11102 4CTESAT1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 -------------------------------------x 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 3 3 v. S1 02 Cr. 395 (JGK) 4 4 AHMED ABDEL SATTAR, a/k/a "Abu Omar," 5 a/k/a "Dr. Ahmed," LYNNE STEWART, 5 and MOHAMMED YOUSRY, 6 6 Defendants. 7 -------------------------------------x 7 8 December 29, 2004 8 9:30 a.m. 9 9 10 10 Before: 11 HON. JOHN G. KOELTL 11 12 District Judge 12 13 13 APPEARANCES 14 14 DAVID N. KELLEY 15 United States Attorney for the 15 Southern District of New York 16 ROBIN BAKER 16 CHRISTOPHER MORVILLO 17 ANTHONY BARKOW 17 ANDREW DEMBER 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 18 19 KENNETH A. PAUL 19 BARRY M. FALLICK 20 Attorneys for Defendant Sattar 20 21 MICHAEL TIGAR 21 JILL R. SHELLOW-LAVINE 22 Attorneys for Defendant Stewart 22 23 DAVID A. RUHNKE 23 DAVID STERN 24 Attorneys for Defendant Yousry 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11109 4CTESAT1 1 (Pages 11103 to 11108 sealed by order of the Court) 2 (In open court; jury present) 3 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It's 4 good to see you all. 5 All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we now begin the 6 portion of the trial for summations. As I've explained to you 7 before, this is the portion of the trial in which the lawyers 8 are given the opportunity to sum up, to explain to you what 9 they submit the evidence in the case has shown or not shown. 10 Like opening statements, the summations by the lawyers are not 11 evidence. They are the statements by the lawyers with respect 12 to what they submit the evidence in the case has shown or not 13 shown. As always, it is your recollection of the evidence that 14 governs. And as I will tell you in my final instructions, if 15 any of the lawyers say something that differs from your 16 recollection of the evidence, it is your recollection that 17 governs. 18 With that as an introduction, the first summation is 19 given on behalf of the government by Mr. Dember. 20 Mr. Dember? 21 MR. DEMBER: Let me adjust the equipment. 22 May it please the Court. Counsel, ladies and 23 gentlemen of the jury. Despite the volume of evidence in this 24 case, despite the length of time it has taken us to present all 25 that evidence to you, this is really a very simple case. These SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11110 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 three defendants, Ahmed Sattar, Lynne Stewart and Mohammed 2 Yousry carried messages from a known, designated terrorist into 3 prison to a convicted terrorist, Omar Abdel Rahman. Not just 4 ordinary innocuous messages; terroristic messages. And after 5 they did that, the convicted terrorist, Omar Abdel Rahman, 6 responded to that message -- those messages by issuing a 7 statement, a statement from him, who at that point was still a 8 very powerful and influential leader, of a terrorist 9 organization based in Egypt, a statement in which he announced 10 he no longer supported a ceasefire that was in place in Egypt. 11 And his withdrawal of support of that, support for that 12 ceasefire meant one thing and one thing only: He was 13 advocating a return, a return to the violence, a return to the 14 killing that existed before that ceasefire was put in place. 15 This case is about the obtaining of that withdrawal of 16 support and that change in position and the use of that change 17 in position by Ahmed Sattar and his friend, pal, partner and 18 coconspirator, Rifa'i Taha. To bring about a change in the 19 government of Egypt and a resumption of violence and killing. 20 And that statement by Abdel Rahman withdrawing his support 21 emboldened, empowered Taha and Sattar to -- after that to issue 22 and ugly, hateful fatwah calling for the murder of Jews 23 everywhere they were and everywhere they could be found. A 24 fatwah, that the evidence has established, they intended to be 25 carried out. That's what this case is all about. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11111 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 It is as we described for you at the very beginning of 2 this case, a jail break. They broke Abdel Rahman out of jail, 3 not literally, of course, figuratively; but made him available 4 to other criminals, the worst kind of criminals we know in this 5 world, terrorists. Rifa'i Taha. They made him available so 6 that he could participate in those -- in their crimes and give 7 them support. It was a secret stealth jail break but a jail 8 break nevertheless. 9 What have we proven in this case? By the nature -- by 10 the evidence we've presented and the -- and those two 11 incidents, breaking Abdel Rahman's message out of jail and the 12 issuing of that fatwah, we have proven the charges in this 13 case. 14 What have we proven? Well, we have proven that all 15 three of these defendants participated in a conspiracy, a 16 criminal agreement to defraud or to fool the United States 17 government by passing those messages to and from Abdel Rahman 18 in violation of the prison restrictions that were in place at 19 the time, the SAMs. You know all about that. 20 What also have we proven? Well, we have proven that 21 Sattar participated in a conspiracy to kill and kidnap people 22 outside the United States. How? By assisting Taha in getting 23 Abdel Rahman to withdraw his support for the ceasefire so that 24 Taha and he could make efforts to resume the violence and 25 killing in Egypt. And also, by issuing the fatwah, the fatwah SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11112 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 to kill Jews. Those two events, those two occurrences are what 2 prove that Sattar is guilty of conspiracy to kill and kidnap 3 persons outside the United States. 4 What else have we proven? What we've proven is that 5 Lynne Stewart and Mohammed Yousry provided and concealed 6 material support to the conspiracy to kill and kidnap that I 7 just mentioned. And how did they do that? By making Omar 8 Abdel Rahman available, available to Sattar, available to Taha, 9 where he was otherwise inaccessible to them because of the 10 restrictions; made Omar Abdel Rahman available as a 11 coconspirator to participate in the crimes that Sattar and Taha 12 engaged in, conspiracy to kill; by carrying the messages to and 13 from Abdel Rahman, the messages that Taha provided to Sattar 14 during their conversations that we'll talk about shortly. 15 What else have we proven? Well, we've proven that 16 Sattar is guilty of soliciting crimes of violence. And how is 17 he guilty of that? Quite obviously by the issuing, by the 18 creation and the sending, the distribution of the fatwah, the 19 fatwah to kill Jews wherever they are. And also by his 20 participation in sending in messages to Abdel Rahman, the 21 messages from Taha. 22 And finally, we've proven that Stewart is guilty of 23 deliberately lying to the United States government on two 24 separate occasions when she twice in May of 2000 and May of 25 2001 submitted false statements to the United States SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11113 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 government, when she signed attorney affirmations promising to 2 abide by the SAMs knowing full well, she had no intention of 3 abiding by those promises and of course violating the SAMs, 4 violating those promises. 5 Let me take a moment and tell you what this case is 6 not about. This case is not about the Egyptian government, its 7 officials, its policies or how it conducts itself. Whatever 8 the defendants thought about or think about the Egyptian 9 government is no defense to the conduct, their conduct in this 10 case. It's no defense to what they did in this case. This 11 case also is not about the religion of Islam. The religion of 12 Islam is a peaceful religion. 13 This case is very much about Sattar and Abdel Rahman 14 and Taha, who distorted the Muslim religion and used it to 15 foment and justify violence. That's what this case is about. 16 This case is not about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 17 Whatever Sattar, Stewart or Yousry think of that particular 18 conflict, that very difficult and complex relationship that 19 exists in the Middle East, whatever they may think, it is no 20 defense to what they did in this case. It does not justify 21 anything they did in this case, including issuing a fatwah 22 calling for the murder of Jews everywhere. 23 This case is not about what these defendants thought 24 of Omar Abdel Rahman's conviction. As you well know now, Omar 25 Abdel Rahman was tried in this very courtroom over a ten-month SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11114 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 period by a jury like yourselves. And that jury, after hearing 2 all the evidence, hearing the arguments from the attorneys and 3 being instructed on the law, reached its own conclusion: That 4 Omar Abdel Rahman was convicted and should be convicted and was 5 guilty of some of the most serious charges we have. And he was 6 sentenced, based on that conviction, to life imprisonment. 7 His conviction was affirmed by the Second Circuit 8 Court of Appeals. Whatever these defendants may think about 9 his conviction one way or the other does not justify anything 10 they did in this case. 11 And, finally, this case is not about what these 12 defendants thought or think about the Special Administrative 13 Measures -- I'm going to start referring to them as SAMs, it 14 makes it much easier for all of us -- simply because their view 15 of the appropriateness or the nature of those restrictions 16 imposed by the Department of Justice on Abdel Rahman is not a 17 defense or justification, again, for anything they did in this 18 case. To the extent they didn't like those restrictions, to 19 the extent they thought they were illegal or improper, Stewart 20 had the capability, had the training to challenge them, 21 challenge them legally if she wished. She chose not to. They 22 chose, instead, to violate them and lie about them. 23 By the way, just as an aside, to the extent anybody 24 thinks or would think that Omar Abdel Rahman was in some way 25 mistreated by the Bureau of Prisons, let me just remind you of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11115 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 some testimony by Dr. Edwardy, the doctor from -- and the chief 2 of medical services at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester. 3 He told you that Omar Abdel Rahman had his own committee of 4 professionals in the institution that dealt with the care and 5 treatment for him. Omar Abdel Rahman was not only cared for by 6 the medical professionals who worked at the Rochester facility, 7 but he was also cared for by doctors from the Mayo Clinic, one 8 of the finest medical institutions in this world. 9 Let me take a moment and talk about you for a second. 10 As you hopefully understand by now, jury service is one of our 11 most important civic responsibilities. Our justice system is 12 obviously very much dependent on jurors who come and serve 13 willingly on all kinds of trials, regardless of how long they 14 are. I know I speak on behalf of all the lawyers in this case 15 when I take a moment to thank you all. Thank you for your 16 tremendous patience, for your obvious commitment to this case 17 and, of course, for your participation. We can't thank you 18 enough. 19 Let me tell you, there is much to discuss with you. 20 It's going to take a while, more than a day for me to discuss 21 it with you. I'll tell you that up front as a warning. 22 Let me tell you how we're going to do it. Let me give 23 you somewhat of what we call a road map of how we proceed 24 through the evidence. Much of the road map will make, kind of, 25 sense to you because it will be chronological. Let me tell you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11116 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 how we're going to proceed. 