 deportation proceeding, Ms. Stewart represented him, and 15 eventually they decided not to deport him. He was the original 16 paralegal for the Sheikh. 17 And on March 19th of 2000 he has a conversation, 18 MY-1705X, pages 3 and 4, and this is what is said. Yousry 19 says -- and you know when you're in the jury room you can look 20 at every page of these you want. I'm trying to tell you the 21 parts that I think are most important but look at it all to 22 make sure I'm not taking it out of context or somehow 23 misleading you about what they say. 24 Yousry says: Well, it's the regulation, the SAMs, the 25 SAMs. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11606 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 And Al-Humusani, who is Nasser Ahmed, says: This 2 regulation special for the Sheikh? 3 Yousry says: Yes. The SAMs, I mean Special 4 Administrative Measures, it is something...something for some 5 people including Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. So, one of the 6 conditions is that the phone call cannot take place without the 7 presence of one of a specific group of lawyers... one of the 8 lawyers who signed to abide by these administrative measures. 9 You see? They can't leave the room during the call. Do you 10 follow me? 11 Then he says: None of them can allow me to say 12 anything to the Sheikh without discussing it with them first. 13 They have to know what I'm going to tell them. I mean, even 14 when I read the newspapers I have to get their approval, get it 15 from Abdeen, Larry or Ramsey. You see? 16 You see again how he tries to implement the SAMs in 17 the way he understands them in calls he has with Ed Noguchi, a 18 reporter for Japanese public television. These calls are 1702, 19 1703 and 1704, and in those calls Mr. Noguchi -- or they call 20 him Eddie sometimes -- calls him and says: I represent 21 Japanese public and TV want to have some questions with the 22 Sheikh and this is the conversation they have: Well, the 23 Sheikh will say what he thinks and even if the lawyers approve 24 it -- 25 And Noguchi says: Yeah. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11607 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 And he says: And they tell you -- 2 Noguchi: Yeah. Oh, so even the lawyers says maybe 3 yes but the Justice Department, may say no. 4 Yousry says: I know, I know, it's, it's -- you see 5 what happened is we cannot tell the Sheikh questions from the 6 media but we can tell him comments. 7 Noguchi says: Right. 8 Yousry: We can read him the newspaper. 9 Noguchi: Uh-huh. 10 Yousry: We can read him -- 11 Noguchi says. Uh-huh 12 Yousry: -- applicable analyses of things and stuff 13 but we wait for the lawyers to approve it because the lawyers 14 sign confidentiality agreement. 15 And Noguchi says: Oh yes? 16 Yousry says: So they can tell the Sheikh what anybody 17 else -- 18 Noguchi: Uh-huh. 19 Yousry: -- unless it is within the guidelines of the 20 Justice Department. So sometimes it happens that the lawyers 21 can give you answers. 22 Now, I'm going to stop in the middle this for a minute 23 because, again, Mr. Dember told you people are candid when they 24 don't know they're being recorded on the phone and Yousry is 25 trying to tell Noguchi -- a stranger to him -- he has no motive SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11608 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 to impress him, no motive not to impress him. He is trying to 2 tell him, so they can't tell anybody what the Sheikh says 3 unless they believe it is within the guidelines of the Justice 4 Department. 5 So sometimes it happens that the lawyers can give you 6 answers 7 Noguchi: Oh, really. 8 Yousry: Sometimes it happens. 9 And then there is a skip and then he says -- not a 10 skip, I'm skipping a part. And he said, Yousry: Yeah. Maybe 11 if you give him the questions tonight -- 12 Noguchi. Yeah. 13 Yousry: -- and we are having a call tomorrow 14 morning; if the lawyers approve the questions I can translate 15 the questions to the Sheikh. 16 Noguchi: Right. 17 Yousry: Then I translate the answers to the lawyers. 18 Noguchi: Uh-huh. 19 Yousry: And if the lawyers think that they're fine 20 and they're not going to cause any problems with the Justice 21 Department -- 22 Noguchi: Uh-huh. 23 Yousry: Then they tell you the answers. 24 So that seems to be his clear understanding. If the 25 lawyers say it is okay, it is okay. If they don't, don't. And SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11609 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 ask yourselves, what motive he has to lie there? 2 Also, just parenthetically, when I was talking about 3 Mr. Dember interpreting Mr. Yousry's "yeah," look at any of 4 these conversations and see how many times people say "yeah" 5 and "uh-huh" and see if they're always saying I agree a hundred 6 percent with everything you are saying, I know precisely what 7 you are saying and I am guilty of it. They don't. 8 Now later, actually months later Noguchi calls back 9 and they have a conversation about the questions that were 10 asked earlier and Yousry struggles to find them in his notebook 11 and he is trying to remember the date. And this is 1704 now 12 and he says: 13 Yousry: You know the... he really can't say more than 14 that. There are... there are a few things that the lawyers... 15 eh... crossed out. 16 Noguchi: Right 17 Yousry: You know he said it but the lawyers crossed 18 it out. 19 Noguchi: Right. 20 Yousry: So I can't really -- 21 Noguchi: Right. 22 Yousry: You know? 23 That's it. He doesn't say I want the Sheikh's word to 24 get out. Notwithstanding the fact that these crummy lawyers 25 cross stuff out, I'm going to tell you what he said. Don't SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11610 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 attribute it to me but I'm going to tell you what he said. He 2 tells him what is approved and he doesn't tell them what's not 3 approved. 4 Even when he is talking to people close to the case he 5 is equally scrupulous. On May 18th of 2000, it is GX 1088X, he 6 has a conversation with Nabil Elmasry. And Nabil Elmasry is a 7 paralegal for the Sheikh. He routinely sends letters to the 8 Sheikh and he was there even before Mohammed Yousry was there. 9 And he was talking to Yousry and he wants to send a letter to 10 the Sheikh and Yousry says: You know, first of all, I have to 11 read the letter to Lynne. 12 Elmasry says: I know. 13 Yousry: And Lynne has to approve it. 14 And Elmasry: Nothing is in the letter. It only 15 includes greetings. 16 Yousry: I understand, but I have to say that. 17 Elmasry: I know. 18 Yousry: By law, I have it say and do that anyway. 19 Send it. You have the number. 20 That's how Yousry understands the SAMs and always -- 21 always -- throughout this case, he acts in good faith. In 22 hundreds of phone calls, both personal and professional, the 23 government can't point to one time without a lawyer Yousry 24 passed or got information from the Sheikh. They have never 25 really shown you that Mohammed Yousry knew specifically what SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11611 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Stern 1 the SAMs required much less conspired with anyone to violate 2 them. 3 When Ramsey was there, when Lynne was there, when 4 Larry was there. He could have had any conversation he wanted. 5 They wouldn't have had the faintest idea if he was telling the 6 Sheikh about Taha or Hamza or the Cole or anything else. But 7 never does he do things like that. He reads the paper, he says 8 the things he is supposed to. That's it. 9 What you know is that Mohammed Yousry did his best to 10 follow the SAMs as he understood them. You know that the 11 government has failed to prove he knew of a conspiracy to kill 12 or kidnap people in a foreign country much less conspired to 13 help it. 14 A wonderful thing about America is that it welcomes 15 ambitious, talented people like Yousry to come here and make a 16 life; to learn and contribute and thrive but greater than that 17 is the power we have to tell the government when they're wrong, 18 the power and our obligation to protect citizens from the 19 government's excesses and mistakes. You jurors are those 20 citizens. It is up to you to tell the government in two simple 21 but powerful words that Mohammed Yousry shouldn't be here. 22 Tell them he is not guilty. 23 Thank you. 24 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we will 25 take 15 minutes. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11612 5145sat2 1 Please, please, remember my continuing instructions. 2 Please, don't talk about this case at all. Please always 3 remember to keep an open mind until I have finally instructed 4 you on the law and you have gone to the jury room to begin your 5 deliberations. 6 All rise, please. Please follow Mr. Fletcher to the 7 jury room. 8 (Jury not present) 9 THE COURT: See you shortly. 10 (Recess) 11 THE COURT: Please be seated, all. 12 The next summation will be by Mr. Paul for Mr. Sattar. 13 All right, let's call in the jury. 14 (Jury present) 15 THE COURT: All right. And of course, ladies and 16 gentlemen, you are to continue to apply my instructions with 17 respect to summations. 18 The next summation will be given by Mr. Paul on behalf 19 of Mr. Sattar. 20 Mr. Paul. 21 MR. PAUL: Thank you, your Honor. 22 May it please the Court, counsel, Mr. Sattar, ladies 23 and gentlemen of the jury. Good afternoon. 24 THE JURY: Good afternoon. 25 MR. PAUL: Let me begin by thanking you because, as we SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11613 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 all know, this has been a very long trial. It's amazing but we 2 have lived through all or part of four seasons this past year. 3 And I know I speak for not only myself but all the participants 4 in this trial when I say that your willingness to sacrifice 5 your time from your own lives in order to participate in this 6 trial is greatly appreciated. 7 Because we have worked together for so long I have 8 looked forward to finally having an opportunity to talk 9 directly with you. I have not had that opportunity since my 10 opening statement which, amazing as it may seem, is now some 11 six months ago. 12 I am sure you must realize that, just like you, when 13 you looked around the courtroom each day at all the parties and 14 tried to figure out what's going on, what are they thinking 15 about, what are they about, we would also try to size you up. 16 We attempted to guess what you are thinking. Unfortunately for 17 me I'm still unable to read minds. I did, however, notice some 18 very obvious things about you as a group. You have been most 19 attentive during this entire trial and that hasn't always been 20 easy. 21 The very nature of the evidence has not been the most 22 exciting. We only have to recall all those stretch breaks we 23 all lived through to be reminded of just that. Nevertheless, 24 even with that, you certainly appeared to be listening very 25 carefully whether you took notes or not. I only ask that you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11614 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 continue to do so while I attempt to review the evidence with 2 you. And though this will obviously take a considerable amount 3 of time because there is a lot to go through, I truly hope that 4 it will not require too many stretch breaks. 5 Allow me to make some general observations before I 6 review and evaluate with you the facts of this case. 7 In attempting to figure out how to discuss and 8 summarize this trial and the evidence, I decided the best way 9 to do this was simply go to the beginning so I looked at the 10 government's opening statement as well as my own. And though I 11 realize opening statements, as I said, were long ago, there 12 were certain things said then that really require some 13 evaluating and repeating now. 14 In my opening statement I spoke at length about the 15 concerns and fears I had from the outset regarding the 16 challenges you would face in following your sworn oath as 17 jurors to be impartial and objective while you evaluated the 18 facts in this case and then applied them to the law as 19 instructed by Judge Koeltl which you will receive at the end of 20 this case. 21 Clearly my fears were justified because it became very 22 apparent early on in this trial that the government was going 23 to attempt to prove their case against Ahmed Sattar by stoking 24 the fires of fear we all live with today. 25 My concern was that your everyday experiences of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11615 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 simply reading and listening to the news, whether it was during 2 the national election debate or about the constant fighting 3 around the world, or the talk of hatred of one people toward 4 another, or the ever recurring violence that is labeled 5 terrorism, all of that kind of news, I fear, would make your 6 job that much more difficult. 7 What I wasn't certain of but unfortunately became 8 obvious during the presentation of the government's case, was 9 how the government would play upon those fears. Those very 10 same fears that overwhelm many of us during this so-called war 11 on terrorism and the effect they have on our emotions and 12 prejudices often resulting in an "us against them" mentality. 13 Though the Court has previously instructed you, and 14 will again, that Ahmed Abdel Sattar, as he sits there right now 15 is presumed innocent and, like any defendant, he is entitled to 16 that presumption as you enter the jury room to begin your 17 deliberations, as well as throughout, even though that is the 18 instruction and even though that is the law and even though 19 that is what we are guided by, I am not so naive to believe 20 that Mr. Sattar will be viewed in the same light as any other 21 defendant. 22 Sad as it may seem, I truly believe that my client, 23 Ahmed Sattar, begins at a distinct disadvantage. Even though 24 he is a United States citizen and considers himself an American 25 before anything else, Mr. Dember; simply his Arabic name, Ahmed SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11616 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Abdel Sattar, places him apart from others. Unfortunately, in 2 today's world, he is forced to confront that he is considered 3 to be one of the them in the war against us. 4 The world of Islam has taken on an entirely new 5 meaning since 9/11 but none of you can let any of that happen 6 during your deliberations. Any biases or prejudices you may 7 feel toward anyone must not interfere in your decision making. 8 My concern has never, not once, been from the evidence 9 presented against my client because I am confident that if you 10 truly evaluate all the evidence fairly and objectively, you 11 will come to the decision that the government has failed to 12 prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt. 13 No, the reason I expressed my concerns to you in my 14 opening statement and do so again today is because the true 15 challenge you face is being faithful to the oath you took as 16 jurors. 17 Will your thoughts of the current war against 18 terrorism remain outside of the courtroom? That is a very 19 difficult challenge when the government has labeled this case 20 that you are listening to as one of terrorism. 21 Though you have each assured us you would be fair and 22 impartial, the random everyday violence and killing of innocent 23 people around the world may not allow you to shut that out of 24 your minds and remain objective. 25 Again, I remind you that thoughts of the war this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11617 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 country has engaged is must remain outside the doors to this 2 courtroom and you should not allow them to creep into your 3 thinking as you evaluate the evidence fairly and objectively in 4 order to reach a determination as to the guilt or innocence of 5 Ahmed Sattar. You must do that in an unbiassed, impartial 6 objective way. You have assured us, all of us, you would and I 7 might add, you have sworn to do just that. 8 You may remember I had warned you that you were going 9 to hear terms and names that would perhaps make you flinch due 10 to those very fears I just mentioned. 11 What I wasn't aware of before we started this trial 12 was how the government would so blatantly attempt to tug and 13 play upon those fears. Why do I say this? Well, the perfect 14 example was when they tried time and time again to bring Osama 15 Bin Laden into this case. 16 You were instructed several times by the Court that 17 Osama Bin Laden is not part of this case. He is not a 18 co-conspirator, indicted or unindicted, with any of these 19 defendants. He is not involved in any way with any of the 20 crimes that these defendants have been charged with. But what 21 did the government do? They made every effort they could to 22 suggest otherwise. 23 Just this past September, a few months ago, during the 24 very week of 9/11, a date that is reminder to all of us of the 25 worst tragedy ever to strike this country and this very city SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11618 5145sat2 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 only a few blocks from this very court building, what did they 2 do? They present Osama Bin Laden, the mastermind of this 3 unimaginable terrorist act. The number one enemy of the United 4 States appears before us in this very courtroom by way of a 5 videotape played by the government. 6 (Continued on next page) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11619 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 MR. PAUL: The timing of the presentation of that 2 piece of evidence may have merely been coincidental. But in 3 any event, think about the effect the showing of that video had 4 on you and ask yourself, what was your initial reaction? Did 5 you ever imagine that Osama Bin Laden, of all people, would 6 make an appearance at this trial, especially, especially after 7 you were all assured when being selected to serve on this jury, 8 that anything related to 9/11 or Osama Bin Laden would have 9 nothing to do with this case? And indeed, as the Court has 10 told you time and time again, neither 9/11 or Osama Bin Laden 11 has anything to do with this case. 12 In point of fact, if you step back and objectively 13 evaluate that video for what it is, it simply showed Osama Bin 14 Laden long before September 11, 2001, when most of us never 15 even heard of or knew anything about him, sitting alongside 16 someone who is involved in this case, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa, 17 or Taha, as he has been called, as well as one of the Sheikh's 18 sons, all calling for the release of the Sheikh from the 19 American prison. It is nothing more than that and nothing less 20 than that. I simply use the video as a perfect example of how 21 your job of being objective has been challenged and tested 22 throughout this trial. 23 Why did the government show that video? Well, it was 24 their perfect opportunity to present Osama Bin Laden to you and 25 all he has come to represent. It was their not-so-subtle way, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11620 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 which they have done repeatedly throughout this trial, to 2 attempt somehow to bring this case home to America. It was 3 their effort to convince you and scare you, I might add, into 4 thinking that this case is not only about Egypt and its 5 repressive government and it is not only about Sheikh Rahman's 6 prison conditions, but also a direct threat to the security of 7 the United States. 8 The evidence simply does not support such an inference 9 and you should not be fooled or tempted into considering it. 10 Did Taha or Mustafa Hamza or the Islamic Group in general, did 11 they issue threats against America because of the imprisonment 12 of Sheikh Rahman? Yes. Because as we have come to learn, this 13 was an organization that after 1997 was a shelf of its former 14 self and had no power or ability to do anything. These were 15 empty threats and merely propaganda. This was clearly Ahmed 16 Sattar's understanding of those statements and threats. 17 And most importantly, don't be lulled into hearing 18 someone else's statements and attribute them to Ahmed. The 19 fact that someone else made a statement or a threat of some 20 kind are not Ahmed Sattar's words or even his beliefs. In 21 fact, as you heard him tell you on the witness stand through 22 his testimony, he did not accept or adopt any of these 23 statements, whether they were issued by Sheikh Rahman, Taha, 24 Hamza, or the Islamic Group. Be very careful and focused when 25 determining who is saying what. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11621 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Maybe Mr. Barkow for the government -- who you notice 2 is sitting here and probably at some point will be taking 3 careful notes during my summation because he is the one who 4 will have the opportunity to stand up here and give you his 5 rebuttal statement -- he will respond simply by saying, wait a 6 minute. We didn't bring Osama Bin Laden into this case. The 7 defendant, Mr. Sattar, did, because he associated with the 8 terrorist Taha, who in turn associated with another terrorist, 9 Osama Bin Laden, in calling for the release of the Sheikh, and 10 that's why he was presented to you through this video. 11 If that is their argument -- and it certainly seems 12 like it was as I listened to Mr. Dember's summation -- it is 13 exactly what I had warned you against previously in my opening 14 statement. Don't fall into the easy trap they are setting for 15 you, the trap being applying guilt by association. Be careful 16 of any argument which implies, as the government has attempted 17 to do throughout this trial, that you should draw certain 18 conclusions from who Ahmed Sattar associated with, whether that 19 means, as we know he did, associate with the Sheikh and his 20 family, Taha, Hamza, or other Islamic Group members such as 21 Salah Hashim and Atia. Or whether, as he testified, that he 22 had sent money to the commissary of those who were in prison 23 having been found guilty of very serious crimes. 24 It is not important to the government, I suppose, that 25 Ahmed sent money to those individuals, those who were in prison SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11622 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 simply because he came to know many of them either through his 2 mosque or while working as a paralegal for the Sheikh during 3 their trial. That's not important. What's important to the 4 government is that he associated with those people. Don't let 5 the government even attempt to infer that all this must add up 6 to Ahmed Sattar being guilty simply because he associated with 7 individuals or a group who he knew were considered to be 8 terrorists. 9 According to the government, of course, you should 10 infer from all of this that Ahmed Sattar himself is a terrorist 11 or at least a terrorist sympathizer who advocates violence. 12 The easy track has been set. Be warned, be wary of it, and do 13 not fall for it because it is not a crime. I repeat, it is not 14 a crime to associate or know about or help others, even those 15 who you may feel are not deserving of any such help or 16 assistance. 17 What else did we come to learn early on in this trial? 18 We always knew from the charges brought from the government 19 that Sheikh Abdel Rahman was going to play a prominent role at 20 this trial. It became clear when his picture was displayed at 21 the very beginning of the government's opening statement. It 22 became clear exactly how in this case it was going to be more 23 about Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman than any defendant sitting at 24 this table. The government apparently thought it necessary 25 during this case to retry Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. They SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11623 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 played his sermons, read his wills, read his intercepted phone 2 calls, all in an attempt to present to you some of the angry 3 words spoken by him in the hope that your emotional reaction to 4 the Sheikh would simply spill over to your feelings about Ahmed 5 Sattar. 6 After all, they would argue, Ahmed Sattar was a 7 follower, a believer, and a supporter of the Sheikh. And 8 though he believed and still does to this day that the Sheikh 9 had been unjustly convicted, he was convicted all the same for 10 very serious crimes against the United States. 11 What does the government do in presenting their 12 evidence in this case on these charges against Ahmed Sattar? I 13 submit to you that they played the Sheikh's sermons in an 14 attempt to lay the groundwork in your minds that the Sheikh is 15 an evil person who advocates violence. And here is Ahmed who 16 not only worked on his case, but believed in him and, 17 therefore, they hoped, it would logically follow that they -- 18 that you would conclude that Ahmed Sattar is also evil and 19 advocates violence. 20 Let me make something very clear. Though Sheikh Omar 21 Abdel Rahman is an unindicted coconspirator in this case, he is 22 not my client. And in fact, he is not a defendant at this 23 trial. I'm not here to defend Sheikh Omar Rahman. You know 24 what, as we have all been reminded many times during this trial 25 over and over and over again, he has already been convicted and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11624 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 sentenced to life imprisonment. It is not important what you 2 think of Sheikh Rahman. However, you should not be tempted, 3 nor allow whatever feelings you may have of the Sheikh to cloud 4 your thoughts in objectively evaluating the evidence concerning 5 Ahmed Sattar. 6 We were told in the government's opening statement 7 that the purpose of an opening statement is not to tell you the 8 evidence because the "witnesses" will do that. What witnesses? 9 We sat here day after day, week after week, month after month 10 waiting for the so-called witnesses to take the stand. One 11 would have assumed that witnesses were going to testify at this 12 trial. We would all listen and then perhaps, if appropriate, I 13 would have an opportunity to challenge their testimony, 14 cross-examine their testimony. That's what trials are all 15 about. Never once, not once did we hear from any of these 16 so-called witnesses or a witness who had anything to tell us of 17 any substance concerning the charges against Ahmed Sattar. For 18 the most part, the only witnesses who were called to testify 19 were the government translators who were employed by the FBI to 20 listen to the tens of thousands of intercepted conversations, 21 and then translate and transcribe those conversations. 22 We also heard from various technicians involved in the 23 retrieval of those interceptions. Unfortunately, we heard from 24 these same witnesses repeatedly. And it soon felt to me like I 25 was sitting in a time warp because I truly began to believe SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11625 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 that Agent Scott Kerns was the most important witness to the 2 government because every time I looked up he was back on the 3 witness stand. 4 We did, however, learn, from Agent Kerns what I would 5 consider important information regarding the ability or 6 inability, in some cases, of the government's efforts in 7 retrieving the intercepted audios. After all, as it turned 8 out, it is mostly from these audios that the government 9 attempted to prove their case. Agent Kerns was not only 10 responsible for copying audios onto disks to be used at this 11 trial, but he was the liaison with the prosecutors, these 12 people, in gathering the intercepts to be introduced at trial. 13 He told us that the FBI retrieved approximately 85,000 14 intercepts, mostly from Ahmed Sattar's phone, which included 15 audio files of voice calls, faxes, and computer internet 16 communications. 17 We were told that these intercepts began in March 1995 18 and continued to the end of March 2002, one month before my 19 client was arrested, with an inexplicable period of time with 20 no intercepts from November '96 to November '98. From these 21 85,000 intercepts employees for the FBI who were doing the 22 listening and determining which of these calls were of any 23 value to their investigation and ultimately to this case 24 determined that there were approximately 5,000 voice calls that 25 were so-called pertinent or, in other words, of some potential SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11626 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 value and relevance. 2 What I found most interesting about Agent Kerns's 3 testimony was the fact that clearly the system the government 4 had set up to intercept and retrieve conversations and relied 5 on for this case were certainly not without fault. During my 6 cross-examination of Agent Kerns he told us that when he 7 asked -- when he was asked by the government lawyers to 8 retrieve the 5,000 calls that were so-called deemed to be 9 pertinent, he was unable to successfully do that. 10 We heard that the FBI used two different systems 11 during the seven years they were intercepting Ahmed Sattar. 12 Whether we are talking about the system used before or after 13 July 2000, when the FBI switched systems, the bottom line is 14 that they were missing conversations which had been determined 15 by the government to be pertinent, important and yet could not 16 be retrieved. 17 How many calls are we talking about? Agent Kerns told 18 us 114 audios could not be retrieved. What is most important 19 is not necessarily the number of calls that could not be 20 retrieved, but the time period in which this gap took place. 21 After all, as I'm sure the government would argue, 114 22 unretrievable intercepts out of 5,000 is not a bad average, 23 unless they happen to be during one of the most important time 24 periods of this case. And Agent Kerns told us just that. He 25 testified that he was unable to retrieve pertinent calls, some SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11627 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 21 pertinent calls in all during the period from September 27, 2 2000 through October 2, 2000. In fact, when he went back and 3 tried to retrieve these calls, these pertinent calls, during 4 this important period of time, he found that he couldn't 5 retrieve any calls, pertinent, nonpertinent, nothing, a gap. 6 Why do I say that this time period is so important? 7 They told us that, the government told us that. They claim in 8 the indictment which they have brought against Ahmed Sattar 9 that this is probably one of the most important time periods 10 during the seven years of intercepts. This is the time period 11 that incorporates the most serious allegations the government 12 has brought against Ahmed Sattar. This is the time period 13 when, according to the government, it is alleged that Ahmed was 14 committing or attempting to commit some of the very acts that 15 are contained in the charges of Count 2, the conspiracy to kill 16 and kidnap persons in a foreign country, and in Count 3, the 17 solicitation of crimes of violence. This is the very time 18 period when Ahmed assists Taha in issuing the fatwah in the 19 name of the Sheikh. 20 This is the time period when, according to the 21 government's opening statement, Ahmed and Taha "have someone on 22 the ground, namely Atia, to do their bidding," which for the 23 government is shorthand for their theory that Ahmed Sattar was 24 trying to help Atia commit terrorist acts. All of this was 25 allegedly happening, according to the indictment, in or about SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11628 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 September and October 2000, the very time period of this gap 2 with unretrievable or missing intercepts. The government will 3 tell you, well, you only have to look at the conversations we 4 have presented to you in order to make your determination. 