2 First we're going to talk a little bit about Omar 3 Abdel Rahman, and then I'll move to talking about the SAMs for 4 a few minutes, what they're about, why they came into place and 5 what they meant in this case. After that I'm going to talk 6 about the ceasefire, what preceded it, what it resulted in, and 7 one can't talk about the ceasefire in this case without talking 8 about Rifa'i Taha. We'll talk about him a bit. He's a major 9 player in this case. He doesn't sit here in court, but he's a 10 major, major player in this case. 11 After I finish talking about that, we're going to take 12 you through the prison visits. It may be hard to remember now, 13 but there actually were four of them, four prison visits of 14 interest that we present evidence to you about during the 15 course of the trial. All four of those prison visits took 16 place at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota, 17 between March of 1999, the last one that I'll talk about in 18 this section, and it is the famous and perhaps most significant 19 one in May of 2000. There is a fifth visit which we'll talk 20 about later. 21 We'll discuss those visits. We'll discuss what 22 happened during those visits and what happened and the 23 significance of information that went in with the persons who 24 took those messages in on those days and what came out of those 25 visits. Significantly we're going to also talk about what the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11117 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 lawyers did or, maybe more significantly, did not do during 2 those visits. And after we do that, after we finish talking 3 about the last visit in that section, the May 2000 visit, as 4 you'll remember, after that was the press release. Actually 5 two press releases that were issued by Stewart and Sattar and 6 Yousry regarding Abdel Rahman's statements. We'll talk about 7 those. We'll talk about the response to that by the United 8 States Attorney's Office, particularly Pat Fitzgerald. 9 After that we're going to talk about that fatwah I 10 have been referring to for a number of times this morning, the 11 fatwah written by Taha and Sattar and disseminated by them, the 12 one calling for the murder of Jews everywhere. 13 After that we're going to talk about this fellow Atia. 14 You will find, and hopefully you've gathered from the 15 evidence -- it wasn't easy evidence necessarily to follow, but 16 hopefully after we talk about it, you'll be able to put the 17 pieces together quite tightly. We'll talk about him because 18 Atia is kind of an interesting fellow. It's the Atia evidence 19 in this case that sort of brings together the ceasefire, the 20 fatwah, brings them into play together and brings together what 21 Sattar and Taha were trying to accomplish, which was a 22 resumption of violence in Egypt. So, we'll talk about him. 23 That's important. 24 And then we'll talk about January 8, 2001. You all 25 scratch your heads and say January 8, 2001? What happened on SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11118 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 that particular day? I'll tell you about it. It's a day in 2 which there were a number of conversations with some of the 3 people on trial here, and as a result of those conversations, 4 lies were told, issued to the press about Omar Abdel Rahman. 5 I'll keep you in suspense and not tell you anything else at 6 this point. We'll get to it most likely sometime tomorrow 7 morning I hope. 8 We'll talk very briefly about the bombing of the USS 9 Cole after that, a war ship that was bombed as a result of a 10 terrorist attack in Yemen back in October of 2000 and how it 11 relates to the case. We will then move from there to the 12 July 2001 visit, that's the fifth visit paid to Omar Abdel 13 Rahman by Ms. Stewart in that case with Mr. Yousry. And then 14 we're getting towards the end, you'll be happy to hear, and 15 we'll talk about the knowledge and intent of these three 16 defendants, what these defendants knew when they did what we 17 say they did; what did they intend by their actions? We'll 18 discuss that towards the end of my remarks. 19 Finally I'll talk briefly, because I probably won't 20 have any energy at that point, talk briefly about the charges 21 in this case, and we'll be done. 22 Let's talk -- let's start. Omar Abdel Rahman. Well, 23 you all know about him. He is a convicted terrorist, a very 24 influential, a very powerful terrorist leader. He was and 25 remained after his conviction, as you learned, the leader of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11119 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 the Islamic Group, one of their leaders, the Egyptian based 2 terrorist organization. And even after his conviction and 3 sentence, a sentence you know which was life imprisonment, Omar 4 Abdel Rahman remained a serious threat to the safety of the 5 people in this country and abroad. Not because he personally 6 posed a physical threat to anyone; as you all know he was 7 blind. He was an older man. But because of his ability to 8 communicate, to incite and inspire violence, he was and 9 remained a very serious threat on the world stage. 10 You all know he was convicted after a trial in this 11 very courthouse in 1995, convicted of some very serious 12 charges, seditious conspiracy, which was to -- which was a 13 crime, conspiracy to engage in a war of urban terrorism against 14 the United States right here in New York City. He was 15 convicted of soliciting crimes of violence, including the 16 murder of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, also of soliciting 17 other persons to carry out terrorist attacks against 18 military -- American military installations. He was convicted 19 of conspiracy to murder Mr. Mubarak. And finally he was 20 convicted of a bombing conspiracy, to bomb buildings, landmarks 21 and tunnels here in New York City. 22 Because of these very serious charges and the finding 23 of that jury, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, as you 24 know. You learned in this case Omar Abdel Rahman, as I said 25 before, was and continued to be, despite the conviction, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11120 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 despite the sentence, the leader of this -- the Islamic Group. 2 In fact, Mr. Sattar, based on almost his own testimony, and 3 Taha viewed him as sort of the ultimate arbiter of any disputes 4 within the group, despite his confinement, despite his location 5 here in America and during much of the case as we've presented 6 it to you, in Rochester, Minnesota. And that's why they 7 communicated with him and passed him messages, because of his 8 influence and his power. 9 You know that the Islamic Group and Omar Abdel Rahman 10 oppose the Egyptian government, wanted to overthrow it and they 11 wanted to overthrow it by the use of violence. And violence by 12 the Islamic Group meant, plain and simply, cold-blooded murder. 13 That's what it meant. 14 You know that Abdel Rahman, from the speeches and 15 sermons that we read to you in the beginning of the case, was a 16 man who preached violence and hatred. He was a man who 17 preached violence and hatred against anyone and anything that 18 conflicted with his view of the world, and preached and 19 solicited violence to achieve his goals. He preached 20 antisemitism and antiChristianity. He was a man who embraced 21 the title terrorist and preached that he and his followers were 22 terrorists and they, "must terrorize those they viewed as the 23 enemies of Islam" and, in his words, "to frighten them and to 24 disturb them and to shake the earth under their feet." 25 When Omar Abdel Rahman referred to the enemies of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11121 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Islam in those speeches, he wasn't shy about it. He preached 2 that Islam's primary enemy was the United States and its 3 allies. And he would proudly, proudly took responsibility in 4 one of those speeches for issuing the fatwah that resulted in 5 the murder of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt back in the 1980s, 6 obviously the president of the country, and also of Rabbi Meir 7 Kahane, an Israeli politician. He was proud of that and 8 bragged about it. And he advocated his own form of jihad, his 9 form of jihad was violent jihad. "Jihad with the sword, with 10 the cannon, with the grenades and with the missile, this is 11 jihad, jihad against God's enemies for God's cause and his 12 word." 13 And also what you learned and what you learned from 14 evidence found at Mr. Sattar's home during the course of the 15 search by the FBI was even though he was convicted, even though 16 he was in jail and sentenced to life imprisonment, that didn't 17 stop Abdel Rahman from preaching violence, soliciting crimes of 18 violence, from wanting violence to be brought against America. 19 Government Exhibit 2070, which is an audio tape, it's Arabic, 20 and 2070T which is the translation of it, there's a portion, a 21 portion of it, and we're going to put up a section of it to 22 document, it's a speech by Abdel Rahman when he was in prison 23 in 1996. Well, 1996 is when he was -- after he was convicted 24 and after he was sentenced. A speech that was apparently 25 perhaps read over the phone by him. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11122 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 This is a preSAMs period of time, before the SAMs and 2 restrictions were put in place. And here's what he said. 3 Well, he was angry, obviously, with his conviction. He was 4 angry with his sentencing and he demanded revenge against the 5 United States, issued a fatwah calling for revenge against the 6 United States. Here's what he said and it's up on the screen 7 for you if you want to follow along or just listen to me. Take 8 your choice. 9 Oh you Muslims everywhere, sever the ties of their 10 nation, tear them apart, ruin their economy, instigate against 11 their corporations, destroy their embassies, attack their 12 interests, sink their ships and shoot down their airplanes. 13 Kill them in land, at sea and in the air, kill them wherever 14 you find them; take them, surround them and lie in ambush for 15 them everywhere. Fight those infidels, treat them with 16 brutality. Fight them. 17 That's a fatwah found in Mr. Sattar's possession. If 18 you recall, when we introduced the evidence from the search of 19 Stewart's offices, there was a piece of paper with almost 20 identical language on it found in her office. It's Government 21 Exhibit 2638. Take a look at it in your deliberations. She 22 knew, as well as Sattar knowing, that despite his conviction, 23 despite his sentencing, the man was still preaching violence, 24 violence against the United States, murder against the United 25 States. He hadn't been silenced and his word had gotten out in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11123 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 1996. 2 Well, not surprising, by 1997, United States officials 3 realized this man who was a tremendous threat prior to that 4 time when he was out before he was arrested, realized that even 5 after he was arrested, convicted and sentenced, he was still a 6 tremendous threat; a threat to the safety of Americans and 7 others living abroad. 8 And so, what happened was officials in the Department 9 of Justice and Patrick Fitzgerald, who you met back in June of 10 this year still -- yes, this year -- testified about being 11 involved in imposing those Special Administrative Measures, the 12 SAMs, because of the danger and threat that Abdel Rahman 13 remained. And the Attorney General of the United States at the 14 time, Janet Reno, authorized those SAMs and they went into 15 effect in April of 1997. And there was never a period of time 16 during the course of this entire case that the SAMs were not in 17 effect; that those restrictions did not apply. They apply at 18 all times. The reasons for them were obvious: He remained a 19 danger to the world. And the purpose of the SAMs, the purpose 20 themselves were simple: To prevent acts of violence and 21 terrorism (SAMs). The SAMs restricted with whom Omar Abdel 22 Rahman could communicate with in order to prevent him from 23 receiving or passing terrorific messages. That's the purpose 24 of them. That's why there were restrictions on his ability to 25 communicate, with whom he could communicate with and how he SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11124 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 could communicate. To prevent terrorism and violence. 