5 Forget the ones we couldn't retrieve. Just look at the ones we 6 did present. This may be true. 7 But as we have seen throughout the defense of this 8 case and Ahmed Sattar's own testimony, conversations have to be 9 placed in context in order to understand one's true intent, 10 which is what you will have to do. You should be provided with 11 the complete picture if possible so you are able to fully 12 comprehend what was happening at the time and then, and only 13 then, are you able to at least attempt to determine one's true 14 intent from his spoken words. 15 This task is made only that much more difficult for 16 you when pieces of the complete picture are missing. Let me 17 also point out to you something I found unusual with the 18 government's case in general. We were presented with some 220 19 intercepts which the government chose out of the 85,000 total 20 that we were told existed over the seven years of intercepting 21 Ahmed Sattar's phone, fax, and internet, from 1995 to 2002. 22 Obviously, one of the reasons you did not hear from me 23 very often throughout this trial is because one cannot 24 cross-examine transcripts as they are introduced by the 25 government. I also cannot cross-examine newspaper articles SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11629 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 introduced by the government. I cannot cross-examine books 2 that were seized from my client's home. And yet it is based 3 mostly on this kind of evidence that the government has 4 presented their entire case against my client. 5 The job of a jury in any criminal case is difficult 6 enough, but your job is especially tough. Not only due to all 7 of the many fears and emotions I already have discussed with 8 you, but also because you have been presented with the task of 9 having to determine what Ahmed Sattar's state of mind or intent 10 was during the time those intercepted conversations took place. 11 As I told you during my opening statement, this is 12 really and truly a case about words and nothing more. After 13 hearing all of the evidence, this entire case has been 14 presented to you. You know what? It is still a case that 15 remains about words, words and a lot of talk and nothing more, 16 nothing ever happens, ever. It is talk and words. The 17 government alleges that the words of Ahmed Sattar add up to his 18 committing very serious crimes. I submit to you that the 19 government's allegations and its theories of Ahmed Sattar's 20 criminal intent have not been proven. 21 Why do I say that? Because you cannot fairly isolate 22 this sentence or that statement or even a particular 23 conversation which, due to the very nature of the type of 24 evidence that was presented throughout this case, goes without 25 challenge through cross-examination, unlike evidence that is in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11630 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 fact presented through witnesses. And in order for you to 2 truly determine anyone's intent from their words, you have to 3 look beyond and behind them to fully understand how and why 4 they were being used when they were used. You have to place 5 Ahmed Sattar's words within some context to have the complete 6 meaning of them. You need to know and be able to see the 7 complete picture, not with gaps, the complete picture of what 8 was happening at that particular time in order to understand 9 his true intent. 10 You also, if possible, need to have an understanding 11 of the person who is speaking those words. Who is he? What 12 role, if any, was he playing when he spoke? How many times 13 during this trial did his Honor instruct you that a particular 14 item of evidence being introduced or an answer from the witness 15 who was testifying is to be considered only for the "knowledge, 16 intent, or state of mind" of a particular defendant. I cannot 17 begin to remember how many times we heard that instruction. 18 And the reason for that is because I submit to you, 19 ladies and gentlemen, that this entire case against Ahmed 20 Sattar is not really about what, if anything, he did, but it is 21 all about his intent. This is crucial in making your decision 22 in this case because it is the intent of Ahmed Sattar that is 23 the key element of the crimes charged against him in both 24 Counts 2 and 3. You will have to decide whether Ahmed Sattar's 25 true intent, you will have to decide whether Ahmed Sattar's SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11631 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 true intent was to further the purpose of the conspiracy to 2 kill and kidnap persons in a foreign country, as alleged in 3 Count 2 of this indictment, as well as whether his true intent 4 was to solicit others to commit crimes of violence, as alleged 5 in Count 3 of this indictment. 6 Ahmed Sattar has told you that this was never his true 7 intent, and he, ladies and gentlemen, is the only person, 8 participant, individual in this courtroom who was best able to 9 determine what his own true intent was during his own 10 conversations, whether they be with others in this courtroom or 11 outside this courtroom, as presented at this trial. In fact, I 12 believe after you have fully evaluated all of the evidence or 13 lack of evidence, you will find that the government has indeed 14 failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the required element 15 of intent for the crimes charged in both Counts 2 and 3. 16 One is not able to determine Ahmed Sattar's intent or 17 state of mind, as the government would have you believe, by 18 retrying Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. You cannot prove Ahmed 19 Sattar's intent or state of mind by showing Osama Bin Laden in 20 a video that was broadcast many months before 9/11 when we all 21 learned about him. You cannot prove Ahmed Sattar's intent or 22 state of mind simply by showing that he had in his home old 23 newspaper clippings, whether they be about the violence in 24 Egypt and the Middle East, and who may or may not have claimed 25 responsibility, or articles about the Islamic Group and its SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11632 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 past. 2 Of what importance are these, especially when you 3 learn that Ahmed would have obviously had a particular interest 4 in this subject, given the fact that he not only worked on the 5 Sheikh's case, but is himself very political and interested in 6 all of the news, as he told you about Egypt and the Middle 7 East. He testified that he would always read Arabic and 8 English newspapers and sometimes he would clip them so he could 9 later read them to the Sheikh, which he did for hours when 10 Sheikh Rahman would call him from prison. 11 You also cannot prove state of mind or criminal intent 12 simply by choosing and then seizing from Ahmed Sattar's home a 13 book titled the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This book 14 about the so-called Jewish conspiracy that dates all the way 15 back to Russia in the 1800s is so absurd it is laughable. I 16 suppose what the government might expect and hope by presenting 17 this book to you is that you would all react and go, this must 18 be proof of Ahmed Sattar's true beliefs and prejudice against 19 Jews. To even suggest this is ridiculous. 20 If that is the government's argument in somehow 21 attempting to connect this book in order to prove Ahmed 22 Sattar's true criminal intent, when he assisted Taha in the 23 writing of the fatwah against Israelis, then I suggest we are 24 all in a lot of trouble. And similar to what Mr. Stern was 25 just arguing in his summation, if that is the case, I recommend SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11633 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 that when you go home tonight you should carefully examine your 2 own personal library and make sure you remove any books which 3 one might conceivably some day infer or argue are proof of your 4 own beliefs. 5 You better get rid of books such as Mein Kompf or The 6 Rise and the Fall of the Third Reich, for who knows, you might 7 be accused of being a Nazi sympathizer. Perhaps you better 8 burn Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto or other writings from Che 9 Guevera or Fidel Castro, for surely you don't want be accused 10 of being a communist. 11 You do not allow yourself and should not allow 12 yourself to be drawn in and tempted to making any such similar 13 or illogical conclusions from the fact that Ahmed Sattar 14 possessed Taha's book. Anyone would agree that this book 15 clearly contains language of anger, hatred, bigotry, and Taha's 16 own unique justification for violence by twisting the teachings 17 of the Quran to suit his own purposes. 18 But simply because Ahmed Sattar possessed this book 19 does not mean that he shared in these same beliefs or that 20 somehow he agreed with Taha's militancy or prejudices. In 21 fact, Ahmed told you he does not agree with Taha militancy or 22 his interpretation of the Quran or Islamic jurisprudence. He 23 also told you that he happened to possess Taha's book. It was 24 sent to him by Taha, he believes, over the internet, so that he 25 would in turn forward it onto the Sheikh for the Sheikh's SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11634 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 approval, which he unsuccessfully attempted to do. 2 Did he read it? Yes. He told you, he read parts of 3 it, which is how he came to conclude he disagreed with it. It 4 was also read and recorded by someone else onto six tapes so 5 that it could then be forwarded to Sheikh Rahman. These six 6 tapes were sent to Abdeen Jabara, who we know was one of the 7 lawyers for the Sheikh who happens to speak Arabic. Everyone 8 knew that anything forwarded to the Sheikh would undergo strict 9 screening, careful screening by the Bureau of Prisons or the 10 FBI, and that is exactly what happened. There was nothing 11 secretive or sneaky going on here. 12 When Mr. Jabara mailed the tapes to the prison, they 13 were returned to him. When Ahmed Sattar testified to this you 14 can be sure that this was the very first time that the 15 prosecutors ever even realized that Taha's book had been 16 recorded onto tapes and then mailed to the Sheikh. They didn't 17 know that before Ahmed testified about it. Because if they 18 had, you could be sure they would have marched up some 19 witness -- a witness finally -- from the FBI and the Bureau of 20 Prisons to explained how they intercepted these tapes, how they 21 screened it, what was on it, why they stopped it. That didn't 22 happen. 23 That only came to light when Ahmed Sattar testified 24 truthfully to that, as he did about everything else. But, most 25 importantly, it shows you that there was nothing going on with SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11635 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 this book other than the fact that Taha had wanted the Sheikh's 2 reaction to it, and Ahmed sent it on through the one attorney 3 who speaks Arabic. That, ladies and gentlemen, is the extent 4 of Ahmed Sattar's connection to Taha's book. 5 Let me just make one other comment here. Again, I 6 suppose what bothers all of us, because it is interesting, as I 7 listened to Mr. Stern's argument -- it clearly bothered him as 8 well -- that one of the reasons this is such a great country is 9 that we all enjoy many freedoms. One of those freedoms is the 10 right to read anything we choose. How else does one learn or 11 gain knowledge of any subject, whether it is just something of 12 interest or simply a desire to understand those who think and 13 believe differently from you? 14 Apparently, the government wants you to believe that 15 you should somehow draw negative inferences and conclude that 16 one who possesses certain books or articles must mean that that 17 person holds similar beliefs as expressed in those very books 18 and articles. And, unfortunately, it is from these kind of 19 unfair inferences which the government has continually relied 20 on in their efforts to prove their case against Ahmed Sattar, 21 it is from this kind of presentation of the evidence which the 22 government continually attempted and, I might add, hoped would 23 somehow prove Ahmed Sattar's criminal intent in the crimes 24 charged. 25 What are the charges that have been brought against SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11636 514MSAT3 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Ahmed Sattar which you will have to decide? 2 THE COURT: Whenever there is a convenient time to 3 break for lunch. 4 MR. PAUL: Your Honor, this might be fine. 5 THE COURT: All right. 6 Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to break for lunch. 7 Please, please remember my continuing instructions. Please 8 don't talk about this case at all. Don't talk about the case 9 at all. Always remember to keep an open mind until I have 10 instructed you on the law and you've gone to the jury room to 11 begin your deliberations. 12 Have a good lunch. I look forward to seeing you at 13 about five after two. 14 All rise, please. 15 (Jury not present) 16 THE COURT: Please be back at five of two. 17 (Luncheon recess) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11637 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N 2 2:15 p.m. 3 (Trial resumed; jury not present) 4 THE COURT: Please, be seated. All right. Bring in 5 the jury. 6 (Jury present) 7 THE COURT: Please be seated, all. Good afternoon, 8 ladies and gentlemen. 9 THE JURY: Good afternoon. 10 THE COURT: Good to see you all. 11 All right, we are going to continue now with the 12 summations and all of my instructions continue to apply. 13 Mr. Stern, you may proceed. I'm sorry. 14 Mr. Paul, you may proceed. 15 MR. PAUL: Thank you. 16 So let's talk about the charges that have been brought 17 against Ahmed Sattar which you will ultimately have to decide. 18 The government has brought three separate charges or 19 counts as set forth in the indictment. These are all very 20 serious charges. Count One, conspiracy to defraud the United 21 States. Count Two, conspiracy to kill or kidnap persons in a 22 foreign country. Count Three, solicitation of crimes of 23 violence. I believe the evidence as it relates to these three 24 charges can be broken down into the following general areas 25 which I will attempt to review with you. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11638 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 First, the Special Administrative Measures, or SAMs, 2 as we have come to know them. Those really go to the heart of 3 Count One since it is alleged that the conspiracy to defraud 4 the United States involved the violation of the SAMs. 5 Second, the peace initiative, which we heard so much 6 about throughout the course of this trial. 7 Third, the so-called ghost-written Fatwah that was 8 issued in the name of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. 9 Fourth, an individual name Atia who was a fugitive 10 from the Egyptian government. 11 In addition to these areas of evidence that were 12 presented I will also discuss with you the formation of 13 political parties in Egypt, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman's health 14 and prison conditions, the U.S.S. Cole and Abu Sayyaf. 15 So, let me start with Count One. 16 Ahmed Sattar is charged in this count with knowingly 17 conspiring and agreeing with others -- and I am referring now 18 to the indictment -- to defraud the United States and an agency 19 thereof, to wit, to hamper, hinder, impede and obstruct by 20 trickery, deceit and dishonest means, the lawful and legitimate 21 functions of the United States Department of Justice and its 22 agency, the Bureau of Prisons, in the administration and 23 enforcement of the Special Administrative Measures for inmate 24 Abdel Rahman. 25 In other words, Ahmed Sattar knowingly agreed with SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11639 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 others to violate and get around the severe restrictions placed 2 on Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman which also included the limitations 3 of his communicating with the outside world and the 4 government's use of the SAMs to enforce those limitations. 5 Did Ahmed Sattar write letters to the Sheikh 6 communicating information from both the Sheikh's family in 7 Egypt as well as many of his followers around the world? Yes. 8 Did Ahmed Sattar write letters to the Sheikh that 9 included personal regards from many of the Sheikh's supporters, 10 whether they be from the local mosques or elsewhere? Yes. 11 Did Ahmed Sattar suggest to the translator, Mohammed 12 Yousry, or the lawyers who represented the Sheikh some of the 13 news items that he felt should be read to the Sheikh so that he 14 would be aware of what was going on in the world? Yes. 15 Was this both done when either the Sheikh called from 16 prison to the lawyers' offices, as well as when his lawyers 17 went to visit the Sheikh in prison? Yes. 18 How did Ahmed Sattar do any of this? 19 As we heard from one intercepted phone conversation 20 with Mohammed Yousry, he sometimes simply would communicate 21 which news articles and which papers he thought would be 22 important or interesting for Sheikh Rahman to hear about when 23 there was to be a prison telephone call. 24 Other times, as he testified, he would write out some 25 of the newsworthy events from Egypt and the Middle East in one SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11640 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 of his personal letters to be read to the Sheikh during a 2 prison visit. On these occasions, prior to their trip to visit 3 the Sheikh, he would give his letters to either one of the 4 lawyers or the interpreter. As he testified, it was then left 5 up to the lawyers who would make the ultimate decision as to 6 whether or not to read Ahmed's letters to the Sheikh and, in 7 some cases, get a response back from the Sheikh. 8 That decision, ladies and gentlemen, was made 9 independently from my client, Mr. Sattar, who had absolutely no 10 input into the final decision as to what or what not was to be 11 authorized. 12 He told you, as he also explained in an intercepted 13 conversation, that the small -- and he referred to, quote 14 unquote, window of opportunity -- to communicate with the 15 Sheikh was provided only through the lawyers and it was 16 therefore up to the lawyers to decide what should be permitted 17 or not permitted to go through and/or come out through that 18 window of opportunity. 19 Did Ahmed Sattar know about the SAMs and what they 20 were about? Yes. 21 Did he know when they came into effect? Of course he 22 did. After all, neither he nor anyone else, except the 23 lawyers, translator and occasionally the Sheikh's wife, were 24 permitted to visit or talk with the Sheikh once the SAMs and 25 its restrictions were placed on him. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11641 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Up until the existence of the SAMs Ahmed Sattar 2 visited and communicated with the Sheikh regularly. As he told 3 you, whether it was before, during, or after the Sheikh's 4 trial, he received prison calls at his home from the Sheikh. 5 They would talk and Ahmed would read newspapers to him from his 6 kitchen table. You heard testimony about that. Obviously 7 those visits and calls ended with the institution of the SAMs. 8 Though Ahmed possessed copies of the SAMs did he ever 9 carefully read any of the ones he received from whichever 10 lawyer sent them to him? Not really. He told you he would 11 look at them but not read them with great care. Why would he? 12 He believed that they didn't have anything to do with him. 13 You know what? He was right. All he understood was 14 that they had to be renewed every few months which is why he 15 received several versions time and time again. Since they 16 weren't really addressed to him all he really needed to know or 17 was concerned with was that the SAMs severely restricted Sheikh 18 Omar Abdel Rahman's prison conditions even moreso than before 19 their existence. 20 Ramsey Clark, former United States Attorney General, 21 who became one of the first attorneys to represent the Sheikh 22 after his arrest, testified. In fact, we learned it was Ahmed 23 Sattar who happened to reach out to Ramsey Clark based on his 24 fine reputation. And Ahmed was instrumental in convincing 25 Mr. Clark to represent the Sheikh when the Sheikh at first was SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11642 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 insisting on representing himself in his own defense of the 2 charges that had been brought against him. 3 Mr. Clark testified how it was important, both before 4 and especially after the SAMs for the Sheikh to be kept 5 apprised of what was happening with his family as well as world 6 events and the news. This was why, from very early on, it was 7 decided by all the lawyers -- all the lawyers -- that the news 8 had to be read to the Sheikh whether it was over the phone or 9 during a prison visit. When the SAMs came into existence he 10 would be completely shut off from that. 11 So, as Mr. Clark told you, reading newspapers to him 12 was a big part of what the lawyers felt they had to do, not 13 only for the reason of keeping him focused but also just for 14 his health and survival. And Mr. Stern made reference to 15 Mr. Clark's testimony when he referred to how Mr. Clark 16 described the reason for this to continue, because Mr. Clark 17 told you this was a blind man losing sensitivity to his 18 fingertips because of his diabetes so he could no longer read 19 Braille. He spoke no English and so, if there were few, if any 20 interpreters at the prison; and he obviously had no access to 21 Arab language broadcasts or even to other prisoners, he was 22 placed in the darkness of isolation that went well beyond the 23 darkness of his handicap. 24 Almost from the very beginning when Ramsey Clark and 25 the rest of the legal team were in place and began representing SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11643 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 the Sheikh on his criminal case, Ahmed Sattar was given his 2 role, what he was supposed to do. He was the one who would 3 continue to maintain contact with the Sheikh's family and 4 others in Egypt, including but not limited to the Egyptian 5 lawyer, Muntasir Al-Zayat. It was Ahmed who had the phone 6 numbers and knew the Sheikh's family. And since he spoke their 7 language, he could translate when it was needed to communicate 8 with him. 9 Mr. Clark testified that he had contact with the press 10 regularly about the Sheikh's case. He issued press releases 11 concerning a variety of subjects about Sheikh Rahman both 12 before and after the SAMs were in place. He talked to the 13 press about the Sheikh's initial position concerning his 14 support of the peace initiative. He continually tried to use 15 the media in order to keep reminded the world of the Sheikh's 16 presence in America's prison, as well as the severe conditions 17 of his confinement. He issued several press releases and held 18 press conferences both here in the United States as well as in 19 Egypt, and he told you about those. 20 Another lawyer, Abdeen Jabara, he too issued press 21 releases concerning the Sheikh, his poor health and his 22 conditions in prison. 23 Ahmed Sattar, who had dealt regularly with the press, 24 also issued press releases with the authorization of the 25 attorneys. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11644 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 These notices to the press continued over the years 2 from the beginning of the Sheikh's confinement both before and 3 after the SAMs. 4 Mr. Clark thought it was essential that as more time 5 passed the more important it became to not allow the world to 6 forget about the Sheikh and the terrible conditions he was 7 living through. This was achieved through the media. 8 And, as Mr. Clark testified, Ahmed Sattar's role, 9 beyond serving as a paralegal on the Sheikh's case, was to 10 continue to maintain the contacts he had previously nurtured 11 with both the American and Arab press just for that specific 12 purpose. 13 When asked about his opinion as to why it was so 14 important for him and the other lawyers to speak to the media 15 about the Sheikh Mr. Clark testified -- and I am now quoting 16 from page 8759 of the trial transcript beginning at line 7: 17 Quote, It was important to keep the memory of the Sheikh alive. 18 He was prohibited from communicating himself. We couldn't 19 patch calls through for him, we couldn't put him on a speaker 20 phone. We couldn't let anybody else listen to the phone calls. 21 We couldn't record them and put them out on a loudspeaker from 22 the top of a mosque. His lawyers had a duty in representing 23 him in hoping to protect his rights to remind the world of his 24 existence so he wouldn't be completely forgotten. End quote. 25 Mr. Clark had also hoped that he knew it would be SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11645 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 difficult to eventually arrange for the Sheikh to be returned 2 to Egypt where at least he would be in a facility and he would 3 be close to his family and where he would have access to others 4 who at least spoke the same language. 5 And to this day, Mr. Clark told you, he is working 6 toward that goal. 7 And it was with this philosophy and policy as set by 8 the lawyers on behalf of the Sheikh that Ahmed Sattar simply 9 continued to do what he was told from the very outset to do in 10 his role of assisting the legal team and their client. Ahmed 11 knew the SAMs applied to the Sheikh and he had knowledge that 12 they restricted the Sheikh's ability to communicate and be 13 visited by anyone other than his attorneys. 14 Was my client ever asked to sign or acknowledge 15 anything having to do with the SAMs? No. Why would he have 16 been? The SAMs clearly were not addressed nor did they ever 17 apply directly to him. 18 Ahmed Sattar never saw his role of dealing with the 19 media differently either before or after the SAMs. He 20 continued to do what Mr. Clark himself had done from the very 21 beginning and continued in the role that had been given to him 22 by Sheikh Rahman's legal team. He dealt with the media and 23 continued to communicate with those from Egypt. He also wrote 24 personal letters with greetings from supporters as well as news 25 and questions from many, including Muntasir Al-Zayat, Mustafa SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11646 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Hamza and Taha. 2 These inquiries from Taha and others of the Sheikh's 3 opinion on various matters and/or information or news 4 concerning their individual positions on different subjects 5 involving the Islamic Group was no different -- no different at 6 all -- than the everyday news articles that were being read to 7 the Sheikh on a regular basis by the lawyers and translator 8 during the many prison calls. 9 In other words, Ahmed Sattar was doing nothing that he 10 could possibly know was outside the boundaries of what was 11 permissible even under the restrictions of the SAMs. 12 For this reason, he was not knowingly participating in 13 any kind of conspiracy, yet alone one that was to defraud the 14 United States. He was simply continuing to do what he had 15 always done and which was within his role as assigned to him 16 and approved by the legal team. 17 He could not possibly believe that anything he was 18 doing was illegal since it was always -- always -- left up to 19 the lawyers to determine what was legal and authorized and what 20 was not. That wasn't his job. 21 Ahmed Sattar never believed that sending letters to 22 the Sheikh was violating the SAMs, nor did he ever believe that 23 he was in any way encouraging or assisting in acts of violence 24 by doing so. 25 I would like to now discuss with you the area of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11647 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 evidence concerning this peace initiative. 2 In providing you a broad picture of this indictment 3 perhaps you remember when Mr. Morvillo, in his opening 4 statement, talked about each of these defendants and how they 5 helped to get the Sheikh's messages out of prison back and 6 forth. This, according to the government, culminated in the 7 spring of 2000, when Sheikh Rahman publicly withdrew his 8 support of the peace initiative and these defendants helped him 9 to get that communication out. 10 Both Mr. Morvillo, in his opening, and now, once 11 again, Mr. Dember in his summation, claim that by doing this 12 the defendants all helped the Sheikh to, quote, break out of 13 jail, end quote. 14 And, essentially, as Mr. Morvillo went on to say, this 15 was the equivalent of the Sheikh telling his followers to, 16 quote unquote, fire. That's what he said. Equivalent to 17 telling his supporters to fire. 18 That certainly made for a very dramatic moment in the 19 presentation of evidence you were going to hear, according to 20 Mr. Morvillo. But, in fact, the evidence never supported such 21 a claim. 22 Whether it was the Sheikh's statement of the, quote, 23 withdrawal of the support, end quote, for the peace initiative; 24 or his later clarification of that statement that it should be 25 quote, re-evaluated, end quote, by the brothers in Egypt; or, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11648 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 as he had said earlier, that he, quote, absolved, end quote, 2 anyone from following it; Ahmed Sattar never ever interpreted 3 any of these statements as the equivalent to telling the 4 Sheikh's followers to fire. Nor did he ever understand any of 5 these statements were a call for violence. 6 First of all, the Sheikh understood that the 1997 7 peace initiative, which he had supported, was a very important 8 political movement in Egypt which had repercussions throughout 9 the entire Islamic world. It was recognized by everyone that 10 although Sheikh Rahman is a very important figure in the 11 Islamic world, the impact of the peace initiative was vast and 12 goes well beyond any one man's opinion, even one as well 13 respected as him. 14 It was in June or July of 1997 when Ahmed first 15 learned of the statement issued concerning a peace initiative 16 having read about it in the Al-Hayat newspaper. 17 The Islamic Group's leader from prison in Egypt had 18 initiated a statement calling for the halt of all violent acts. 19 It was a peace offering made to the Egyptian government which 20 was clearly not unanimously supported by the Islamic Group 21 members. There was general support from those members of the 22 Islamic Group who were inside of Egypt such as the leaders in 23 prison -- the Egyptian lawyer Muntasir Al-Zayat and Salah 24 Hashim who we also know as the engineer. And there were those 25 on the outside of Egypt who, as time passed, with little or no SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11649 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 progress shown on the part of the government of Egypt, did not 2 support it. 3 These different factions over the years were the cause 4 of great friction within the Group as to how to best negotiate 5 with the Egyptian government. They all continued to remain 6 unified in their support of the peace initiative. And, more 7 importantly, do so even today. 