2 Well, how did they evolve? Because the SAMs weren't 3 in their final form from day one. They were -- they evolved 4 over time. As you saw, the early versions of the SAMs were 5 quite different from ones that were imposed later on. The 6 SAMs, as you learned, were sort of a new procedure. Very few 7 federal inmates lived under these restrictions. And so, it was 8 a new concept different than anything that had been used 9 before. And the restrictions and the language used and the 10 actual restrictions placed on Abdel Rahman changed a bit. And 11 this is rather important. As I mentioned, the SAMs restricted 12 who he could talk to on the phone; who could visit him and it 13 restricted -- it had restrictions with respect to mail, letters 14 coming in to him and leaving from him. Obviously all these 15 restrictions were geared towards preventing acts of terrorism 16 and violence. 17 Now, with respect to the telephone, only his attorneys 18 and his wife could speak to him by telephone, and that never 19 changed. With respect to the visits, well, his attorneys could 20 visit him and also immediate family members; not just his wife 21 but other members as well. That never changed. 22 The mail had certain restrictions placed on it. And 23 the restrictions were very simple: Anything coming in to him 24 had to be screened. Anything going out from him in the mail 25 had to be screened. If you look at the mail sections of all of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11125 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 the SAMs in evidence in this case, you'll realize and see 2 anybody could have sent him mail. And when we talk about mail, 3 you learn during the case that the mail also consisted of 4 tape-recordings. Obviously, Abdel Rahman was blind. If 5 somebody wrote him a regular letter he himself couldn't read 6 it, perhaps a translator at the facility certainly could read 7 it to him. But he couldn't read it himself. But people could 8 and did send him recordings, messages. They tried to translate 9 Taha's book, put it on tape, let him read it. The Bureau of 10 Prisons thought otherwise. We'll talk about that book in a few 11 minutes. And there was ways of communicating with him. 12 But anybody could communicate with him if they wished 13 by mail. And that mail, as I said, could be letters or could 14 be recordings. Anybody could. 15 But because anyone could communicate with him by mail, 16 what was extremely important and obvious in the SAMs was 17 that that mail had to be screened to make sure there were no 18 overt or -- overt messages or coded messages in those 19 recordings or letters or communications, coded messages that 20 might mean, what? Terrorism. His views on whether a terrorist 21 act should be committed, his views on whether a certain target 22 should be or individual or country should be targeted. Coded. 23 And so the Bureau of Prisons and the Attorney General 24 of the United States said, sure, anybody can communicate with 25 him by mail, but it has to be screened. That's very important. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11126 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Because who knows what's coming in and coming out. 2 Now, let me talk about one thing about the SAMs where 3 there may be some confusion and there shouldn't be. In no 4 version of the SAMs that existed in this case from the very 5 beginning in April of '97 to the very end in 2002, no version 6 of the SAMs ever prevented any of the lawyers representing Omar 7 Abdel Rahman from talking to the press and making their own 8 statements. None. 9 Now, the defense, particularly Stewart and Yousry, run 10 around and presented evidence in their case suggesting, oh, my 11 goodness, you know, press releases and attorneys making 12 statements was done all the time. And for some reason that 13 should justify or explain why, gee, they really didn't think 14 there was any problem when Stewart and Sattar and Yousry issued 15 Abdel Rahman's withdrawal of support for the ceasefire in June 16 of 2000. 17 Well, and a lot -- almost all of -- almost all of the 18 cases or the instances they cited of press releases were of 19 Abdel Rahman's lawyers, whether it's mostly Clark or Jabara, 20 making statements to the press expressing their own views. 21 Nothing prevented and ever prevented any of the lawyers in any 22 version of the SAMs whenever they existed from commenting about 23 Abdel Rahman's case, his conditions of confinement, the SAMs. 24 They could talk about anything they wanted to talk about. 25 At some point in time -- and I'll explain this in a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11127 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 minute -- they were prevented, prevented from relaying any 2 statements by Abdel Rahman. That was clear. But during the 3 entire period of time, if they wanted to make their own 4 statements, they could do it. Nothing ever restricted them 5 from doing that. 6 Now, what came into being was a restriction that they 7 could not, they could not communicate his words to the media 8 or, for that matter, any third person. Now, if we go back and 9 look at the SAMs that existed at the very beginning -- and 10 LS203, which is an exhibit that Stewart introduced, was the 11 first SAMs in place. It's the April 1997 SAMs right there, 12 just look at the top of it. 13 And that version of the SAMs -- and when I say "that 14 version," that language in that particular document remained 15 the language in the SAMs for the April '97 SAMs, the 16 August 1997 SAMs, the December 1997 SAMs -- and those are, by 17 the way, Exhibits 375 and 376. We introduced those to you 18 during our rebuttal case. 19 That language in that -- in LS203 also appeared in 20 Exhibits 319 and Exhibits 320, which were SAMs that were issued 21 in January and February of 1998. 22 Now, in those SAMs from April of '97 to April of '98 23 there was not a single provision in that -- those SAMs that 24 prevented any of Abdel Rahman's lawyers from relaying to third 25 persons or to the media Abdel Rahman's statements. Now, the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11128 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 defendants, particularly Yousry and Stewart, made a big deal 2 about the fact that, my goodness, Ramsey Clark in the summer of 3 1997 issued a press release after the ceasefire went into 4 effect that Abdel Rahman supports the ceasefire. And Stewart 5 and Yousry pointed to that and said, my goodness, of course, we 6 lawyers all were operating under the assumption we could always 7 issue press releases. We could issue press releases with Abdel 8 Rahman's statements in them and that was always understood. 9 That's what they wanted you to believe. 10 Well, when we questioned Stewart, when it was our 11 turn, we asked her about that press release that Ramsey Clark 12 issued in '97. And then we confronted her with her own 13 exhibit, LS203, and asked her, asked her to read the exhibit. 14 She read through the provisions. There wasn't a single 15 provision in the SAMs in existence at that time throughout 1997 16 that prevented any of Abdel Rahman's lawyers, including Ramsey 17 Clark, from issuing a press release with Abdel Rahman's 18 messages or words or statements. Didn't exist. It didn't 19 exist. 20 They could at that time, throughout 1997 into early 21 '98, they could do that. But they portrayed that to you as if, 22 gee, Ramsey Clark did it so we all can do it, and there was 23 nothing wrong in doing it in June 2000 when these three 24 defendants issued a press release in which Abdel Rahman 25 withdrew his support for the ceasefire. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11129 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Well, they well knew, and Stewart certainly knew, that 2 in 1997 there was nothing restricting Clark from doing what he 3 did. But that changed. And it changed with the May 11, 1998, 4 SAMs. 5 Let me backtrack for a second. The reason why Stewart 6 and Yousry wanted you to believe, aha, Clark's issuance of that 7 press release was a precedent for them to issue their release 8 in June of 2000 was because they are looking -- because Ramsey 9 Clark was the former Attorney General of the United States. 10 He's a prestigious, important man, or was, certainly in that 11 position. And if he did it, gee, we relied on what he was 12 doing. So what we did in June of 2000 couldn't have been 13 wrong. 14 Well, Stewart in her own testimony proved to you that 15 she was being dishonest when she presented that to you, because 16 when we asked her about the 1998 SAMs, she told us -- told you, 17 more importantly, she told you that, yeah, in 1998, 18 particularly that May 11, 1998, SAMs, that was the first time 19 the government put in the SAMs the last paragraph that appeared 20 in every SAMs from May 1998 to the end. And that was the 21 provision that explicitly said, explicitly said, that Abdel 22 Rahman could not communicate with the media by any means 23 possible, including through his attorneys. 24 And Stewart, who was relying upon the Ramsey Clark 25 press release in '97, said to you, oh, yes, when they put that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11130 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 provision in in '98, that was the result of Ramsey Clark 2 issuing the press release in '97. Because in '97 he could do 3 that. But you couldn't do it after 1998, May of 1998. 4 She knew full well that was not a precedent. Clark's 5 press release in '97 was no precedent for what she did in June 6 of 2000. But she tried to portray it that way. She and Yousry 7 were dishonest with you, dishonest with you by trying to 8 present to you the fact that, gee, the lawyers make statements 9 all the time about Abdel Rahman, so what was the big deal? 10 And so they understood, they understood that in 11 June 2000 they could do the same. They knew better. They all 12 knew better. What they understood and knew was in '97, there 13 was nothing preventing the lawyers from issuing statements, 14 including statements to the media, which included Abdel 15 Rahman's message. That changed in May of 1998. 16 And they knew full well that practically every 17 message, every press release, every press statement that they 18 presented to you was simply a lawyer saying to somebody in the 19 media or commenting to somebody in the media about their own 20 view of the case, their own statements. Those messages, those 21 press releases or press statements did not include statements 22 by Abdel Rahman. They did not pass Abdel Rahman's statements. 23 The first time that happened after the summer of '97, 24 when Clark issued the press release in which he said Abdel 25 Rahman supports the ceasefire, was in June 2000 when Stewart SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11131 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 issued the press release saying he doesn't support the 2 ceasefire. He withdraws his support for the ceasefire. At a 3 time when she knew quite clearly that, in fact, that was a 4 violation of the SAMs. 5 Now, as I mentioned, in 1998, May of '98, the SAMs 6 that were in effect -- Government Exhibit 3, that's one version 7 of it. There is other exhibits which also consist of the same 8 SAMs. And it's the first SAMs -- and as I said, here's the 9 front cover of it. We can put it up, if you like. It's the 10 first copy -- excuse me, it's the first SAMs that has that 11 provision in it. 12 That says, quote, no contact, no communication with 13 the media by any means, including by lawyer. And if you go to 14 the last page of the exhibit -- we'll do that for you, 15 Ms. Griffith is faster than I. The last page, in fact, it's 16 the last paragraph on the page has that provision that says 17 quite clearly, the inmate shall not be permitted to talk with 18 or otherwise communicate with any representative of the news 19 media, either in person, by telephone, by furnishing a recorded 20 message, by communicating through inmate's attorneys/staff. 21 Can't be any clearer. Can't be any more unambiguous. Clear as 22 can be. 23 Well, you also learn, by the way, that during the 24 progression of the case, by December of 1999 -- and the 25 different versions of the SAMs are all in evidence for you. If SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11132 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 you want to look at them, just ask during the deliberations. 