8 In August of 1997 a prison visit was made to the 9 Sheikh in Springfield, Missouri by Ramsey Clark and Mohammed 10 Yousry. Ahmed, as he did before every prison visit, made the 11 arrangements and paid for the plane tickets. The lawyers would 12 coordinate a convenient time to visit and then Ahmed would make 13 the reservations and book the tickets. The purchase of the 14 plane tickets and traveling expenses were paid by contributions 15 from the Muslim community here in the United States who still 16 supported the Sheikh. These donations were also apparently 17 used for the Sheikh's family. 18 Ahmed Sattar testified that in advance of each prison 19 visit he would usually write a letter in Arabic for the Sheikh. 20 He said that most of the content of these letters consisted of 21 information concerning the Sheikh's family, the Muslim 22 community in the United States and an update on the local 23 mosque and general information of what's going on in the United 24 States and around the world. 25 There was a continued effort, as Ramsey Clark told SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11650 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 you, to keep the Sheikh involved and informed of everything. 2 These personal letters contained greetings as well as inquiries 3 from his supporters around the world. They would inform the 4 Sheikh of what others might be saying regarding certain issues. 5 Ahmed would give these letters to either the lawyers or 6 Mr. Yousry and then, ultimately, the lawyers would decide 7 whether to read the letters to the Sheikh or not. That was 8 their decision. 9 On this particular visit in 1997, Ahmed's letter 10 included information about what he had learned concerning the 11 statement from the prisoners in Egypt of a peace initiative 12 being offered to the Egyptian government. Since it was 13 reported that it was met with both approval and denial, Ahmed 14 requested, through Mr. Clark, the Sheikh's opinion. And he in 15 fact received it. 16 The Sheikh approved of the peace initiative and this 17 position was announced by both Ramsey Clark, to the press. 18 And, with the authorization of Mr. Clark, Ahmed made the same 19 announcement to the Arab media. 20 The Sheikh was quoted as saying that he gave his 21 blessings, quote unquote, to stop the violence and ask others 22 to support it. Ahmed issued the statement to the press because 23 that was the Sheikh's reply and opinion on the subject. It was 24 not important to Ahmed Sattar that the Sheikh's opinion was in 25 fact different from his own, which he in fact expressed in the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11651 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 letter he sent to the Sheikh. 2 Ahmed Sattar testified that, unlike the Sheikh, he 3 felt at that time it was a mistake to offer a peace initiative 4 and that they should wait. It was Ahmed's feeling that at this 5 time in 1997 the Islamic Group was all but completely defeated 6 by the Egyptian government. They no longer had any strength 7 and were completely powerless. He believed that, politically, 8 this was a bad policy for why would the Egyptian government 9 want to negotiate with a group that was, for the most part, 10 defeated and was simply now surrendering. Why would there be 11 any motivation by the Egyptian government to make any 12 concessions in response to this position of weakness? 13 Ahmed Sattar's position was not advocating violence by 14 suggesting to wait. He merely believed that the Egyptian 15 government would never respond in kind and they did not. Ahmed 16 Sattar's opinion of the peace initiative changed some four 17 months later in November 1997. November 17th, 1997, to be 18 exact. 19 We all heard at this trial about the brutal attack 20 that happened at Luxor. Ahmed Sattar learned of this while he 21 was watching the TV news. He recalls, as he told you, seeing 22 the bodies of the foreign tourists and the Egyptian policemen 23 who were killed, as well as the attackers; and he was 24 horrified. 25 At first the Sheikh did not respond to this violence SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11652 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 but it was with Ahmed's urging and communication to the Sheikh 2 through Ramsey Clark that Sheikh Rahman condemned this violence 3 in a statement he issued during a prison call. 4 Thereafter, after having been first and after having 5 been arranged through Ahmed, Ramsey Clark conveyed the Sheikh's 6 disapproval of the violence in a statement to the America and 7 Arab media. 8 The fact that Luxor occurred some four months after 9 the Sheikh had issued his statement of the support for this 10 initiative is evidence of how the Sheikh's opinion, though 11 important, is not a ruling opinion or even a deciding vote when 12 it comes to the Islamic Group. 13 According to Ahmed Sattar's understanding, the Sheikh, 14 though the spiritual leader of the Islamic Group, counts only 15 as one vote within the leadership or sure it counts and 16 decision requires a majority vote. Ahmed always understood the 17 Sheikh's role within the Islamic Group as an advisory one and 18 nothing more. 19 Events involving the Islamic Group show this to be 20 true for not only did Luxor occur after the Sheikh announced 21 support for the peace initiative but the Sheikh also opposed 22 the formation of political parties and yet, thereafter, a 23 political party was formed in Egypt. 24 The Sheikh also declared, as we heard, that the 25 Islamic Group should never create a new charter without his SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11653 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 consultation and yet we learned that a new charter was 2 published at the end of 2001 or the beginning of 2002. 3 Clearly it appears obvious from this that the Sheikh's 4 role was advisory and his vote counted only as one. 5 As Ahmed Sattar testified, immediately after Luxor 6 there were statements from Islamic Group members claiming 7 responsibility as well as from others who denounced it. If the 8 Luxor attack was committed by some who were associated with the 9 Islamic Group, it seems likely that given the group's vote and 10 the support from Sheikh Rahman for the peace initiative, there 11 would have to have been some splinter group that had never been 12 made aware of the peace initiative. 13 It was in early 1998 when Ahmed Sattar was first 14 contacted by Yassir Al-Sirri. He had gotten Ahmed's telephone 15 number from an interview that was published in a newspaper. 16 Al-Sirri was an Egyptian activist living in London who 17 was seeking political asylum. He had started a center called 18 the Islamic Observation Center which was concerned with Muslims 19 and their human rights around the world. Because of their 20 common interests in the Sheikh and Egyptian politics, Al-Sirri 21 and Ahmed began to speak more often. 22 In late 1998 Ahmed Sattar was first contacted by Taha, 23 who had received his number from Al-Sirri. This was someone 24 who Ahmed had already known about having read of him in 25 newspapers and books about the Islamic Group. He knew that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11654 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Taha was a founder of the Islamic Group and soon realized he 2 was calling from Afghanistan where many Egyptians had 3 previously gone to fight against the invasion by the Soviets. 4 Soon after first hearing from Taha, Ahmed received a 5 telephone call from someone named Yunis who, apparently, got 6 his number from Taha. And though the government claims that 7 Yunis and Mustafa Hamza are one in the same, Ahmed only knew 8 him as Yunis. He does, as he told, however, know of Mustafa 9 Hamza who was in charge of the Islamic Group after Taha had 10 resigned. Like Al-Sirri, Taha and Yunis contacted Ahmed Sattar 11 because of their common interest in the Sheikh and Egypt. 12 To this day Ahmed has never ever met any of these 13 individuals nor had he ever, even once, called Taha or Yunis. 14 They always called him. 15 It was through the many conversations that Ahmed had 16 with both Taha and Yunis as well as through the three-way phone 17 calls that he patched through to others for them that he 18 learned their position concerning the peace initiative. 19 Yunis supported the initiative. Taha's position was 20 more complicated. He did not support it completely because 21 apparently he felt that there had been very few favorable 22 results. 23 Since the Egyptian regime was not responding in any 24 significant way to the initiative, Taha wanted to push and push 25 some more for more propaganda in the media and to take a more SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11655 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 forceful position with the threat -- the threat -- of force. 2 As Ahmed explained, it was his understanding that Taha 3 wanted to utilize his militant reputation with the Egyptian 4 regime and play the tough cop in pushing for more results. 5 In the March 1999 prison visit Ahmed wrote a letter to 6 the Sheikh which included, among many other things, a 7 communication from Taha where he was complaining about not 8 being satisfied with the results of the initiative, as well as 9 being shut out and silenced by others whenever he wrote or gave 10 his opinion. 11 Ahmed again received the Sheikh's response to all the 12 various parties from his letters to the Sheikh. This included 13 a reply to Taha which was spelled out in points. 14 The Sheikh told Taha that though he is entitled to his 15 opinion and there is nothing wrong with differing with the 16 brothers in prison, he should understand, however, that they -- 17 those in prison -- are probably in a better position to know 18 what is happening inside Egypt and, because of that, their 19 position should be adhered to and given a chance. 20 The Sheikh also stated that he did not support the 21 idea of the formation of an Islamic political party in Egypt. 22 Once again, an example where Ahmed disagreed with the Sheikh's 23 opinion for -- unlike the Sheikh -- he does support a multiple 24 political party system. 25 Ahmed both testified as well as having previously SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11656 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 stated his opinion on this very subject by writing on a 2 bulletin board posted through a website on the internet. This 3 was introduced into evidence as Defense Exhibits AS-19 and 4 translated as AS-19T which was retrieved from his computer and 5 where Ahmed had expressed, in detail, unbelievable detail, how 6 he believed in a democracy with the establishment of political 7 parties working within an Islamic framework. And you can look 8 at those exhibits and you can see how he spelled out the fact 9 that he did in fact believe in political parties being utilized 10 and used in Egypt, unlike what the Sheikh's position was, 11 apparently. 12 In September of 1999, after the murder of four Islamic 13 Group members by the Egyptian government, the Sheikh's response 14 to these murders was to begin to question the effectiveness of 15 the peace initiative. 16 As told to Ahmed, after the prison visit in September 17 1999, the Sheikh felt that though he had supported the 18 initiative in the past, it should still be left up to those in 19 Egypt to decide how to proceed and how to best proceed. He 20 demanded that the brothers do a, quote unquote, comprehensive 21 review of the peace initiative and its results. And if it was 22 in the interest of the group, they should keep it in place and, 23 if not, they should consider themselves, quote unquote, 24 absolved. 25 It was decided by Ramsey Clark not to release the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11657 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 statement to the press because -- because -- according to 2 Mr. Clark, he feared that this could result in the Sheikh being 3 cut off even further from his lawyers and family. And not for 4 any other reason, as suggested by Mr. Dember. 5 Ahmed's understanding of this statement when he 6 conveyed it to Taha in a telephone call on September 20th, 7 1999, was not that this was a call for the Islamic Group to 8 return to the days past of violence, but rather a call for 9 different factions within the group to have a dialogue and 10 settle their differences. 11 That's what comprehensive review of the initiative and 12 its results means. That's what the Sheikh said. And that's 13 not a very ambiguous statement. 14 And isn't it interesting that in a call that was 15 actually referred to by Mr. Dember in his summation, 16 specifically Government Exhibit 1030X, a call between Ahmed 17 Sattar and Mohammed Yousry on September 20th, 1999, that it 18 certainly doesn't sound like Ahmed is someone on this mission 19 that we heard so much about from Mr. Dember, to get the 20 Sheikh's statement about the initiative out there and to be 21 issued by one of the Sheikh's lawyers. We heard a lot about 22 that from Mr. Dember. There was this mission on the part of 23 Sattar and Taha because they weren't satisfied, they wanted the 24 lawyer's word to be out there giving the Sheikh's opinion. 25 So, let me refer to 1030X, Government Exhibit 1030X. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11658 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Yousry states: When, unintelligible, talked to that 2 guy, Ramsey, and said to him that the Sheikh announced the, 3 unintelligible, and so, when Ramsey says... 4 Sattar: No, he did not tell me that, Ramsey didn't 5 say so... 6 Yousry: Ask Ramsey. 7 Sattar: Ramsey didn't tell me that. 8 Yousry: Ask Ramsey. This issue was discussed and 9 Ramsey knows it. 10 Sattar: He probably figured it out from his legal 11 angle. That's okay. If he sees it this way, fine. I thought 12 he was going to put these words in a communique and send it to 13 the press or something. 14 Yousry: He should have written to the press. 15 Sattar: I don't believe he is going to do that and I 16 am not going to do that either. 17 It doesn't sound like someone pushing for some agenda 18 here. 19 Sattar continues: For as long as he is not going to 20 announce it to the press, that's it, finished. He wanted to 21 have this known in a certain realm, that's fine. You can't ask 22 him to do something that is beyond -- and he continues -- his 23 ability either. 24 Yousry: Did you ask him? 25 Sattar: No, I didn't. I didn't ask him precisely SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11659 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 about this point. 2 Yousry: Yes, but you asked him about all the other 3 things. 4 Sattar: I did. I asked him about all the other 5 things and I told him that I was under the impression that 6 these words were going to come out in a statement from you to 7 the press. He said, no. I said, fine. 8 It doesn't sound like some agenda going on here that 9 Mr. Sattar is so upset that Mr. Clark isn't issuing a press 10 conference about this or a statement. 11 And Yousry goes on, Yousry: Well, we can solve this 12 problem next week. 13 Sattar: Yeah. 14 Yousry: We can tell him to ask the Sheikh and that's 15 it. 16 Sattar: Exactly. 17 Yousry: He asks and the Sheikh answers him, wants to 18 issue a statement. 19 Sattar: It will be up to them. 20 Meaning the Sheikh and Ramsey Clark, when he has a 21 prison call with the Sheikh. He's not pushing anything here. 22 And from that conversation it certainly doesn't sound 23 like Ahmed was someone who is very upset about Ramsey Clark not 24 wanting to give a press conference or issue a press release, or 25 someone who has some agenda that, with Taha, that would require SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11660 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 a lawyer to issue the Sheikh's opinion. It doesn't seem like 2 it. 3 And Mr. Dember's effort to prove something about 4 Mr. Yousry, he disproves one of his own theories about Ahmed 5 Sattar. And you cannot have it both ways. 6 In February of 2000 Abdeen Jabara and Mohammed Yousry 7 went on a prison visit to see the Sheikh. Again, Ahmed sent a 8 personal letter to the Sheikh which included updates from his 9 family, people from the mosque, and a review concerning the 10 initiative with the opinions of it expressed by Taha as well as 11 Mustafa Hamza. 12 Ahmed never received any reply back to his letters or 13 the reason why Abdeen Jabara had refused to read the letters to 14 the Sheikh. 15 Again, Mr. Dember referred to a call that took place 16 between Ahmed Sattar and Hamza after this visit on February 17 28th, 2000, which is Government Exhibit 1062X. In that call 18 Ahmed states that he is angry with Abdeen Jabara for having 19 refused to read Ahmed's letters and receive a response back 20 from the Sheikh. 21 The reason Ahmed would have been angry is because he 22 simply is surprised at this point that Abdeen Jabara had 23 refused to do what Ramsey Clark himself had done during the 24 previous visit with the Sheikh in September 1999. 25 Remember, though Mr. Clark had decided not to give a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11661 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 press release about the Sheikh's opinion concerning the peace 2 initiative, he nevertheless had authorized the reading of 3 Ahmed's letters and, in fact, also authorized the Sheikh's 4 response to those letters. How else would Ahmed have received 5 the response about what the Sheikh had said concerning the 6 initiative and that there should be this comprehensive review? 7 For Ahmed the fact that this was now, on this 8 occasion, refused by Abdeen Jabara without any explanation, 9 made no sense to him. That was why he said he was angry in 10 this conversation that took place with Hamza. And for no other 11 reason. This theory Mr. Dember argued that Ahmed Sattar was 12 angry and frustrated because he needed a lawyer to come forward 13 and issue the Sheikh's opinion on the peace initiative is 14 clearly not the case. 15 You also should not lose sight of the fact that any 16 information that was ever written in Ahmed Sattar's letters was 17 no different -- no different -- than what was being read to the 18 Sheikh on a regular basis during the Sheikh's many prison 19 calls. This was the only visit, the only time where it was 20 decided not to read the letters from Ahmed and that, and that 21 reason alone, is why he was upset with Abdeen Jabara. 22 Your Honor, this might be a convenient time to take a 23 recess. 24 THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, we will 25 break for 10 minutes. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11662 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Please, please, remember my continuing instructions. 2 Please, don't talk about this case at all, always remember to 3 keep an open mind until I have finally instructed you on the 4 law. 5 All rise, please. Please follow Mr. Fletcher to the 6 jury room. 7 (Jury not present) 8 THE COURT: See you shortly. 9 (Recess) 10 THE COURT: Please be seated, all. All right, let's 11 bring in the jury. 12 (Jury present) 13 THE COURT: Please be seated, all. 14 Mr. Paul, you may proceed. 15 MR. PAUL: Thank you, your Honor. 16 Ladies and gentlemen, let me just point one thing out 17 to you so you are aware of this. Some of the exhibits that are 18 being displayed, the Government's Exhibits, you may or may not 19 notice, have those stars. Those are always -- or asterisks -- 20 those indicate that there has been redactions from the actual 21 exhibits. And we have done that so when I'm reading from my 22 notes that matches with that part that you are seeing. 23 So, I just want to alert you to that but the full 24 transcript is not being displayed on your desk tops there, your 25 screens. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11663 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Let me now talk about the visit, the prison visit in 2 May of 2000. 3 As we know, this was another prison visit to the 4 Sheikh and had been planned and then arranged by Ahmed for 5 Lynne Stewart and Mohammed Yousry. This visit, as we learned, 6 was intercepted by the government. And we all sat here and we 7 watched in this courtroom on the screen the video of that and 8 we have seen again some excerpts of that, as well. 9 On this visit, Ahmed wrote letters to the Sheikh 10 which, as always, included the usual greetings from friends and 11 family; news events; as well as complaints from Taha about how 12 he is being criticized by the Islamic Group's leaders who are 13 speaking out against the Egyptian government. 14 It was always Ahmed's understanding that Taha was 15 simply asking for the Sheikh's moral support in order to lend 16 credibility to him so he could continue to speak out against 17 the repressive government of Egypt. 18 Taha was upset at how the faction of the leaders from 19 within Egypt's prison and their lawyer, Muntasir Al-Zayat, as 20 well as Mustafa Hamza, who was outside Egypt, were all trying 21 to cut him off. 22 Ahmed tried, in his letter, to convey to the Sheikh 23 how Taha was speaking out against the Egyptian regime for 24 ignoring and refusing to respond to the initiative. Taha was 25 causing the regime to sit up and take notice due to its SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11664 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 knowledge of his past leadership role in the Islamic Group 2 during the war -- the period of war from 1990 to 1997. 3 The other faction of leaders in Egypt were trying to 4 silence Taha because they fear that the regime would respond by 5 making conditions even worse for the Islamic Group prisoners if 6 that was at all possible. 7 Ahmed also told the Sheikh in his letter that he 8 believed that Taha remained committed to the peace initiative 9 and only wanted to exert pressure on the government for a 10 response and a real political solution. 11 Ahmed Sattar's understanding of what Taha wanted was 12 for his reputation as a militant to be utilized and Taha 13 believed that this propaganda could be promoted by escalating 14 threats against the regime through the media. 15 As Ahmed himself testified, it was his understanding 16 at the time that Taha's position was, given his militant 17 history of fighting against the Egyptian government during 18 those years of war prior to the peace initiative, that he could 19 be used as a foil, which was the term that Ahmed testified 20 about and to; knowing full well that the Islamic Group no 21 longer had any power whatsoever. Ahmed also understood and 22 recognized this to be simply a bluff. 23 In other words, all this meant was that if Taha was 24 permitted to speak out by doing so he would hopefully get the 25 attention of the Egyptian government and they would take notice SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11665 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 and respond with a much more meaningful response and relief for 2 the Islamic Group members who remained in prison. 3 This understanding of Taha by Ahmed of what Taha's 4 position always was concerning the peace initiative and how it 5 could be used was even explained by Ahmed Sattar seven months 6 after the May prison visit in a telephone conversation with Um 7 Ammar who was one of the Sheikh's wives. 8 In this conversation Ahmed is explaining to Um Ammar 9 that Taha only wanted to exert pressure on the government and 10 nothing more. And I'm now going to refer to Government Exhibit 11 1217X, which is a call on December 21, 2000, many months after 12 the May prison visit, between Ahmed Sattar and Um Ammar. 13 And Sattar by begins this conversation, and again 14 these are excerpts: 15 Sattar: The man -- meaning Taha -- is with them 16 wholeheartedly. The whole thing is a difference of vision. 17 Um Ammar responds: Yeah. 18 Sattar: Nothing more or less than that. 19 Um Ammar: Yeah. 20 Sattar: Long ago he said, quote, brothers, use me as 21 a paper that exerts pressure, end quote. 22 And he continues: Use me as a pressure exerting paper 23 in a sense that not all the people are happy with what goes on. 24 Um Ammar: Of course. 25 Sattar: Not all the people are pleased with this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11666 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 initiative. Some people -- Sattar continues -- still think it 2 doesn't result in anything. 3 Ammar responds: Ah, no, no, in fact. 4 Sattar responds simultaneously: Easing things in 5 jails and this talk is not enough. 6 Ammar: Easing things is in fact very notable. 7 Sattar: Easing things in jails and this talk is not 8 enough. 9 And he continues: Not enough. We say, all you 10 people, government, all you did is not enough. You allowed 11 visits, you eased things, you did so and so and, and -- 12 He continues: All this is not enough. Some people 13 had been in detention for 12 years without -- 14 And he continues: -- like your brother, Dr. Mamoud. 15 And he continues: -- without -- he was not put to 16 trial, he was not sentenced nor... there are scores, even 17 hundreds of people like him. 18 Ammar: There are so many, yeah. 19 Sattar: And those who served their complete 20 sentences -- continues -- Lake Sheikh Hamdi and Sheikh Esam and 21 the rest of those people. 22 Ammar: Many of them completed. 23 Sattar says: They served their complete sentences. 24 You see that things are quiet and all the people committed 25 themselves, even he -- again, meaning Taha -- even he who said SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11667 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 he doesn't approve of the initiative is committed to this day. 2 Now, this is a conversation months after where Sattar 3 is explaining to Um Ammar his understanding of what Taha's 4 position was, that he was being used as the foil, he was being 5 used as the card, he was being used as the paper that the 6 Islamic Group should be using in this initiative as a pressure, 7 as a bluff to get the Egyptian government to respond. 8 And he continues in this conversation, Sattar: And 9 our brothers who served their full sentences are still in jail 10 for five or six years. Does this make sense? 11 He continues: This is what bothers us. We say so and 12 it should be known to the concerned authorities. 13 And he continues: He -- meaning Taha again -- is 14 after the interest. He says, brothers, don't ever imagine that 15 one day I will split off -- continues -- you are, eh, this is 16 what the man says. This is what he always says. At least use 17 me as a piece of paper in your hands. 18 In this conversation these many months after the May 19 visit and the press release in June, Ahmed makes it very clear 20 what his own understanding of Taha's position always was 21 concerning the peace initiative; that even though Taha may not 22 approve of the initiative because in his view the Egyptian 23 government is not doing anything significant in response, he 24 nevertheless, quote, is committed to this day, end quote. He 25 wants to be used, quote, as a piece of paper in your hands, end SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11668 5145SAT4 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 quote. In other words, use me. I'm here. They know about me, 2 they're afraid of me. Utilize my reputation to exert pressure 3 on this regime. 4 And if we look back at the actual letter from Ahmed 5 that was written and read to the Sheikh by Mohammed Yousry at 6 the end of the prison visit on May 19th, 2000, you will see the 7 same thing. And I am referring to Government Exhibit 1707X, 8 which is the transcript from the May 19, 2000 prison visit, and 9 Mohammed Yousry is reading Ahmed Sattar's letter and it says, 10 reading, referring to Sattar's letter: My communications 11 increased during the past year. I have semi-constant contact 12 with -- and then he listed a number of people -- and many other 13 brothers, thanks God. If there is anything, please notify. 14 And now he is going to number 10 so obviously there 15 were nine before this and this is the last one on the list that 16 was read. 17 (Continued on next page) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11669 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 MR. PAUL: Abu Yasir called me the day before 2 yesterday. He still asked for your Honor's moral support for 3 his position, particularly at this time. After three years 4 have passed since the initiative that did not produce big 5 results was issued. I had explained to you, sir, his viewpoint 6 before, meaning past visits. Back then you asked him to commit 7 himself and to give his brothers a chance. Up until now the 8 man is committed, but I don't think he will be able to remain 9 quiet, quiet, longer than that. I sent to you, sir, the 10 statement he issued on Al-Azhar University incidents which 11 exposed him to the criticism of some brothers, particularly 12 because of its strong language. And he continues. And it 13 says: Resumes reading from the letter from Mr. Sattar, which 14 exposed him to strong language, criticism of some brothers, 15 though he didn't say anything other than what is supposed to be 16 said. And this was comments he was making at the time being 17 critical of the government at that period. He therefore asks 18 for your straightforward opinion, sir, especially that you know 19 that the man has his massive weight among many brothers, his 20 reputation. 21 And that if the regime worries about anyone, it is Abu 22 Yasir, meaning his reputation again. I had told him and the 23 other brothers about your request, sir, concerning the 24 evaluation of the initiative. He had the same opinion. It is 25 clear, though, that those who push to go by the initiative are SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11670 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 the brothers in Liman, in prison, even though they are very 2 few. No. The brothers in Liman and very few others outside. 3 Abu Yasir is of the opinion that the group has to well 4 utilize the initiative paper. We heard that in December, when 5 he is explaining to Umar, utilize me, utilize my reputation, 6 use me as a foil. The least to do is to allow media escalation 7 and to demonstrate that the way the situation ended up 8 especially that the most they allow now is some improvement in 9 prisons, permission of visits, and release of some prisoners. 10 Bear in mind, though, that those they released had nothing to 11 do with anything to start with, and that there are so many 12 others the government refuses even to discuss their future, 13 like those detained for more than ten years without any charge. 14 And then he lists some of those unfortunate individuals. 15 Even our brothers who serve the sentences they had in 16 Sadat's case more than five years ago are still in jail. Since 17 1992, the brothers, who were pronounced innocent in any case, 18 are still under detention. They were not released. Brother 19 Abu Yasir, Taha, and many other brothers think that all these 20 things need you to have a more forceful position. No objection 21 to the formation of a team that calls for cancellation of the 22 initiative, meaning propaganda. Let's get that out there. It 23 is possible that could be used, or make threats or escalates 24 things. 25 Please, your eminence, say your opinion about this, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11671 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 dictate some points we can announce in a press conference with 2 Lynne. And -- there is an and in that sentence -- if you don't 3 want to announce them, please, let Lynne know that. Just let 4 her know. That's okay. You want to tell her, you want it 5 announced, you want a press conference, tell Lynne. If you 6 don't want it announced, if you don't want a press conference, 7 that's okay, too. Doesn't sound like he is pushing for any 8 press conference, does it? 9 It is clear from the very last part of his letter that 10 Ahmed did not care if there was a press conference or not, nor 11 did he have any stake in the Sheikh's decision. As he himself 12 testified, he had no concern with the Islamic Group's policy. 