2 But by December of 1999 the language of the SAMs at 3 that point never changed from that point going forward through 4 2002. They never changed. Not a word, not a sentence, not a 5 punctuation mark. It's identical. The only thing different 6 between each versions of the SAMs themselves is the date on the 7 top. They didn't change at all. 8 (Continued on next page) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11133 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 MR. DEMBER: Now, you know the SAMs existed. You know 2 they existed now certainly; we've read them to you many, many 3 times. You probably have them memorized, or at least some 4 sections memorized. Did the defendants know about the SAMs? 5 You bet they did. They knew all about the SAMs. Let's go 6 through some of the evidence. 7 The first one we will talk about is easy, Stewart. 8 She certainly knew about the SAMs. She was periodically sent 9 copies of the SAMs. She would sign the attorney affirmations 10 saying she had reviewed the SAMs and would abide by them. She 11 took those affirmations and sent them to the U.S. Attorney's 12 office here in Manhattan. She had copies of the SAMs and 13 copies of the affirmations in her office. 14 Mr. Francisco from our office testified about sending 15 and having copies of the various versions of the SAMs that he 16 had sent to Stewart and actually also to some of the other 17 attorneys as well. 18 And, she obviously read them. She knew them. It was 19 important for her to know them because her important client, 20 Abdel Rahman was -- had to live under them and lived under 21 those restrictions. And she told you it was important that she 22 know what they were like so she could vigorously represent him. 23 How about Mr. Yousry, did he know the SAMs? You bet 24 he did. He knew all about the SAMs. 25 How? Well, you know it from his own testimony. You SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11134 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 know he had copies of the SAMs in his home that were seized 2 during the search of his home. He even had a copy of the 3 federal regulation, as Stewart did, but he also had a copy of 4 the federal regulation that allowed the Department of Justice 5 and the Bureau of Prisons or attorney general to impose the 6 sentence. It is a rather technical federal regulation to have 7 a copy of. 8 You know he talked about the SAMs. Maybe most 9 significantly, and we will get to some of this, he wrote about 10 the SAMs. He wrote about the SAMs at periods of time that make 11 it absolutely clear that by May of 2000 and June of 2000, when 12 that press release is issued and Abdel Rahman withdraws his 13 support for the cease-fire, he knew full well that he was bound 14 by the SAMs himself and that Abdel Rahman communicating with 15 the media was absolutely taboo, couldn't be done. He knew 16 other aspects of the SAMs as well, okay? 17 Well, I gave you a whole bunch of categories. Let's 18 go through them as quick as I can. 19 What did he do? He testified and told you he had a 20 general understanding of the SAMs. He said that he believed 21 the SAMs were imposeed to restrict Abdel Rahman's 22 communications with the outside world. That's obvious. He 23 knew that Abdel Rahman first became, had to -- was first 24 subjected to the SAMs in the spring of 1997. He knew that they 25 changed over time. He discussed the SAMs with Abdel Rahman SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11135 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 during visits, prison visits or calls a number of times. He 2 told you that. 3 He knew certain aspects of them. He knew about 4 certain aspects of the SAMs that he testified about. He told 5 you that the visits were restricted to his first wife and some 6 family members and the lawyers. He told you about the fact 7 that Abdel Rahman could only speak to certain people on the 8 phone. 9 For a person, just from his testimony alone, for a 10 person who knew that much about the SAMs, it sure seems like he 11 must have read them. 12 There is more. Well, he had copies of the SAMs, as I 13 said, in his home. An example is Government Exhibit 2305-1. 14 Ironically, that's a copy of the SAMs that were in effect in 15 December of 1999. And as I told you just a moment ago, the 16 SAMs in effect in 1999, the language of those SAMs never 17 changed each time they were renewed. It all remained the same. 18 Not a sentence, not a word. And that was certainly the SAMs in 19 effect in May of 2000 during the prison visit and the 20 subsequent press release. 21 Another example, another copy of the same SAMs was 22 2312-37. And, ironically, when we asked him about that first 23 exhibit I just mentioned, 2305-1 was the December '99 SAMs, he 24 told you that in his testimony that he had received that on or 25 about April 5th, 2000. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11136 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 If you remember, that exhibit had the cover letter 2 which was dated April 5th, 2000, from the United States 3 Attorney's office. If you look at it, it's a cover letter from 4 the U.S. Attorney's office signed by an assistant U.S. Attorney 5 named Paul Butler, the cover letter indicating it was enclosing 6 the SAMs and attorney affirmation. 7 What was most interesting about that exhibit, it was 8 an original -- it was the original letter that was sent. Now, 9 it was addressed to Mr. Jabara and Ms. Stewart, so we don't 10 know if it's the letter that Jabara got or the letter that 11 Stewart got, but one of those attorneys gave that letter with 12 the SAMs attached to it to Yousry. He had the original letter. 13 And he said he got it around the date of the letter, which was 14 April 5th, 2000. That's more than a month before the May 2000 15 visit. 16 And I mentioned before about Yousry possessing a copy 17 of the federal regulation authorizing the Department of Justice 18 and the Bureau of Prisons to impose SAMs. That's exhibit 19 2405-4. 20 And, you know, during the cross-examination when we 21 questioned him about his knowledge of the SAMs, we asked him 22 about his knowledge of the mail provision in the SAMs. 23 Remember that provision? It's very basic. Anything coming in 24 has to be screened. Anything going out has to be screened. 25 And what we found in his possession in his home was Government SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11137 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Exhibit 2415-10. 2 May we have that, and we will put it up in front of 3 you. It's a memo, if you remember, from the Bureau of Prisons, 4 that Yousry told you he got. I believe there is a fax on the 5 top page -- you don't have to show it -- but on the top line of 6 the document there is a fax number. And I believe it's -- the 7 fax line indicates that Yousry got it on March 10th, 1999. 8 And it refers to some tapes that had been sent to 9 Abdel Rahman. And we later learned from Mr. Sattar that's the 10 tapes, the book on tapes. It's Taha's book, which we will talk 11 about in a couple of minutes. And it was rejected by the 12 Bureau of Prisons. Surprise, surprise. Taha's book was 13 rejected by the Bureau of Prisons. They didn't let it go in 14 and let Abdel Rahman listen to it on tape. 15 There is an interesting provision in the memo, and I 16 think we will highlight that for you in a moment, which says 17 the following: The Special Administrative Measures provide 18 that if any common mail is determined by the FBI or the Bureau 19 of Prisons to contain overt or covert discussions of or 20 requests for illegal activities or actual or attempted 21 circumvention of the Special Administrative Measures, that mail 22 shall not be delivered. 23 What does that tell you? Well, it tells you that 24 Yousry knew all too well, well in advance of -- well in advance 25 of many of the visits he made with the various attorneys, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11138 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 including Stewart, to Abdel Rahman that any mail, any letters, 2 any messages being brought in for Abdel Rahman had to be 3 screened by the Bureau of Prisons and the FBI. He knew that. 4 Now, as I mentioned before, Mr. Yousry's knowledge of 5 the SAMs wasn't limited to what he possessed and what he told 6 you he knew during his testimony. It also consisted of things 7 that he wrote. He actually wrote about the SAMs. 8 And one of the things you know is a note that he 9 kept. He kept a notebook in which he kept, he would write 10 down, put down various statements made by him or others and 11 Abdel Rahman during his visits with Abdel Rahman with the 12 attorneys or during the calls, the legal calls that Abdel 13 Rahman had with his attorneys that he would translate. 14 And one of the entries in his notebook is a 15 fascinating one. By the way, it is not our exhibit; it is 16 Mr. Yousry's exhibit, okay? And the number is MY--1002-CT. 17 It's page 284 of that exhibit. 18 With that up for you, let's focus a little more on it. 19 Very good, that's great. If you want to, look at it on your 20 screens there. It's very interesting. It is a very 21 interesting document. 22 What's interesting about it is on the top of the line 23 there after the translator's notes, which I think we have taken 24 off for you, right below that and just the strict translation 25 of what was on the -- because, remember, Mr. Yousry wrote his SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11139 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 notes in Arabic, so this is the translation of his Arabic that 2 Mr. Yousry offered into evidence or put into evidence. And the 3 first line says, SAM, May 11 98. Interesting date. You have 4 heard that date before. I think I have mentioned it a few 5 times before already. 6 If you look at the top of Government Exhibit, or the 7 top of the second page of Government Exhibit 3, it's the 8 Special Administrative Measures. It's dated May 11, 1998. 9 Yousry is telling Abdel Rahman about the May 11, 1998 10 SAMs. Sounds like he's got a copy of it in front of him and he 11 is making his notes. Very specific, SAMs 1998. Okay. 12 And, by the way, there is copies of these SAMs from 13 the Stewart search as well. There are a number of copies of 14 them. And let me just, so you can put the time frame on here, 15 Mr. Yousry, if you look through his notebooks, doesn't date 16 every entry. So sometimes it is not easy to figure out when he 17 makes a particular entry in his notebooks. If you look at the 18 pages before you get to this particular page, and this page is 19 284, and look for the first page that has a date on it, you 20 come up with the date, a date that says "Tuesday, 4/21." So 21 one can conclude that's Tuesday, April 21st. It doesn't 22 indicate the year. That's the first date that appears on a 23 page before the page we have up in front of you. 24 If you go and look at the pages behind this page, 25 which is page 284, and look for a page that has a date on it, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11140 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 that seems to indicate it's the date that the note or entry was 2 made. You will find it several pages behind this page before 3 you on the screen, and it has the date that says 6/3/98. 4 June 3rd, '98? Probably, sure. The preceding was probably 5 April 21st, the one after is June 3rd '98. 6 So, most likely sometime between those two dates is 7 when Yousry makes this entry, because the SAM -- May 11, '98, 8 clearly refers to the SAM itself, but there is no other date on 9 that page. 10 So, some time between April and June of '98 Yousry is 11 talking to Abdel Rahman about this version of the SAMs. Okay, 12 that's interesting. 13 Here is something more interesting. Well, clearly it 14 says on the third line down, concerning Sheikh Omar Abdel 15 Rahman. And then go one line down. Fascinating. And 16 remember, these are Yousry's notes. And it says: "The 17 lawyers, members of their staff and those who work with them, 18 they should abide by this" -- then the word law is crossed 19 out -- "administrative order." 20 What does that tell you? What that tells you is 21 Yousry is writing down that anybody working with the lawyers 22 has to abide by the SAMs. Guess who is working with the 23 lawyers for Abdel Rahman? Yousry. He wrote it down. He knows 24 he has to abide by the SAMs. Well, of course he knows. 25 And by coincidence, where does he get that from? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11141 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Where does he get that information from? Well, he gets it from 2 Exhibit Number 3, or this version of the SAMs, specifically 3 page 1 -- the first page of the SAMs where it is dated -- 4 paragraph 2, the first part, okay? I won't put it up for you, 5 but I will read it for you. And it says as follows: 6 The inmate's attorneys of record -- the inmate is 7 Abdel Rahman -- individually, by each, if more than one, must 8 sign an affirmation acknowledging that counsel, counsel's staff 9 and anyone else at the behest of or with the knowledge of the 10 attorneys, will fully abide by the below listed restrictions. 11 That's where Yousry gets the information from. He's 12 got the SAMs. And what he has got in his notes comes right out 13 of the SAMs. And most significantly, in 1998, probably 14 sometimes in May or early June of '98, Mohammed Yousry knows, 15 if he didn't know beforehand, he is required to abide by the 16 SAMs. 17 What else does it say here? Let's go down a few lines 18 to there is an E, then the number 3 circled, and then the 19 letter A. Right there, that section. If you are with me, it 20 says: The Sheikh is forbidden to send or receive any 21 information, taped or written, unless it is from the lawyer. 22 Where does that come from? Well, that comes from 23 page 1 of the SAMs, the May 11th, '98, SAMs paragraph 3A, which 24 reads as follows: The inmate is prohibited from passing or 25 receiving any written or recorded communications to or from SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11142 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 other inmates, visitors, attorneys, BOP staff or anyone else, 2 except as outlined and allowed by this document. 3 That's where he is getting it from. So, we've 4 established Mr. Yousry knows full well he must abide by the 5 SAMs, most likely sometime between April and June of 1998. 6 Okay? 7 Now, you have heard a lot about Mr. Yousry and his 8 famous dissertation. We all know he is a doctoral student and 9 had finished a lot -- I guess most of his coursework, and still 10 had to write his dissertation. 11 His lawyers and he introduced into evidence the 12 various versions, the various parts of his dissertation. 13 Obviously it wasn't final, it isn't final -- he told you -- but 14 they introduced that into evidence. 15 And this is rather important, because during the 16 course of the evidence we couldn't read and we didn't read and 17 we didn't ask and the other attorneys didn't ask every possible 18 question, didn't read every single document to you. If we had, 19 we would probably be here forever. We didn't do that for one 20 reason or another; the obvious ones I think you know. 21 But, Yousry wrote about the SAMs in his dissertation. 22 There is a particularly interesting part of it which you 23 haven't heard yet and you haven't seen yet, but I'm going to 24 read it to you and show it to you. 25 The exhibit itself is MY-550-LT4. And unfortunately SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11143 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 for all of us, the pages of his dissertation weren't numbered. 2 It's in there, and we are going to put it up on the screen for 3 you. The two pages that I am going to read from, this is what 4 he wrote about the SAMs. I'm going to skip around a little bit 5 as I read this, so if I can, I will read this slow, if you can 6 follow it. 7 We are going to start where -- in the section that 8 says silencing the Sheikh. Convicted criminals are not allowed 9 to preach. 10 We are going to skip the first sentence or so, and the 11 third line down after the title, if you go to the very end, 12 there is the word in at the end of the line there. I'm going 13 to start there. And it says: In March of 1997, the FBI and 14 the Justice Department jointly issued Special Administrative 15 Measures forbidding the Sheikh from speaking to anyone except 16 his approved lawyers for one hour once a week. 17 Then I'm going to skip a few words, going to the 18 middle of that line: And his first wife for 15 minutes per 19 month, the subject matter of such conversations also being 20 restricted to legal and family matters respectively. He is not 21 even allowed to ask about the weather in Egypt. 22 Let me read the next sentence for you: As a convicted 23 criminal placed directly under the Special Administrative 24 Measures issued by the U.S. general attorney herself. 25 Okay, now I'm skipping the rest of that paragraph, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11144 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 going down to the next paragraph and first sentence. We will 2 start with the first sentence there: To counter the attempt on 3 the part of the American government to silence him, the Sheikh 4 and his lawyers worked out a plan. 5 We can skip the next few words to the start of the 6 next sentence on that line: The plan was to publicize his 7 unfair treatment here and abroad. 8 Okay. Skipping down some to the next paragraph 9 beginning with the word "soon": Soon after his lawyers began 10 publicizing Sheikh Omar's condition and views, the U.S. 11 government requested that all four of his lawyers and the only 12 authorized interpreter sign an agreement not to disclose any 13 part of their conversation with the Sheikh to the media. 14 And phone calls had to be made from their office which 15 meant that the interpreter had to travel. In February of 1999 16 the U.S. lawyers found a way to circumvent some of the 17 restrictions. 18 I'm going to skip down now to the last sentence in the 19 next paragraph there, and it says: Basically news of the 20 Sheikh was disseminated by the widely-read Al-Hayat newspaper, 21 Al-Quds, Al-Arabi and Egypt's major opposition newspapers, such 22 as Al-Arabi, Al-Nasseri and Al-Sha'b. 23 Let's go back and look at it. What have I just read 24 to you? Well, some interesting stuff. Some interesting stuff, 25 meaning particularly that he is writing that the attorneys and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11145 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 the only interpreter -- that's him -- were required to sign an 2 agreement not to disclose any part of their conversation with 3 the Sheikh to the media. 4 Well, that tells you a few things, just that line 5 alone. It tells you that in his dissertation -- first of all, 6 Mr. Yousry is lying in his dissertation, because you know full 7 well he was never required to sign an affirmation or an 8 agreement of any kind. Okay? 9 So, to begin with, he is not even telling the truth 10 about something he has absolute personal knowledge of, and 11 that's a requirement that he sign some agreement. He has never 12 signed an agreement. In fact, that was elicited in his own 13 testimony. He didn't have to sign an agreement. But, I guess 14 to make himself appear more important to the people reviewing 15 his dissertation, perhaps he added that. 16 Well, here is one piece of evidence of dishonesty on 17 the part of Mr. Yousry, something he knows full well: He 18 didn't sign any agreements. 19 But more significantly, he is writing in his 20 dissertation that he knows there is a requirement in the SAMs 21 that prevent the attorneys -- and actually him, too -- him, 22 too -- from issuing statements by Abdel Rahman. They had to 23 sign agreements saying they wouldn't do that. 24 Now, you know that first happened in May of 1998. 25 That's when the provision went into effect, the May 11th, 1998, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11146 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 SAMs. Yousry knows it, too. 2 When did Yousry know it? Well, he knew it in '98. So 3 you can draw that conclusion because he had the SAMs. We 4 talked about the part in his notebooks where he obviously read 5 the SAMs and referred to the SAMs when talking to Abdel Rahman, 6 but he clearly knows it because it is in his dissertation, 7 okay? 8 But there is more evidence as to when he knew it. 9 More significantly, the evidence is crystal clear that he knew 10 it at the very least before the May 2000 visit and before the 11 press releases that he and Stewart and Sattar issueed in June 12 of 2000. 13 How do you know that? Very simply. When we 14 cross-examined Mr. Yousry on a number of occasions during cross 15 examination, my colleague asked him about this particular 16 segment, section of his dissertation. When I say this section, 17 I'm talking about the whole exhibit, which is 550-LT4. 18 A number of times he was asked when was the last time 19 he modified that portion of his dissertation? A number of 20 times. And his answer was, late '99, early January, February 21 2000. And the only time he modified, changed anything in that 22 part of his dissertation, it had to do with Abdel Rahman's 23 early life as a youth in Egypt. 24 After late '99 or January/February of 2000, the only 25 time he made changes to this part of his dissertation involved SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11147 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 changes involving Abdel Rahman's life as a youth in Egypt. 2 Well, the section I just read to you involves Abdel 3 Rahman's life in America; not as a youth, but as a convicted 4 terrorist in prison. 5 So what Mr. Yousry told you was by this dissertation, 6 quite clearly, is that he knew well in advance -- well in 7 advance -- of the May 2000 visit, and probably as far back as 8 '98, that the lawyers could not issue statements to the press, 9 to the media containing Abdel Rahman's statements, views, 10 opinions, words. He knew it. 11 There is more evidence, as we go through the evidence 12 and talk about the different topics I have told you about, 13 which will clearly demonstrate that Yousry knew full well that 14 Abdel Rahman's statements, words and messages could not be 15 transmitted by the lawyers or anyone else to the media. 16 Another mention of Mr. Yousry and his dishonesty. He 17 told you in his testimony that the first time he saw the SAMs 18 was late 2000 or 2001. Well, just from what I have argued to 19 you and talked to you about already, you know full well he knew 20 about the SAMs well in advance and had seen the SAMs well in 21 advance of 2001. But his counsel actually restricted the 22 question to when was the first time that you saw the SAMs -- 23 saw the SAMs. 24 Well, you know he saw the SAMs before then because in 25 Government Exhibit 1063X, it is a conversation between Sattar SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11148 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and Yousry on March 18, 2000. Mr. Sattar calls up Mr. Yousry 2 and says some person they know named Kaukab would like a copy 3 of the SAMs. And Mr. Yousry, in responding to Mr. Sattar says, 4 oh, I've got a copy here somewhere. Let me go look for it. 5 I'll find it and I will send it to Kaukab or you. But I will 6 find it because I have a copy here. 7 Again, that's March of 2000. He obviously saw a copy 8 of the SAMs before late 2000-2001 because in March of 2000 he 9 is telling Sattar on the phone he's got a copy of the SAMs in 10 his home. Then he says, if I can't find it, I will call up one 11 of the attorneys and get a copy of it. But, he said quite 12 clearly he had a copy. He thinks he has a copy in his home and 13 he will send it to him. 14 So, Mr. Yousry was not honest with you when he told 15 you he had first seen a version of the SAMs in late 2000, early 16 2001. 17 Let me make one thing perfectly clear, because I'm 18 just about through talking about Mr. Yousry's knowledge of the 19 SAMs for now. There will be more of it as we go through the 20 evidence. 21 At the end of the case when Judge Koeltl instructs you 22 on the law, he is going to instruct you on the first count. 23 The first count is a conspiracy to defraud the United States, 24 okay? And the SAMs and these restrictions have much to do with 25 that count. That count is not a conspiracy to violate the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11149 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 SAMs, firsts of all, okay? 2 And there is nothing in the Judge's instructions that 3 he will give you that says in order for Mohammed Yousry to be 4 guilty of that count, that he must have read or possessed the 5 SAMs; there is nothing like that in there, or to sign an 6 affirmation, for that matter. Nothing like that in there. He 7 doesn't have to. 8 To be a part of that conspiracy, he doesn't have to 9 have had a knowledge of all the details or the full scope of 10 what that conspiracy was about, including having detailed 11 knowledge or having read the SAMs. He doesn't have to have had 12 all complete knowledge, full knowledge to have knowingly joined 13 that conspiracy. If he is aware at the very least of some 14 basic aims or goals of that conspiracy, which was to defraud 15 the United States by passing messages back and forth, that is 16 sufficient. 