13 If there was a reply from the Sheikh regarding this issue, 14 then, as always, he viewed his role to see to it that the 15 Sheikh's opinion was sent out whether he personally agreed with 16 it or not. He doesn't exactly sound like he is on some 17 mission, as Mr. Dember has hatched during his summation, with 18 Taha to get a lawyer to issue the Sheikh's opinion on this 19 matter. Doesn't sound like he is pushing very hard for that. 20 When he says we can announce your position in a press 21 conference and if you don't want to announce it, that's okay, 22 too, just let Lynne know that. 23 After this prison visit in May Ahmed did receive a 24 reply back from the Sheikh to his letter. He held on to this 25 reply and did not forward it on to Taha or Muntasir al-Zayyat SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11672 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 because he was told by Mohammed Yousry after this prison visit 2 that Lynne Stewart was going to be making an announcement to 3 the press, that the Sheikh had in fact withdrawn his support 4 for the peace initiative. 5 Prior to the press release Ahmed talked about the 6 Sheikh's statement to Muntasir al-Zayyat, Taha, Salah Hashim, 7 and Yunis. He told them and you've heard conversations from 8 that. From what he was told of the visit, the Sheikh was 9 clearly dissatisfied with the peace initiative and he was 10 asking to escalate through the media. It was thereafter agreed 11 and decided by everyone to release the Sheikh's opinion to the 12 press. Ahmed made the arrangement for Lynne Stewart to speak 13 from her office with Esmat Salaheddin, who we heard from, a 14 reporter from Reuters. The statement from Salaheddin was the 15 Sheikh withdrawing his support for the peace initiative and he 16 was dissatisfied with what the Egyptian government was doing 17 with the Egyptian people. 18 As we heard a call from Ahmed Sattar and Mohammed 19 Yousry and later between Mohammed Yousry and Lynne Stewart, it 20 was Ahmed Sattar that felt the immediate impact of this press 21 release. As he testified, there was, to use his word, a huge 22 reaction. He was personally attacked and accused of 23 everything, including being a CIA agent. His integrity and 24 loyalty was questioned by others. Why? Because he told you, 25 he was the easy target. It is easier to attack somebody who is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11673 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 not a member of the Islamic Group, one who has no position 2 concerning these issues. 3 And even if he did, he was not someone whose opinion 4 mattered very much. No one could care less what Ahmed Sattar's 5 own opinion was on any issue, yet alone one as important as the 6 peace initiative. Quite simply, it was just easier for 7 everyone to attack and question the messenger rather than the 8 message itself. And even though it was not Ahmed who was the 9 messenger who had actually issued the press release to 10 Mr. Salaheddin, it didn't matter. He was still viewed as the 11 one to be attacked. 12 It was due to this hostile reaction to the Sheikh's 13 statement in the press release that later in a prison call to 14 Lynne Stewart's office the Sheikh clarified his statement. In 15 his clarification he spelled out what he meant by his initial 16 statement that had been released. He reaffirmed for those who 17 may have questioned his support for his attorney, Lynne 18 Stewart, and his paralegal, Ahmed Abdel Sattar. 19 The Sheikh said in this clarification statement, which 20 was introduced into evidence as Government Exhibit 2663, the 21 following. Let me refer you to the exhibit. This is 22 Government Exhibit 26363, and it says for release, and it lists 23 several points. I am going to read starting at No. 2. I 24 declare that Ahmed Sattar is a Muslim brother who has worked 25 with me all these years and even on my case as a paralegal. I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11674 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 trust him with everything I have, to the degree that he holds 2 my power of attorney to act on my behalf and he is the executor 3 of my will. I trust him to give advice to my children in my 4 absence, transfer my body when I die, and to pay off my debts. 5 I testify that he does not speak anything but the truth. To 6 those who accuse him of being an agent, I tell them to fear 7 Allah, and do not say anything that they are not aware of and 8 to watch their tongues. 9 And the statement also goes on to clarify in this 10 response the Sheikh's comments concerning Ms. Stewart. No. 4: 11 Even though the Egyptian government is still killing the 12 innocents and not releasing the detainees from arbitrary 13 imprisonment and even though they are terrifying people in 14 their homes and other criminal acts continue, I did not cancel 15 the ceasefire. I do withdraw my support to the initiative. I 16 expressed my opinion and left the matter to my brothers to 17 examine it and study it because they are the ones who live 18 there, and they know the circumstances where they live better 19 than I. I also ask them not to repress any other opinion 20 within the Gama'a, even if that is a minority opinion. This is 21 the way we have been since we founded this Gama'a, and we 22 should continue to be open to all opinions. 23 The first comment is the one -- I apologize -- which 24 is reference to Ms. Stewart. Everything said in the previous 25 statement is correct and indeed I said those things. Lynne SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11675 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Stewart has been my lawyer since 1994. She defended me in my 2 trial from beginning to end. She did her utmost and she 3 continues doing it now. Any statement that comes from her that 4 she confirms is from me, should be taken as if I said it. And 5 when my son said what he said, I believe he was unaware of 6 these facts. 7 Mr. Dember argued in his summation that he believed 8 that because Ahmed Sattar was opposed to the peace initiative 9 and had allied himself with Taha he made certain only to convey 10 Taha's position about the initiative to the Sheikh, and no one 11 else's opinion. That's what he told you in his summation. He 12 kind of screened out everyone else's opinion because he had 13 this agenda with Taha. He wanted Taha's opinion, he wanted 14 this to come forward for the Sheikh and then to be replied to 15 by the lawyers in a statement. That was what Mr. Dember again 16 argued in his summation. The evidence, ladies and gentlemen, 17 does not support that argument. 18 First of all, as we all know, the Sheikh was calling 19 on a regular basis two times every week to his lawyers' 20 offices. And we also know that during these long calls, Arab 21 newspapers which contained news from Egypt and the Middle East, 22 including statements from various individuals of what was going 23 on with Egypt and the Islamic Group, they were all being read 24 to the Sheikh regularly. So though it may be incorrect to say 25 that the Sheikh was hearing the news daily, he was certainly SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11676 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 hearing the news quite often and was getting an update as to 2 what was happening in Egypt and the peace initiative. 3 Additionally, we know from the evidence that in fact 4 Ahmed Sattar never ever attempted to keep anything from the 5 Sheikh about anyone's opinion, whatever that opinion was. And 6 if Ahmed Sattar was ever asked by anyone to convey their 7 opinion of the peace initiative or any other subject to the 8 Sheikh, he did that. Keep in mind, ladies and gentlemen, we 9 are talking about a handful of prison visits to the Sheikh that 10 is involved in this entire case. And then ask yourself, was 11 there ever a telephone call prior to any of these prison visits 12 from anyone, such as Hamza, Muntasir al-Zayyat, Salah Hashim 13 that was made to Ahmed Sattar asking that their opinion of the 14 peace initiative be presented to the Sheikh and then Ahmed 15 refusing to do that, not doing that. 16 Why there isn't any such call? Because it never 17 happened. In fact, the evidence is quite the opposite. If we 18 look at Mohammed Yousry's notebook, which is in evidence as 19 MY-1006CT, and turn to pages 1073 to 1077, you will see that he 20 has written at the top, as he did, as you've seen this 21 morning -- as you saw this morning during Mr. Stern's 22 summation, approved by Lynne Stewart. And in these excerpts 23 are pages I am going to refer to. It says approved by Lynne 24 Stewart to read Friday, June 23, 2000. And then there are 25 letters on these pages from Salah Hashim and others explaining SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11677 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 their position in support of the peace initiative. 2 Where would Mohammed Yousry have received these 3 letters from except from Ahmed Sattar? Like he received all 4 the other letters. In fact, we know that all or parts of these 5 letters that appear in the exhibit that I am going to look at 6 with you in a minute were seized by the government from Ahmed's 7 apartment to corroborate that fact. And I'm referring 8 specifically to Government Exhibits 2012, 2023, and 2024, all 9 consisting of the very letters or parts of these letters that 10 were given to Mr. Yousry to be read to the Sheikh. In fact, if 11 you look at one of those exhibits, it actually has a fax line 12 on the top that says that this was sent out by fax June 20. 13 Let me just read from Mr. Yousry's notebook to show 14 you how Mr. Sattar was doing everything in his power to make 15 sure that the other side, the side that didn't agree with Taha, 16 never made its way to the Sheikh's ears. It is ridiculous. 17 This is Yousry's notebook page 1073. As you see, it 18 says: Approved Lynne Stewart to read Friday, June 23, 2000. 19 I'm just going to read parts of it. You can look at these 20 books. As Mr. Stern told you, go through them in detail, go 21 through them carefully, look at this entire exhibit as 22 carefully as you want. But if you notice, it is engineer Salah 23 Hashim. This is a letter from Mr. Hashim. We know what his 24 opinion of the peace initiative is. He is one of the founders, 25 one of the people that was pushing the initiative. This was a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11678 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 letter addressed to the Sheikh. 2 It says: His eminence Sheikh, Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman, 3 may God protect him. And I'm referring to hopefully this 4 initiative will benefit us. He then goes into his letter in 5 detail. At the bottom it says: As one of the initial 6 proponents of the initiative I can say that the majority of 7 short term and publicized goals of the initiative have been 8 accomplished. Continuing on page 1074: I would like to bring 9 to your attention the fact that the origin of this initiative 10 is unilateral. As such, inasmuch as we could not establish 11 what constitutes a minimum level of cooperation with the other 12 party, we cannot judge its success. We certainly know the 13 initiative was unilateral. 14 Then it goes on. Second, benefits of the initiative. 15 And it is listed. He says: Let me summarize some of the 16 benefits obtained as a result of the initiative. 1. A 17 reevaluation of the intellectual discourse of al-Gama'a 18 al-Islamiya. 2. An end to the bloodshed between al-Gama'a 19 al-Islamiya and the regime in which we lost most of our 20 theological and military leaders. 3. Stability for the 21 families of the detainees and fugitives, resulting from an end 22 to police harassment and persecution. 4. A complete halt in 23 new detentions as well as the end of police profiling in the 24 streets. 5. Subpoenas issued to those brothers who are not in 25 jail, only allow for one day of questioning. 6. The SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11679 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 improvement of prison conditions with respect to overall 2 treatment, medical care, nutrition, recreation, visits, 3 leisure, and intellectual pursuits. 4 And it continues. 1075: Third, obstacles facing the 5 initiative. It is logical to view the initiative as not very 6 successful as long as some of the brothers are still in 7 detention. And naturally this creates fear and distrust of the 8 regime. It might occur to some that the regime is simply 9 providing minor relief to al-Gama'a al-Islamiya by sporadically 10 releasing a few prisoners when they are actually waiting for 11 the right moment to eradicate it. 12 It goes on. If we want to push the initiative forward 13 and continue to gain benefits, we have to be united, resolve 14 our disputes, and speak in one voice in trying to make the 15 initiative successful. That is what I wanted to explain and it 16 is signed engineer Salah Hashim. 17 That's not all. Continuing on Yousry's notebooks, 18 1076, again, approved by Lynne to be read June 23, 2000. It 19 continues. This is other letters from other people, people who 20 support the initiative. I'm reading in the middle of the page. 21 Our honorable beloved Sheikh Dr. Omar. You might not be aware 22 of the situation that existed before the initiative to 23 describe. That situation would require several volumes full of 24 pain and sadness. Blood was being spilled, women were becoming 25 widows, children were becoming orphans, houses were being SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11680 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 demolished, and families were being destroyed. The soul was 2 about to leave the body. People had only negative thoughts 3 about God. We had to take a stand for God, for Muslims, and 4 for Islam. Since what was occurring served no theological or 5 religious purpose. On the contrary, it was tragedy followed by 6 tragedy. 7 Then came the initiative which everyone here felt was 8 theologically valid, thousands now believe it is theologically 9 valid and is beneficial. People realized that tragedy must 10 stop. They realized the benefits that could be obtained, and 11 even if all the benefits are not being attained, at least the 12 tragedy has stopped. At the same time, a great number of 13 benefits materialized. Some benefits resulting from the 14 initiative are as follows: 15 Our dear beloved eminent Sheikh Omar. These people 16 list the advantages of what has happened since the peace 17 initiative from their standpoint. An end to all executions, an 18 end to all military tribunals, an end to all assassinations, an 19 end to arbitrary detention, an end to the regime's practice of 20 taking hostages such as mothers, fathers, and sisters, 21 continued improvement of prison conditions, an end to torture 22 in prison and to all harassment in prison. The reinstitution 23 of release on medical grounds for disease and it lists the 24 diseases. 25 And continues on Yousry notebook 1077. We ask that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11681 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 your eminence not side with the opinion of the one individual 2 who opposes the initiative. We know that's Taha, don't we? 3 But please take into account all opinions, whether inside or 4 outside of Egypt. They would not agree with something that is 5 wrong. Do not ignore our agreement and that of thousands of 6 people here in Egypt. They are the most qualified to describe 7 their reality, their sadness, and their tragedy. Do not ignore 8 pain, suffering, and the river of blood that was spilled. Do 9 not ignore the screaming of mothers who have lost children, the 10 crying of orphans, and the suffering of widows. And it goes on 11 and on and on and on and it is signed by all of these 12 individuals at the bottom. 13 Does that, ladies and gentlemen, sound like someone 14 who has an agenda to filter out the other side? These were 15 letters that Mr. Sattar gave to Mr. Yousry to read to the 16 Sheikh. Where there is a letter they are saying Taha's 17 position, he is on his own, don't pay attention to him. There 18 was no agenda. 