17 But to the extent that the other side has suggested or 18 will argue to you it's a big deal, he wasn't required to sign 19 the affirmation, or it's a big deal because the government 20 hasn't proven he read every word of the SAMs. Nonsense. He 21 was aware of the SAMs, he knows of them. He knew the 22 restrictions, what they consisted of, and he was aware of the 23 fact that what he was doing was wrong because of those 24 restrictions. 25 Now, let me talk a little bit about Mr. Sattar and his SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11150 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 knowledge of the SAMs. 2 Well, Mr. Sattar told you much of his knowledge of the 3 SAMs, a lot about it, because he testified about it and what he 4 knew about it. But also he talked a lot about the SAMs, and we 5 will go through those calls in a minute. 6 What he testified about was he knew the SAMs. When 7 the SAMs were first imposed, he knew that only five people were 8 able to visit Abdel Rahman. He knew that they were renewed, 9 the SAMs were renewed every 120 days. 10 He also possessed copies of the SAMs. Government 11 Exhibit 2035X actually is the regulation that authorizes the 12 imposition of the SAMs. He obviously had a copy of the 13 regulation, just like Mr. Yousry as well. 14 He also had in his possession Government Exhibit 2037. 15 And what that is is the May 11th, 1998 SAMs and a signed copy 16 of the attorney affirmation that was signed by Stewart that 17 pertained to those SAMs. It was signed on May 7th, '98. 18 Both the SAMs and the affirmation were faxed to 19 Mr. Sattar by Ms. Stewart. There is a fax line on that exhibit 20 indicating that it came from Ms. Stewart's office to Mr. Sattar 21 on May 7th of 1998. 22 Interesting, if you look at that exhibit in 23 particular -- and it is on this kind of old kind of fax, kind 24 of paper you used to use when you fax; kind of very loose, soft 25 paper. But if you look at it right on -- next to on the first SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11151 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 page of the SAMs itself, the page that says Special 2 Administrative Measures and has the date May 11, 1998, next to 3 paragraph 3A, which is on that same page, the first page of the 4 SAMs, somebody wrote brackets, like a bracket that you would 5 have on a document, a bracket, handwritten on the document on 6 the paragraph alongside -- I should say, paragraph 3A. I read 7 paragraph 3A to you a few minutes ago. Let me do it again 8 quickly. 9 It says: The inmate is prohibited from passing or 10 receiving any written or recorded communications to or from 11 other inmates, visitors, attorneys, BOP staff or anyone else 12 except as outlined and allowed by this document. 13 It is in his possession, found in his home. 14 He also had in his home Government Exhibit 2063, which 15 is the SAMs that were in effect in December of 1999. And as I 16 told you, those SAMs never changed. In other words, the 17 language never changed from December 1999 on. Those were 18 the -- it is the same language that was in effect in May of 19 2000 during that prison visit when they issued the press 20 releases. 21 Well, Mr. Sattar also spoke about the SAMs as well. 22 He spoke to them on many, many intercepted conversations. When 23 we cross-examined him last week -- or is it the week before? 24 I'm losing track of time -- he was confronted with those 25 conversations. Let me just give you several examples of things SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11152 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 he said about the SAMs in conversations with other people which 2 were intercepted on his phone. 3 Government Exhibit 1002X, December 12, 1998, 4 conversation between Sattar and Muntasir Al-Zayat, the lawyer 5 from Egypt, Sattar told Al-Zayat that Abdel Rahman is not 6 allowed visits other than from his attorneys and a translator. 7 That's from the SAMs. And that Sattar is not allowed to call 8 Abdel Rahman. That's the SAMs 9 Government Exhibit 1003X, conversation two days later 10 between Sattar and Mustafa Hamza about the SAMs restrictions 11 that were imposed. He tells Hamza -- Sattar tells Hamza who 12 can visit Abdel Rahman; the fact that Abdel Rahman gets one 13 call per month for 15 minutes with his wife. He makes 14 reference to the actual federal regulation in the conversation 15 and he says -- this is now in December of 1998 -- Abdel Rahman 16 can have no contact with the media. Can't send messages to the 17 media. Sattar knows that in December 1998 18 A few more examples. Government Exhibit 1005X, a 19 conversation on January 26, 1999 between Sattar, again with 20 Hamza. Sattar explains that Abdel Rahman is under this, a law 21 that is applicable only to a few prisoners -- that's the 22 SAMs -- it restricts his communication with others and with 23 him -- meaning Sattar. 24 And then he tells Hamza that if something Abdel Rahman 25 says gets published, it could be a problem, quote, A person SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11153 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 should be very careful in, because there is -- and there is 2 some ah, ah, ahs -- and there is a very small window which is 3 still open. I don't want to close it. To reopen -- to reopen 4 it, I will go through, through legal issues which might take 5 years. Then he says, quote, that is why Ramsey Clark carefully 6 selects his words. 7 What is he saying? He is saying Abdel Rahman's words 8 and messages and statements and messages can't be published in 9 the media. There is a requirement, there is a provision in the 10 SAMs that prohibits that. It's the last paragraph that appears 11 in the SAMs, starting in May of 1998 and continues on through 12 the years. It's the last paragraph that says, no communication 13 with the media through any source, including attorneys. 14 Let me give you another example, Government Exhibit 15 1016X, an April 1999 conversation between Sattar and Yassir 16 Al-Sirri. 17 He says that -- Sattar tells Al-Sirri that a reporter 18 can't meet with Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman because he is under 19 what is called "Special Administrative Measures." He actually 20 knows the title, meaning certain measures pertaining to him. 21 He cannot meet or talk to anybody. He is isolated from the 22 media. 23 Another example, Government Exhibit 1044X, a November 24 1999 conversation between Sattar and a lawyer named 25 Hasaballah. Sattar tells him that Abdel Rahman has been under SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11154 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 these restrictions since March of '97, just one month earlier, 2 that only the attorneys and people like me can see him. 3 People like whom? Like Sattar, of course not. 4 Mr. Sattar is not honest with Mr. Hasaballah. Mr. Sattar 5 cannot see him, but he is telling Hasaballah there is 6 restrictions. He says again that Abdel Rahman only gets a call 7 for about 15 minutes per month with a family member and that 8 the restrictions come directly from the Department of Justice. 9 He seems to know a lot about the SAMs 10 Two more examples for you Government Exhibit 1071X, an 11 April 2000 conversation again with Sattar and Al-Sirri, where 12 Sattar makes specific reference to the fact that the SAMs 13 restrictions placed on Abdel Rahman -- he says, quote, they 14 imposed eight pages restrictions on him. They made a special 15 law for him. 16 By the way, the eight pages version of the SAMs is 17 that final version from December of '99 going forward, eight 18 pages. As I said, the words, letters and sentences are all the 19 same. 20 Finally, Government Exhibit 1119X, a June 2000 21 conversation with Sattar and Taha. Sattar says to Taha, the 22 lawyers have to sign papers saying they are not allowed to say 23 anything or pass anything -- meaning messages -- to and from 24 Abdel Rahman. Quote, that is why I told you that this woman 25 risked her whole career. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11155 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 What is he referring to? He is referring to the press 2 release that Stewart, he and Yousry issued, and the fact that 3 she is the one who is announcing it and whose name appears in 4 the press; and that she issued that press release declaring 5 that Abdel Rahman was no longer supporting the cease-fire; and 6 that doing that, clearly, at the very, very least, violated the 7 SAMs. And for that reason she has risked her whole career, 8 because he knows the SAMs prohibit it. 9 In fact, Mr. Sattar testified he knew, he says, as 10 early at '97, '98, that the lawyers couldn't pass Abdel 11 Rahman's messages to the media 12 Let me quickly repeat what I just said about 13 Mr. Yousry and his knowing, reading or possessing of the SAMs. 14 It is quite clear, just from the examples I have given you and 15 what you will learn as we go through the visits, the prison 16 visits I told you about, that both Sattar and Yousry knew full 17 well the various provisions of the SAMs. At the very least 18 they knew they couldn't pass messages to him. They couldn't 19 receive messages from him. And Abdel Rahman's words, messages, 20 statements could not be made or distributed to the media. They 21 all knew that. 22 Whether or not in fact Sattar read the SAMs, read 23 every word of the SAMs is not significant. It doesn't matter. 24 When you review and listen carefully to the judge's 25 instructions on Count One, the conspiracy to defraud, it is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11156 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 quite clear -- quite clear -- that he knew the aims and the 2 objectives of that conspiracy in the most general terms at 3 least. He doesn't need to know all the details of those SAMs 4 to be a knowing participant in that conspiracy. 5 And let me just say with respect to both Mr. Sattar 6 and Mr. Yousry, to the extent they, by chance, by very, very 7 small chance they didn't read the SAMs they had in their homes, 8 and, goodness, why would they have them but for to read them; 9 but if they hadn't read them, they consciously chose not to 10 read them knowing full well what those restrictions were, they 11 consciously avoided reading them and knowing the details of 12 each provision of the SAMs, it does not matter. They knew, 13 they participated, the evidence is clear. 14 And I think it is time for a break. And when we come 15 back, we will talk a little bit about the cease-fire and the 16 Luxor massacre. 17 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we will 18 take a 15-minute break. 19 Please, please remember my continuing instructions. 20 Simply because we have moved to another part of the trial, that 21 does not change my instructions at all. It is very important 22 that you continue to follow these instructions throughout the 23 summations, and indeed, throughout the charge until there comes 24 a point when I send the jurors to deliberate. 25 Please, it is very important, do not talk about this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11157 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 case at all. Do not talk about it at all. 2 Always remember to keep an open mind. As I explained 3 at the end of the last time that we were together, the 4 reason -- the reason for that, and the reason I emphasize it at 5 this point is the evidence has been concluded. We are now in 6 the process of summations, which will go on for some time, and 7 then I will instruct you on the law. 8 It is only after I have instructed you on the law, 9 when I have explained to you the various elements of the 10 various offenses that are charged in the case, that you will 11 have the entire case before you. And so it is very important 12 for you not to say anything about the case, not to do anything 13 to interfere with your ability, after I have fully instructed 14 you on the law, to begin to talk about the case at that point. 15 That's why I say, please, don't talk about this case 16 at all, and continue to keep an open mind until there comes a 17 point when I have finally instructed you on the law and sent 18 you to the jury room to begin your deliberations. 19 So, don't talk about the case, continue to keep an 20 open mind. Have a good break and I will see you shortly. 