19 In addition to that, as if that was not enough, there 20 are two telephone calls that also show, contrary to 21 Mr. Dember's argument, that Ahmed was more than willing to 22 forward to the Sheikh anyone's letters and it didn't matter to 23 him what their opinion was of the peace initiative. I am now 24 referring to Government Exhibit 1143X, which is a call on June 25 20, 2000, which is at or about the time after the prison visit SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11682 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 between Ahmed Sattar -- at or about the time of the press 2 release, I should say, between Ahmed Sattar and Mohammed Abdel 3 Rahman. 4 The first one is 1143X. Sattar says: You are still 5 there. Listen mister. The Sheikh called today and almost 6 everything was read to him, meaning the letters. Even there 7 was -- and he continues. I'm telling you that the Sheikh 8 called. Now, he thought those letters would have been read 9 because remember I told you there is a fax line that it was 10 sent out on June 20. The Sheikh has prison calls twice a week, 11 so he thought, Sattar thought, June 20, they were read. It 12 turns out it got put off to June 23. And it doesn't matter if 13 in fact they were ever read. 14 The point I'm trying to make was that Mr. Sattar was 15 not holding back anything, not taking a side, not taking a 16 position, not aligning himself, as was suggested to you. 17 He continues: I'm telling you that the Sheikh called 18 and almost everything which had been said in the last period 19 was read to him. Among them there was a message from the 20 brothers in the Liman. That's the list of individuals that it 21 is at the end of that last letter I was referring to. An 22 evaluation from Sheikh, Sheikh Salah Hashim, that's the other 23 letter from Salah Hashim, the engineer. 24 Sattar continues: After the reading, he reported 25 almost five points, and he requested to publish them. I am SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11683 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 going to read them to you. And that's what I was referring to 2 in 2663. Those are the points. 3 And he starts reading in this exhibit, this 4 conversation, No. 1: All the statements which were reported by 5 my lawyer, Lynne Stewart, on my behalf are true statements, and 6 they were issued by me. Lynne Stewart is my lawyer. Lynne 7 Stewart is my lawyer. And he goes on: It is true that they 8 were issued by me. Lynne Stewart is my lawyer and she knows 9 all the details about my case from A to Z. She spared no 10 efforts to defend me and she is still doing so. 11 No. 2: He continues in response of what's in 2663 and 12 he reads: I, Ahmed Abdel Sattar, a Muslim brother, the case he 13 was officially appointed as a paralegal, and he goes on. And I 14 trust him, all what I have, and I gave him an authorized power 15 of attorney and I authorized him to give and ship my body, to 16 ship my body and to pay my debts. 17 If we turn to 1149X, another call between Ahmed Sattar 18 and Mohammed Sallah on June 21, 2000. Mohammed Sallah is a 19 reporter. And, again, this is a continued conversation between 20 Sattar and Sallah. 21 Sattar: Did you see Salah Hashim's letter? Yes yes. 22 It is about the evaluation and all that stuff. 23 Salah: Yes, I saw it. 24 Sattar: Do you know since when, unintelligible, was 25 requested? It is unintelligible, but I suggest to you this was SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11684 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 requested to be the word missing. Salah continues: Um. 2 Sattar: Nine months. 3 Salah: You told me it was months ago. 4 SATTAR: Nine months. 5 Salah: Months ago. 6 SATTAR: And, and, and listen in one minute. 7 Salah: There is negligence and there is -- the 8 response should have reached them. 9 SATTAR: Whenever I talk, our brethren says please 10 brother. They say you are following the directions of so and 11 so. I'm not following the directions, meaning I'm not 12 following the directions of anyone, Taha or anyone else. 13 And he continues in that. 14 Sattar: Rifa'i is the only one who is not negligent. 15 He is the only one that ever sends me any opinion about this 16 peace initiative. 17 Sallah: He says about expressing his point of view. 18 Sattar: Exactly. He told them that he did. 19 Unintelligible. 20 Nine months he reached out to Salah Hashim, give me 21 your side of it, give me your opinion, let me have your opinion 22 and I'll give it to the Sheikh, if you want. Didn't happen. 23 Both of these calls indicate that at no time was Ahmed Sattar 24 only following Taha's position to be expressed to the Sheikh. 25 In the last call he was asking for Salah Hashim's opinion for SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11685 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 some nine months, but never received it until now, which when 2 received Ahmed gave it to Mohammed Yousry. Where is that plan 3 that Mr. Dember kept emphasizing? Where is that agenda? Where 4 is that joined at the hip that Mr. Dember kept emphasizing in 5 his summation? It is not there. The evidence does not support 6 that argument. 7 But what is most important for you to keep in mind 8 about all this evidence concerning the peace initiative is the 9 fact that Ahmed never believed that either the Sheikh's first 10 statement, which was released to the press, or the subsequent 11 clarification I just referred to was a call for violence. He 12 never thought or intended that this statement was a call for 13 any violent activity on behalf of the Islamic Group. What he 14 did believe was that it was a call for the Egyptian government 15 to come to the negotiating table and for the Islamic Group to 16 continue to evaluate the situation in Egypt and the peace 17 initiative. 18 Ahmed Sattar testified that he simply viewed this as 19 Sheikh Rahman's way to create some movement in Egypt from the 20 existing situation which at the time was at a complete 21 standstill. You need only to have listened to Ahmed Sattar's 22 testimony. I'm sorry. You need not only to have listened to 23 Ahmed Sattar's testimony in determining that he never believed 24 the Sheikh's statement was a call for violence. For you can 25 examine, as was already presented to you before and again I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11686 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 will refer to it now, an interview he gave to Al-Jazeera back 2 on June 23, 2000, only nine days after the initial press 3 release and three days after the Sheikh's clarification 4 statement. 5 And I'm referring now to Defense Exhibit AS-12T, an 6 interview between Ahmed Sattar and a reporter from Al-Jazeera 7 news channel on June 23, starting in the middle. 8 Newscaster: Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who is serving 9 a life sentence in the United States, stated that he leaves it 10 up to, unintelligible, to evaluate the situation inside Egypt. 11 He also reiterated his charges against the Egyptian authorities 12 accusing them of what he called the most gruesome crimes 13 against citizens as well as prisoners. With me on the phone in 14 New York is Ahmed Abdel Sattar, the Legal Aid of Sheikh Omar 15 Abdel Rahman. Mr. Abdel Sattar, let us start with this. I 16 mean, the position of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman appears to be 17 ambiguous. On the one hand, he withdraw his support for the 18 initiative. Yet, on the other hand, he calls on or he left the 19 responsibility for evaluating the situation in the hands of his 20 comrades within al-Gama'a on the inside. How do you explain to 21 us this ambiguous position? 22 SATTAR: The Sheikh simply expressed his opinion. He 23 also expressed his dissatisfaction with the conditions, with 24 the conditions in general in Egypt, his withdrawal of his 25 support of -- his support for the initiative means that he only SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11687 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 expresses his point of view and advises his brothers in Egypt 2 that this initiative has not brought about results or the 3 results expected from it. 4 Newscaster: I mean, don't you think that this opinion 5 or this position can be translated in the real world or can be 6 interpreted as if it is a call for the resumption of violent 7 activities? 8 Sattar: There is -- no, no, definitely not. The 9 Sheikh -- I mean, as he said in his statement, I mean that his 10 brothers -- that he left the entire matter in the hands of his 11 brothers to look -- to look into it, and to look into the 12 advantages of this initiative because they know more about the 13 situation than he does. They know about the intricacies of 14 what's going on in Egypt better than him. He only expressed 15 his opinion. Did he not call for anything? We should not 16 attach -- give this matter more than what it deserves. 17 Newscaster: But I mean Mr. Abdel Sattar, how can 18 Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman evaluate this matter and the situation 19 from the outside? Would it not be more beneficial for him to 20 draw his opinion from the leaders of al-Gama'a who are inside? 21 Sattar: It is inevitable that we state that the 22 Sheikh draws his information or most of his information of what 23 is reported about the situation in the Arab media, unlike what 24 the government claims. And what is published in the Arab media 25 does not bring good news. Rather, I mean, anyone who follows SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11688 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 the Arab media and what is published especially about Egypt in 2 that meeting, find that, reach the same conclusion, that is 3 eminence, the Sheikh had reached as for the conditions and -- 4 or what the leaders who are inside say. It is definitely 5 important. And if it is received, the Sheikh will take it into 6 consideration. 7 Newscaster: I mean, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman also 8 justified this position of him by saying that the Egyptian 9 government has not responded to this initiative, but -- and 10 that this initiative did not bear fruits. But in reality the 11 Egyptian government has released thousands of prisoners. Don't 12 you think that this is an important step along the path of 13 bringing about calm and dialogue? 14 Sattar: It is definitely an important step. I mean 15 releasing any prisoner is an important step, but also 16 definitely the Egyptian government has not responded to this 17 initiative as it should. The Egyptian government, there are 18 still thousands of detainees. If the Egyptian government has 19 released 2500, there is more than 15,000 detainees, most of 20 them held without trial. Most of them have been under arrest 21 for more than ten years. We rejoice to see the release of any 22 prisoner who was unjustly put in jail. 23 At the same time, this step undertaken by the Egyptian 24 government is not sufficient. We hope to see the Egyptian 25 dealing seriously with this initiative. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11689 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 Newscaster: If you don't think this step is 2 sufficient, what are the demands that should be met in order 3 for you to change these positions that you hold? 4 Sattar: I mean, we demand the release of all 5 prisoners, all those who do not stand trial, all those who did 6 not receive court sentences, and all those to were tried and 7 served their prison terms. We demand from the Egyptian 8 government to stop military trials. We demand that the 9 Egyptian government to take into consideration the health 10 conditions of prisoners who receive court sentences. I mean, 11 all the reports, all the reports of human rights organizations 12 that focus on Egyptian jails revealed that, what our brothers 13 go through in Egyptian jails, all of these are demands and 14 things that we request the Egyptian government to fulfill. 15 Does that interview back in June of 2000 sound like 16 someone who believed that the Sheikh's statement was a call for 17 violence? I submit to you that Ahmed Sattar's testimony, along 18 with this interview, shows exactly how he viewed and understood 19 the Sheikh's statement. It was never, never, in his mind, a 20 call for violence, nor could it have been interpreted as 21 anything more than a statement to continue evaluating the 22 initiative and for the entire issue to be left among the 23 leaders who were in Egypt and in the best position to know what 24 is going on and how to proceed. 25 As we sit here today, ladies and gentlemen, keep in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11690 514MSAT5 Summation - Mr. Paul 1 mind that there has not been any violence in Egypt that is 2 attributed to the Islamic Group since this press release or 3 during any of this period that we have been talking about. 4 Keep that in mind. And as you have also heard, the peace 5 initiative is still in effect today as it has been since the 6 Islamic Group chose to unilaterally announce it back in 1997. 7 A shout to fire? As we heard when the government 8 opened, a shout to fire. I don't think so, nor does the 9 evidence support such a claim. 10 Your Honor, I think it is time. 11 THE COURT: It is a convenient time to break. 12 Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to break for the 13 day and we will resume tomorrow morning at 9:30. Of course, I 14 am going to repeat my continuing instructions to you. I want 15 to emphasize them also to tell you that simply because I repeat 16 them should not in any way undercut their force. If anything, 17 I repeat them with all of the force my words can convey. 18 Please do not talk about this case at all among 19 yourselves or with anyone when you go home. Don't talk about 20 it when you come back tomorrow. Please don't look at or listen 21 to anything to do with the case. If you should see or hear 22 something inadvertently, simply turn away. Do not look at or 23 listen to anything to do with the case. 24 Finally, always remember to keep an open mind until I 25 have finally instructed you on the law and you've gone to the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11691 514MSAT5 1 jury room to begin your deliberations. Fairness and justice to 2 the parties requires that you do that. 3 With that, have a very good evening and I look forward 4 very much to seeing you tomorrow morning at 9:30. 5 All rise, please. Please follow Mr. Fletcher to the 6 jury room. 7 (Jury not present) 8 THE COURT: I had given the lawyers some additional 9 language for breaks during deliberations, and I didn't hear 10 back from anyone. I take it that there are -- 11 MR. RUHNKE: Speaking for Mr. Yousry, they are fine, 12 your Honor. 13 MR. TIGAR: Speaking for Ms. Stewart, no objection. 14 I do have a question of the Court with respect to the 15 smoke break issue. Do the marshals keep a log of those events? 16 THE COURT: I don't know. 17 MR. TIGAR: I would request that the marshals do keep 18 a log of when jurors leave the jury room. It can be under 19 seal. I assume that it would be under seal. But I 20 respectfully request that that be done. 21 THE COURT: I'll ask if the marshals can do that. 22 MR. PAUL: Your Honor, we have no objection to the 23 statement that you gave to us. That's fine. 24 MS. BAKER: No objection from the government. 25 THE COURT: And I'll come up with a revision of the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11692 514MSAT5 1 last page of the instructions to the way in which they are now: 2 I ask the jurors to sit in the box while I talk to the lawyers. 3 And I'll come up with a revision to ask the jurors to go to the 4 jury room while I talk to the lawyers. 5 Finally, I assume that tomorrow would not be the day 6 to which I am charging. If for any reason the parties have any 7 reason to question that, just let me know, but I just don't see 8 that happening. And I don't know if it will occur on Thursday 9 or not. I'll see how tomorrow goes. We will see where we are 10 at the end of the day tomorrow. 11 Have a very good evening. Please be here at 9:15 12 tomorrow morning. 13 (Adjourned to Wednesday, January 5, 2005, at 9:15 14 a.m.) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300