21 (Jury not present) 22 (Recess) 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11158 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 (At side bar) 2 MR. RUHNKE: There is nobody here for Mr. Sattar at 3 the moment. 4 THE COURT: We'll wait. 5 (Pause) 6 THE COURT: There was someone in the crowd who was 7 making a picture, a sketch of the courtroom and it's, you 8 really can't make out the faces of the jurors or of the -- but 9 the marshal confiscated the drawing and is going to keep it and 10 has instructed the person that they ought not to be making 11 sketches like that. 12 You are welcome to see it. I will return it to the 13 marshal. 14 Thank you, all. 15 (Continued next page) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11159 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 (In open court; jury present) 2 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, excuse 3 me. I brought you in while we were still coming in to the 4 courtroom, and that's my responsibility, so I regret any 5 movement that is still going on while you were coming in. 6 Again, that's -- it's my responsibility. 7 All right. Mr. Dember, you may proceed. 8 MR. DEMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 9 When we broke I told you we were going to turn to now 10 some discussion about the ceasefire. One can't talk about the 11 ceasefire without talking about the Luxor massacre in November 12 of 1997. 13 As you've learned during the course of the case, in 14 1997, after years of terrorism in Egypt, murders of tourists 15 and government officials in Egypt, members, some members of the 16 Islamic Group called for a ceasefire -- unilateral ceasefire 17 with the Egyptian government intending to halt the use of the 18 violence and the killing of innocents to achieve the Islamic 19 Group's goals. Not everyone agreed with that. And as you 20 know, what preceded that ceasefire was essentially a reign of 21 terror in Egypt carried out by the Islamic Group, killing of 22 innocents, killing of tourists, killing of government 23 officials. Nothing short of cold-blooded murder. Nothing 24 depicts, represents that more than what happened in Luxor in 25 November of 1997. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11160 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And during the course of the trial, in the early weeks 2 of the trial, we brought here for you a witness, person who was 3 actually present at that scene who saw, witnessed the massacre 4 itself, the murders that took place. That was Ekkehardt 5 Hassels-Weiler. And he told you about what happened that day, 6 what he saw, what he heard during that horrible morning on 7 November 17th of 1997. 8 He told you that he arrived at the ancient temples, 9 which are the famous tourist sites in Luxor, early that 10 morning, and that when he was approaching one of the temples he 11 heard gunfire. He turned and when he turned he saw seven to 12 ten armed men, armed with pistols and automatic weapons. He 13 saw them start to fire, fire their weapons at two guards, two 14 soldier-type individuals, guards, who were there to protect the 15 tourists visiting the site. 16 He saw those armed men gun down those two guards and 17 to continue to fire their weapons. Mr. Hassels-Weiler told you 18 that after that, seeing that, he made his way into one of the 19 temples itself and hid. And during that time he heard gunfire. 20 He heard shouting. He heard screaming. At one point in time 21 he saw an Asian woman, an Asian tourist woman and saw her shot 22 in the head, fall to the ground as he looked into the plaza. 23 He saw the gunmen chasing after other tourists. He saw havoc, 24 chaos, murder as it happened. 25 As I mentioned, he continued to hear gunfire, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11161 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 screaming and wailing of the victims for a period of almost 40 2 minutes. And after that stopped, and after he and other 3 tourists determined or believed it was safe to come out from 4 their hiding places, he emerged. And what he saw, the horrific 5 sight that he saw was Luxor, the Luxor massacre. He told you 6 he saw approximately 50 people dead, with gunshot wounds and 7 knife wounds. He saw a tourist bus ablaze, put on fire. And 8 he did what other tourists did. He did his best to get to 9 safety to get out of that location. He saw what the Islamic 10 Group had done that morning -- unadulterated, cold-blooded 11 murder of innocent people. 12 That was the hallmark of what the Islamic Group was 13 all about and how they intended to achieve their goals, killing 14 innocent people who had nothing to do with the Egyptian 15 government or the people in the Egyptian government they 16 disagreed with. 17 As you know and as each of these defendants learned 18 and knew before they did what they did in this case, they 19 learned that those responsible in the Islamic Group for that 20 massacre claimed responsibility for the massacre and they 21 learned, these defendants knew and learned that they committed 22 this massacre in an attempt to somehow win the release of Abdel 23 Rahman. And at the site itself they left pamphlets announcing 24 that they were doing, committing this horrific act in the name 25 of Abdel Rahman to force his release. Obviously they did not SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11162 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 achieve their goal. All they achieved was bloody murder. 2 And you learned during the course of this trial that a 3 person who had involvement in that Luxor massacre, perhaps 4 involved most likely involved in the planning of the massacre, 5 in its being carried out, was Atia; a name, a person we will 6 talk about quite extensively sometime either later today or 7 tomorrow. 8 Now, after Luxor there were other members, and those 9 who favored the ceasefire cried out again for others in the 10 group to join them and abide by a ceasefire. And some, in 11 fact, did. We're going to put up for you Exhibit 800. 12 Government Exhibit 800, if you recall, is a map of part of the 13 world with the names of many of the players in this case, names 14 you've known and come to know and learn about. 15 You learned after Luxor certainly, after Luxor at the 16 very least, certain members of the Islamic Group's leadership 17 certainly favored the ceasefire, including the Islamic Group 18 leaders who the -- the ones who were in prison, they were the 19 ones who first called for it. They continued to want it to be 20 enforced. 21 And you learned about Mustafa Hamza, one of its 22 leaders. And that he, he who was also known by the names 23 Eunice and Abu-Hazim, I'll always refer to him as Hamza just to 24 be consistent. You learned that he was an IG leader, living 25 outside Egypt in Afghanistan, and he was from almost the very SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11163 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 beginning of the recordings that were intercepted that we 2 played for you, a person who favored strongly the ceasefire -- 3 favored the ceasefire, wanted to remain in effect. 4 You learned about Salah Hashim, commonly referred to 5 as the engineer, or Abu Nadhara. He was also an Islamic Group 6 leader. He happened to be able to live and was living in 7 Egypt. You learned about Mustafa Al-Zayat, another name that 8 came up and has been mentioned quite prominently whose calls 9 and conversations with Sattar were intercepted. And you heard 10 he is the lawyer in Cairo, he was a person who represented many 11 in the Islamic Group and was looked at as their representative, 12 their legal representative. 13 And at some point in time you learned that, yes, even 14 Abdel Rahman supported the ceasefire for a period of time. And 15 as you well, know, that came to change at some point in time. 16 But as Mr. Sattar himself testified, there was a 17 conflict within the Islamic Group. And each side, the side 18 that favored the ceasefire and the side that favored doing away 19 with the ceasefire and resuming the violence and the killing 20 sort of struggled over Abdel Rahman. Each side wanted him with 21 them, because of his influence, because of his prestige, 22 because of his power, each side wanted Abdel Rahman with them. 23 And then there was Rifa'i Taha. Taha. Taha never 24 supported the ceasefire. As you well know now, he is and was 25 the most militant member of the Islamic Group and, starting as SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11164 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 early as 1999, did everything and whatever he could to end that 2 ceasefire, most prominently in his efforts was to win the 3 support of Abdel Rahman. And so Abdel Rahman, he sought his 4 alliance and allegiance and support. 5 Who is Taha? We learned a lot about this fellow. I 6 told you he was very important in this case. He is, without 7 question, a terrorist. He is a murderer. He is a lot of 8 things. The worst kind of terrorist a, a person who revels in 9 the killing and the soliciting of killings of others. And what 10 did you learn about him? Well, you learned about him from his 11 own statements in a recorded conversation with Sattar, 12 Government Exhibit 1161X, which was a conversation in July of 13 2000, that he certainly considered the president of Egypt an 14 infidel. He considered the government to be illegitimate and 15 quote, the government and Mubarak must be removed and will be 16 removed by armed force. He believed in the use of violence to 17 achieve his goals. 18 You know, going back a few years, that in 1998, 19 February of 1998, he joined such prestigious company as Osama 20 bin Laden in a fatwah that Bin Laden issued calling for the 21 killing of Americans and their allies, civilians and military, 22 wherever they could be found. He kept nice company, didn't he? 23 You learned that he, again, in 2000, September 2000, joined 24 Bin Laden again and Ayman Al-Zawahiri in a fatwah with Mohammed 25 Abdel Rahman, Abdel Rahman's son, calling for the release of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11165 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Abdel Rahman. That's the recording that we played for you that 2 was from Al-Jazeera, the TV network that played the tape. 3 That's the tape in which Abdel Rahman's son is heard at the end 4 screaming that they should avenge the Sheikh, let's go to the 5 grounds of jihad and spill blood. Let us spill blood. 6 Obviously they wanted blood to be spilled in order to release 7 Abdel Rahman. 8 Taha kept company with those people. 9 And you know about Taha's book. What can one say 10 about Taha's book? One can say a great deal about his book. 11 It is a book that simply is a justification for killing 12 innocent people. He describes in his book justifications for 13 killing essentially all nonMuslims, particularly Jews and 14 Christians. It's a total explanation or attempt at justifying 15 killing, killing innocent people. Killing people he didn't 16 agree with. 17 Among the people he targeted at the top of his list 18 were Americans and Jews. This is what he said about them. 19 Quote, Kill them anywhere on the face of the earth and in any 20 possible way. Page ten of the translation, if you care to look 21 at it. It's Government Exhibit 2700 and 2700T. 22 He is the one that Sattar wisely chose because he knew 23 what Taha was all about, to write the fatwah to kill Jews. He 24 is the one who tried to use the terrorist murder of 17 United 25 States sailors on the USS Cole as a way of extorting the United SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11166 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 States to free Abdel Rahman. And, as you well know from the 2 bulk and volume of evidence in this case, he is the one who 3 made and took efforts and accomplished his effort of getting 4 Abdel Rahman to withdraw his support for the ceasefire and 5 joined Taha and Sattar in a call in a return to the violence 6 and killing in Egypt. 7 Well, you know all about Taha. And just as important, 8 you all know -- you know all about what Sattar knew about Taha. 9 He knew about the fatwah in 1998 that Taha joined with 10 Bin Laden calling for the murder of Americans and their allies 11 everywhere. He knew that Taha was a high-ranking member of 12 this terrorist organization, the Islamic Group, a group that 13 committed the Luxor massacre; a group that committed the murder 14 of 18 Greek tourists in front of their hotel in Cairo, Egypt, 15 in 1996. He knew that Taha led the bloodiest period of the 16 Islamic Group and led that group during its bloodiest period 17 from 1990 to 1997. You know that he knew, Sattar knew that 18 Taha was considered the United States' enemy. Sattar knew that 19 Taha was on a designated list of the government, the US 20 government list of designated terrorists in the world. And 21 Sattar knew all about his book, his justification for killing, 22 killing at Luxor, killing Americans, killing Jews, killing 23 Christians, killing children, killing women. He knew all about 24 that book. He had read it. And he had others read it on to 25 audio tapes so that it could be sent to Abdel Rahman. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11167 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And no surprise, as I mentioned before, that when the 2 American government, the FBI or the Bureau of Prisons officials 3 were given these tapes and they were translated and they read 4 the translations of Taha's book, that they didn't let Abdel 5 Rahman have it. It essentially is a solicitation to murder, a 6 solicitation to violence, a solicitation to terrorism. That's 7 what the book is. 8 And Sattar knew full well, that Taha's goal, his 9 objective was to violently overthrow the Egyptian government. 10 You know full well, Taha was and is a horror, a fanatical 11 terrorist. He was and is a terrorism nightmare for the 12 civilized world. Why on earth would Ahmed Sattar talk to this 13 person, align himself with this person, deal with this person, 14 take his calls? My goodness, Ahmed Sattar should have been 15 running as fast as he could away from Taha. He should have 16 distanced himself by 1,000 miles from Taha. He should have 17 never spoken to him, knowing all that he knew about Taha. 18 But what does he do? He embraces him. He joins him. 19 He aligns himself with him. He befriends him. He becomes his 20 coconspirator. What other explanation is there for why that 21 man would talk to, do the bidding for and work with Taha, 22 knowing all he knew about him? There is one explanation, and 23 only one explanation, and that is this: He agreed with him. 24 He agreed with his vision, Taha's vision of Egypt and a 25 necessity to overthrow its government by violent means. He SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11168 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 agreed with Taha that the only way to free Abdel Rahman from 2 his prison cell in the United States in Minnesota was to 3 overthrow the Egyptian government. And that only could and 4 would be done by the use of violence. And that's why he joined 5 him. There is no other explanation. 6 When he said to you in his testimony, I am just trying 7 to help other Muslims, other Egyptians, you knew that was 8 nonsense. There are plenty of innocent, nonterrorist, 9 nonmurderrous Muslims to be helped if he was so interested in 10 giving Taha his charity. 11 There's only one reason to deal with Taha, to talk to 12 Taha, to do his bidding. There's one explanation. Your common 13 sense tells you what it is, your good judgment tells you what 14 it is: It's because he agreed with him. Because Taha is and 15 was a horror and the record is filled with evidence of it. 16 There is a time, a conversation, let me tell you about 17 it, Government Exhibit 1002X, December 12, 1998, it's one of 18 the first conversations we presented to you, it's between 19 Sattar and Taha. And Sattar tells Taha at that early stage 20 there's no chance for Abdel Rahman's release so long as the 21 political situation in Egypt is tranquil. Egypt has refused to 22 take Abdel Rahman, he said, in a transfer. That's all that 23 Taha needed to hear or know. Not that he needed more 24 justification for resuming the violence and killing in Egypt he 25 was for to begin with. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11169 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 As I said before, both Sattar and Taha looked to Abdel 2 Rahman as the final arbiter, the ultimate arbiter of any 3 dispute within the Islamic Group. And as you know, there was a 4 dispute. There was proceasefire and anticeasefire. There was 5 the dispute. And who was going to resolve it? Who was going 6 to, in their view, settle it? There's only one man: Abdel 7 Rahman. And Sattar and Taha's view was, it's time to end the 8 ceasefire. 9 As I said in a conversation, a conversation we played 10 for you, Government Exhibit 1021X, conversation on August 9th 11 of 1999, Sattar is talking to a person who can't be identified, 12 another person. But they're talking about Taha. And what does 13 Sattar say to this individual when referring to Taha? He calls 14 him, quote, my friend, the leader of the Islamic Group. My 15 friend. He moves in rather strange company, Mr. Sattar. 16 That's what he considers a friend. An enemy of America, a 17 terrorist. 18 It's time to move ahead and start talking about the 19 prison visits. The prison visits, as you have come to learn, 20 were an opportunity to pass messages from Taha through Sattar 21 to Abdel Rahman and to transfer Abdel Rahman's responses back 22 to Taha. The prison visits I referred to, March 1999, 23 September 1999, February 2000, and of course the May 2000 one, 24 the evidence about those visits relates to, ladies and 25 gentlemen, to a number of the charges in this case. Let me SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11170 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 talk about them for a moment. 2 What these defendants did in passing messages back and 3 forth violating restrictions, pertains, frankly, to Count 1, 4 which is the conspiracy to defraud the United States by passing 5 these messages, which were clearly prohibited by the SAMs. 6 These defendants participated -- with Abdel Rahman, I might 7 add -- in that conspiracy. The evidence that you're going to 8 hear and I'm going to discuss with you about these visits also 9 relates to the Counts 2 and 3 of this indictment, the 10 conspiracy to kill and kidnap persons outside the United 11 States, and which Sattar was charged with and also Count 3 12 which Sattar was also only charged with, and that is the 13 solicitation of crimes of violence. The goal, the purpose for 14 passing these messages back and forth was initially to get 15 Abdel Rahman to side with them, to work with Sattar and Taha in 16 their conspiracy to kill and in their solicitation of crimes of 17 violence. And as you'll see, that's what happened. That's 18 what happened. And this evidence about these visits relates to 19 that. 20 And thirdly, the evidence that we'll discuss, start 21 discussing in a moment about these visits relates to Counts 4 22 and 5, Stewart and Yousry are charged with, providing material 23 support to a terrorism crime; meaning conspiracy to murder that 24 Taha and Sattar entered. And Yousry and Stewart, you will see 25 from the evidence, participated by providing material support SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11171 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and conspiring to provide material support by providing, as 2 only they could, Abdel Rahman to Taha and Sattar so they could 3 accomplish their objective and their conspiracy to kill and 4 kidnap persons outside the United States. 5 Let's talk about the March 1999 prison visit first. 6 It occurred on March 1st and 2nd of 1999. There was 7 no recording of that visit. We didn't play any -- we didn't 8 read any transcripts to you, there was no video to play of the 9 visit. It was a visit that was attended by Stewart and Yousry 10 of Abdel Rahman at Rochester in which they brought messages 11 from Taha and others to Abdel Rahman in violation of the SAMs. 12 And as with every visit, as Yousry and Stewart told you, before 13 the visit occurred, they would get from Sattar a letter from 14 Sattar and other documents and other messages and letters, and 15 before the visit itself Yousry would translate, verbatim, those 16 letters and documents to Stewart before they started the visit. 17 What's the significance of this particular visit? 18 Well, there are two major things that happened: There was a 19 message passed to Abdel Rahman seeking his view about whether a 20 political party should be established, an Islamic political 21 party. That was one of the messages. 22 And secondly, the other message was Taha's message, a 23 message which would be repeated over time in other visits, 24 which was he wanted Abdel Rahman to support him, to side with 25 him in ending the ceasefire and resuming the killing and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11172 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 violence in Egypt. 2 What happens? Well, how do you know what happens? 3 Before it happens, let me just remind you, ladies and 4 gentlemen, that at the time of the visit, which was in 1999, 5 the SAMs in effect certainly were the SAMs, the May 11, 1998, 6 SAMs. By that time clearly there was no -- it was not 7 permissible to communicate with the media anymore and pass 8 these messages or statements, Abdel Rahman's messages or 9 statements to the media. And I'm not going to read it again, 10 but in the SAMs, right on that first page, I've read it before 11 you twice now, paragraph 3A clearly indicates, communications 12 back and forth, from Abdel Rahman with others, whoever they may 13 be, are controlled by the conditions and provisions, I should 14 say, of the SAMs themselves. That's in effect. 15 And Stewart signed an attorney affirmation, which is 16 the first page of the exhibit. She signed it on May 7, 1998, 17 and among other things she promised, because of course she 18 promised in each of these affirmations, that she would abide by 19 the SAMs. And let me just read paragraph 3 for you. It says: 20 I further understand that neither I nor any member of my office 21 shall forward any mail received from inmate Abdel Rahman to a 22 third person. Nor shall I use my meetings, correspondence or 23 phone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between third 24 parties, including but not limited to, the media and Abdel 25 Rahman. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11173 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 As you will learn and as you remember, she violated 2 that provision of this during this particular visit. 3 Now, if we don't have a recording of the visit, audio 4 or video, if we don't have any live witness present at the 5 visit to tell you what happened, how do you know what happened? 6 Good question. Well, the answer is also pretty simple: You 7 look to the calls, the intercepted calls on Sattar's phone that 8 took place before the visit and after the visit and that will 9 tell you what happened during the visit. 10 Now, the only call of real relevance before the visit 11 is a call on January 26, 1999. It's Exhibit 1005X. And it's a 12 conversation between Sattar and Hamza. And during that 13 conversation Sattar says to Hamza that he's got a letter from 14 two fellows named Gamal Sultan and Kamal Habib regarding the 15 forming of a political party in Egypt. And they want -- what 16 they want is a fatwah, these two gentlemen want a fatwah from 17 Abdel Rahman on whether the Islamic Group should form a 18 political party. OK, interesting. They wanted a fatwah. They 19 want Abdel Rahman to respond to this letter. 20 And Hamza tells Sattar he would like to know Abdel 21 Rahman's view on this subject as well and to consult him when 22 he gets the answer. And just to remind you, that call is about 23 four or five weeks before the actual visit on March 1st and 24 2nd, 1999. 25 Now, you know the visit took place and we told you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11174 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 before, a few minutes ago, the two messages that's written, I 2 just told you about the two letters from Mr. Habib and 3 Mr Sultan seeking a fatwah about political parties but you 4 learn from the calls that follow the visit that Taha's message 5 was also communicated to Abdel Rahman during the visit by 6 Yousry and Stewart. 7 Now, how do you know that? Now, if you look at 8 Government Exhibit 1007X, it's a March 9, 1999 call, one week 9 after the visit took place. It's a conversation between Sattar 10 and Hamza and what happens is Sattar tells Hamza essentially 11 what happened, tells him what happened during the meeting, the 12 visit. 13 The first thing h